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The original objective was to analyse
synergies and tensions between land
tenure reform and the Wild Coast Spatial
Development Initiative (SDI), as well as
the impact of these two programmes on the
environment of the Wild Coast area. How-
ever, due to the delays in the implementa-
tion of these two programmes, this was
modified. The objective became to:
· explore the government’s attempt to
resolve land claims in the areas targeted
for development
· analyse the process of SDI ‘implemen-
tation’ and land reform (for example,
conflict resolution, consultation, inter-
departmental co-ordination and so on)
· explore struggles around defining a
‘community’ of beneficiaries for the
SDI and land reform in project areas
· analyse different views on how the Wild
Coast environment can contribute to
development
· explore the potential impact of the land
reform programme and the Wild Coast
SDI on rural livelihoods.
Research approach
This study was carried out over three-year
period – from December 1997 to Decem-
ber 2000 – using a combination of both
primary and secondary data collection and
analysis in three case study sites: Magwa,
Port St Johns and Mkambati, in the Eastern
Cape Wild Coast region. Initially, a sub-
stantial review of available documentation
on the Wild Coast and former Transkei
area was conducted, examining work on
issues such as past and present rural
livelihoods; state involvement in rural
economic development; and environmental
policies and politics spanning most of the
twentieth century. Research studies con-
ducted during the 1990s in different parts
of the Wild Coast were particularly valu-
able. An analysis of social and ecological
dynamics of rural livelihoods in the
Mkambati area conducted in 1996 and
1997 (Kepe 1997a) provided useful back-
ground material. Similar studies, con-
ducted elsewhere on the coast, were also




The main aim of this study was to explore the issues involved in reconcil-
ing the policy objectives of land reform, environmental conservation and
the private sector profit-oriented rural development initiative in post-
apartheid South Africa. Rather than examining the conceptual framework
of the projects being implemented, the study attempts to reveal short-
comings in the processes of development. The research was conducted in
close collaboration with relevant departments, agencies and individuals
driving processes of change in the area under consideration, although the
independent nature of the work was not compromised.
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1996; Manona & Manona 1997; Palmer et
al. 1997). Commissioned planning reports
for the SDI project were also important.
National and provincial policy documents
on land and the environment, amongst
other subjects, also provided useful
insights.
Secondly, relevant workshops and
group meetings were attended. These
included meetings about land rights issues
in areas targeted for economic develop-
ment under the Wild Coast SDI, conflict
mediation workshops, information sessions
on the Wild Coast SDI, forestry indabas
and different committee meetings in case
study areas. The researcher was invited to
attend most of these meetings by the
organisers, presumably because of their
knowledge about the ongoing research. In
some case the researcher was invited – in
the capacity of resource person – to take
part in the discussions, and share prelimi-
nary research findings. But in most cases a
request to attend was made before the
meeting. It is necessary to mention that on
at least two occasions some of the partici-
pants did not welcome the researcher’s
presence. In both cases the other partici-
pants insisted that the researcher should
stay. The researcher was able to learn
much about conflicts within the SDI
anchor project areas through such meet-
ings (see Chapter 5 for more detail).
Thirdly, semi-structured interviews with
key informants within local communities,
community-based organisations (CBOs),
non-government organisations (NGOs)
and government departments were con-
ducted. At local level such interviews were
useful for exploring issues such as liveli-
hood problems, perceptions about the SDI,
and land reform. At the organisational and
departmental levels, the interviews were
used to gain information about the objec-
tives of the organisation or department,
including their role in improving the
welfare of rural people.
Another component of the research
approach was the observation of local
livelihood activities, land reform and SDI
processes. Lastly, informal discussions
were held with other researchers who
worked on similar issues on the Wild Coast
and elsewhere. On occasions collaborative
research resulted in papers on common
themes (for example, Manona & Kepe
1997a; Kepe et al. 1998; 2000a; 2000b;
2001; Wynberg & Kepe 1999).
Rationale for choice of case
study areas
There are at least three reasons behind the
choice of Magwa, Port St Johns and
Mkambati as case study areas. Firstly, a
case study area on the northern section of
the Wild Coast was necessary as other
projects were being undertaken on the
southern section. In particular, a large team
of researchers had descended upon
Wavecrest to gather information that would
either support or oppose dune mining by a
private company. In Dwesa-Cwebe several
studies had been going on from as early as
1995. Here the Institute of Social and
Economic Research (ISER – based at
Rhodes University), Village Planner (a
consultancy company), as well as post-
graduate students from Boston, Rhodes
and Uppsala universities, conducted
studies between 1995 and 2000. Some of
this data informs sections of the study
presented here. Between 1997 and 1999
detailed studies on the land issue within
the SDI were conducted in the Coffee Bay/
Tshezi area (see Ntsebeza 1999). It was
therefore decided that, rather than dupli-
cate work, the researcher’s activity in these
areas should be limited to accessing (wher-
ever possible) the findings of existing
studies.
Having settled on the northern section
of the Wild Coast as the research focus, the
next task was to decide on specific case
study areas. The priority was to ensure that
all case study areas had been identified as
investment nodes within the Wild Coast
SDI. Apart from being the only SDI anchor
project areas other than Dwesa-Cwebe and
Coffee Bay, the three chosen areas
(Magwa, Port St Johns and Mkambati)
each offered certain unique features to
give some diversity.
In the case of Port St Johns, this is the
only Wild Coast town with a municipality;
it has long been a tourist destination;
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several community development projects
were initiated prior to the introduction of
the SDI; and the area was home to state
farms that had been targeted by the SDI.
The Port St Johns SDI node also included
Silaka Nature Reserve, where adjacent
rural communities had a land claim and
had continued hunting inside the reserve.
Magwa had been chosen by the SDI team
as a node for agriculture, and tea produc-
tion was already in place. The SDI focus in
Mkambati was on the Mkambati Nature
Reserve, which is regarded as one of the
most important protected areas in Southern
Africa. For almost 80 years there had been
tense conflict between local people and the
managers of the reserve. In all three case
study areas there were existing tensions
over land rights.
Another, perhaps critical, factor in the
choice of these three areas was the re-
searcher’s familiarity with them, having
lived at Magwa Tea Estate for some time in
1996, and having spent almost a year in a
village close to Mkambati Nature Reserve
while conducting a study on livelihoods
and environmental change.
Structure of the report
The report is divided into nine chapters.
The background and policy context influ-
encing the study is presented in Chapter 2.
This contextual background focuses on
policies that are relevant to the key ques-
tions this study attempts to address, at
national, provincial and local level. Issues
addressed include policies on land, eco-
nomic development, conservation and
local government. Chapter 3 presents a
discussion on the nature of rural liveli-
hoods on the Wild Coast and uses the
example of thatch material to illustrate the
social and ecological dynamics of resource
value to the livelihoods of different people.
Environmental debates regarding land use
and the contribution of the environment to
economic development in the Wild Coast
are discussed in Chapter 4. Specifically,
the chapter explores propositions for
reconciling sustainable environmental use,
sustainable livelihoods and profit-making.
The first part of Chapter 5 provides a brief
background of the Wild Coast SDI and
general debates that have emerged since its
inception. A critique of the Wild Coast SDI
implementation process, with particular
focus on communication and conflict
management strategies, is then provided.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8, respectively, present
detailed cases of land rights issues, liveli-
hoods and perceptions of the impact of
the SDI in Port St Johns, Magwa and
Mkambati. These case studies form the
core of the report from which the conclu-
sions and summary (Chapter 9) are drawn,
and an attempt made to outline implica-
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Most of the information used in this chap-
ter derives from secondary sources, includ-
ing government policy documents, con-
sultants’ reports, academic research find-
ings, media reports and promotional
brochures. Personal observations made
during the years of research in the case
study area provide further insight.
Policy context
The four main policy thrusts of the post-
apartheid government which have im-
pacted on the dynamics of livelihoods in
the Wild Coast area are economic develop-
ment, land reform, environmental conser-
vation and local government. In all these
policy directions the overall objective has
been to redress the race-based socio-
economic injustices of the past.
Economic development
Elimination of rural poverty is arguably
one of the most challenging tasks of the
post-apartheid era. Just prior to the first all-
race elections in 1994, the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) released a policy
framework document known as the Recon-
struction and Development Programme
(RDP) (ANC 1994). The RDP was seen as
a programme that addressed the needs of
the poorest people of the country. Unfortu-
nately, the RDP was a short-lived policy,
its ideals conflicting with the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (Gear)
macro-economic strategy adopted in 1996.
Gear emphasised private sector investment,
with the state playing a ‘facilitating’ role.
Among the many criticisms of Gear has
been its concern to boost investor confi-
dence, at the expense of integrating the
main RDP objectives which included
economic growth, employment and redis-
tribution (Adelzadeh 1996). It is thus
widely believed that Gear is unlikely to
make inroads into solving rural poverty
(Mather & Adelzadeh 1998; Blake 1998).
Despite this critique – shared by the main
labour unions – the government has
persisted with the Gear strategy and related
programmes.
The Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) began promoting Spatial Develop-
ment Initiatives (SDIs), designed to target
areas of the country which have both
unrealised economic potential and great
need for development (Jourdan 1998) in
1996 as an integral part of Gear. The Wild
Coast SDI in the former Transkei, Eastern
Chapter Two: Environment, land
and development: The policy
context and background
Introduction
This chapter provides the background and context for the study. Broader
policy issues which are key to rural livelihoods of people in the case
study area are explored; a brief profile of the Eastern Cape province is
provided in order to facilitate better understanding of livelihood dynamics
in the case study areas; and the physical and socio-political background
of the Wild Coast area is detailed.
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Cape province, was officially launched by
government which has widely publicised
the interest that investors in ecotourism,
forestry and agriculture are apparently
showing in the SDI programme.1  When
the SDIs were first introduced it was
envisaged that rural people from the
disadvantaged areas would become the
primary beneficiaries, through employ-
ment, partnerships with external investors,
income from leasing their land and im-
provements in local and regional infra-
structure. Thus far reviews of the SDI have
been mixed and, to an extent, appear to
reflect the political affiliation of those
critiquing the programme.
Land reform
The main goal of land reform in South
Africa is to redress the racially-based land
dispossessions of the apartheid era and the
resulting highly inequitable distribution of
land ownership. More specifically it seeks
to create security of land tenure for all and
provide a basis for land-based economic
development. The three main components
of land reform are restitution, redistribution
and tenure reform (Department of Land
Affairs 1997).
Restitution policy aims to restore land
or provide other forms of redress (alterna-
tive land or financial compensation) to
those dispossessed of their rights to land
through discriminatory legislation and
practice since 1913, a primary objective
being to promote both justice and recon-
ciliation. The framework for the resolution
of land claims is provided in the Restitu-
tion of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and
subsequent amendments. Claims are
investigated by the Commission for the
Restitution of Land Rights, before they are
submitted to the Land Claims Court for
adjudication (Department of Land Affairs
1997). Amendments to the Act have made
it possible to deal administratively with
uncontested matters.
Through the redistribution programme
the government aims to re-allocate land to
the landless poor for residential and pro-
ductive purposes. The government com-
mitted itself to provide settlement and land
acquisition grants to eligible individuals
and groups in order to purchase land from
willing sellers, including the state. Since
mid-1999, when a new minister took over
the land portfolio, there has been a policy
rethink on redistribution; priority is now
given to ‘emerging’ commercial farmers,
arguably at the expense of the propertyless
(Cliffe 2000). But it is hoped that the new
focus will speed up the redistribution
programme, which has not yet come close
to achieving its original goals.
The tenure reform programme aims to
address issues such as insecurity and
overlapping and disputed land rights
resulting from apartheid-era policies.
Those most affected by these problems are
in rural areas in the former bantustans,
which under apartheid bore the brunt of
land-related apartheid laws. In many of
these areas the land is still nominally
owned by the state and held in trust for the
occupants. Most of the land is held ‘com-
munally’, and is in many areas still under
the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. A
number of laws have been enacted to
facilitate reform. Reforms relevant to
former bantustans include the Interim
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31
of 1996 which protects people with inse-
cure tenure from losing their rights and
interests, pending future reforms, and the
Communal Property Association Act 28 of
1996 which enables groups to acquire,
hold and manage land through a group
legal entity which operates under a written
constitution.
The land reform programme has been
an extremely challenging undertaking. In
the almost five years since its inception it
has achieved very few successes. Com-
mentators have offered a range of differing
explanations for the slow pace of land
reform. Some argue that political will by
government is lacking, translating into
minimal resources being devoted to land
reform (Cousins 2000; Hlatshwayo 2000).
Others argue that there is a lack of strategic
thinking on how land reform should relate
to other reforms by government. More
specifically it is unclear how land reform
could improve the livelihoods of potential
beneficiaries, especially those who live in
rural areas (Du Toit 2000). But it is clear
Chapter Two: Environment, land and development:
The policy context and background
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that the potential for land reform to im-
prove livelihoods does exist (Cousins
1999; Adams et al. 2000), and this should
be a strong argument against delaying or
slowing down the process. And, of course,
land reform is enshrined in the country’s
Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution.
Biodiversity conservation
South Africa’s Constitution not only pro-
vides for a right to land reform and equita-
ble redress, but also to environmental
protection. New policies and laws on
environmental management, biodiversity,
forestry and water also embrace the impor-
tance of environmental protection. To-
gether they break radically with the past by
bringing social justice, economic and
development considerations into the
environmental agenda. One of the most
fundamental and problematic shifts in
approach has undoubtedly been within the
conservation sector. Traditionally the
domain of natural scientists and wildlife
enthusiasts, conservation has moved
squarely into the socio-political arena
concerned with human rights, access to
natural resources, equity and environmen-
tal sustainability. Certainly this has not
always been the case. Although South
Africa has had impressive scientific
achievements in conservation, these have
been tied to the turbulent past. The vo-
cabulary of the sustainable and equitable
‘people and parks’ relationship is now well
established in South Africa, although it
tends to focus more on income generation
than it does on true co-management or
resource tenure rights (Kepe et al. 2000a).
Rural local government
Rural local government has also been
affected by the new policies of the post-
apartheid government. The need for
effective local government in these areas
has been seen as key to the implementa-
tion of most programmes aimed at improv-
ing rural livelihoods. In 1995, a two-tier
system of rural local government was
established with district councils at re-
gional level and transitional rural councils
(TRCs) at local level. However, few policy
makers thought that this development
would cause as much controversy as it has.
With both democratic rule and tradi-
tional authorities in rural areas enshrined in
the new Constitution, a fierce conflict has
developed between the two. Traditional
authorities are fiercely opposed to what
they call ‘erosion’ of the powers they held
under apartheid. These included being
responsible for land allocation in commu-
nal areas and presiding over minor local
conflicts. Income derived from the fines
imposed in these cases, as well as other
‘donations’ from their subjects made the
traditional authorities’ position of power
even more lucrative. Besides these respon-
sibilities, they were the link between
district magistrates and villagers.
This conflict between traditional au-
thorities and elected representatives existed
even before the new dispensation, when
civic organisations such as Sanco (the
South African National Civics Organisa-
tion) challenged the authority and legiti-
macy of chiefs and headmen during the
late 1980s (Ntsebeza 1999). The period
between 1995 and 2000 was characterised
by confusion in rural areas, with both
structures seeking to assert their authority
and legitimacy. Proposals for the two
institutions to work together in harmony
have thus far not borne fruit. Ntsebeza
(1999) argues that government failed to
clarify the powers, functions and legiti-
macy of traditional authorities. This confu-
sion and tension was again brought to life
by government proposals to combine rural
areas with nearby towns under single
municipalities, a move, it was argued,
intended to improve the process of service
delivery to rural areas. However, the
opposition, (that is, traditional authorities),
received so much sympathy from govern-
ment that they were able to endanger the
second post-apartheid local government
elections in December 2000 (Daily Dis-
patch 2000a). Government was forced to
make concessions, which included increas-
ing the traditional authorities’ representa-
tion in local councils. Furthermore, it is
rumoured that the government is consider-
ing changing the country’s Constitution to
enshrine an enduring role for traditional
authorities. In view of the persisting fears
around the role of traditional authorities,
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Figure 1: Location maps of the Eastern Cape
much negotiation and compromise is
expected in the future. In the meantime an
authority vacuum exists in many rural
areas, affecting most things from use of
natural resources to service delivery in
these extremely poor areas.
Provincial physical, social and
economic overview2
The Eastern Cape province comprises the
eastern portion of the former Cape Prov-
ince, as well as most of the former
Transkei and Ciskei bantustans. With a
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population of more than six million, it
covers an area of over 170 000km2 and is
the second largest province in the country.
Nearly 70 per cent of the population live in
rural areas and most of these live in the
former Transkei and Ciskei. The province
is divided into several district council
juridictions, with the highest density of
population generally falling within the
Wild Coast and the former Transkei areas.
The Eastern Cape is the poorest province
in the country, and is home to most of the
poorest districts in the country, the major-
ity of these in the former Transkei. The
provincial unemployment rate is close to
50 per cent (Ainslie et al. 1997).












Source: Statistics South Africa (2000)
The rural areas of the province are the
worst hit by inadequate infrastructure.
Roads, electricity, telecommunications and
health are some of the key services where
major work still needs to be done. Accord-
ing to Statistics South Africa (2000), the
Eastern Cape is ranked as the province
most in need of basic infrastructure and
services (see Table 1).
Provincial Rural Development
Framework
Until October 2000 the Eastern Cape
government did not have a clearly defined
rural development framework. Nor is there
a published document outlining the na-
tional rural development framework.
However, a mere draft discussion docu-
ment entitled The Integrated Sustainable
Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS)
exists, which builds on Cabinet Memoran-
dum no. 18 of 2000 entitled A strategic
approach to rural development: An Inte-
grated Sustainable Rural Development
Strategy (ISRDS). This national strategy
focuses on co-ordinating existing depart-
mental initiatives and programmes to
achieve greater impact in rural areas by the
year 2010.
In early October, representatives of the
Eastern Cape provincial government,
labour, business and non-government
organisations met at the University of
Transkei in Umtata for a two-day Rural
Development Summit. They jointly de-
clared a commitment to co-operate in fast-
tracking rural development in the province
(Daily Dispatch 2000b). A background
paper that was prepared for the summit
served as a draft provincial Rural Develop-
ment Framework (Ecsecc 2000). The
country’s Constitution, the RDP and Gear
provide the broad parameters within which
this framework was formulated. Section 27
of the Constitution – which guarantees all
citizens the right to goods and services
such as health care, water, food and social
security – is regarded as one of the key
principles for rural development. While the
framework endorses the Gear strategy it,
perhaps uncharacteristically for a govern-
ment document, notes Gear’s limited
success in meeting its objectives of creat-
ing ‘sufficient jobs for all work seekers’
and in redistributing income and opportu-
nities in favour of the poor (Ecsecc
2000:13). It also highlights the importance
of the country’s many other policy frame-
works (for example, land reform) to rural
development, but notes their shortcomings
in the province.
The framework document also makes a
call for an integrated rural development
strategy. In evaluating current policies and
programmes intended to serve the needs of
the rural poor, the Rural Development
Framework document highlights the
province’s failure to properly co-ordinate
rural development efforts. It argues that
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current efforts ‘remain fragmented and
partial’ (Ecsecc 2000:23). In its conclusion
the document calls for a reorientation of
policy and planning in favour of rural
areas, while at the same time building
institutional capacity of rural local govern-
ment to facilitate delivery.
The next section focuses on the bio-
physical and social aspects of the Wild
Coast area. This includes brief descriptions
of climate, vegetation, as well as the
general land issues pertaining to the former
Transkei and the Wild Coast.
Overview of the Wild Coast
The Wild Coast covers a coastline area of
about 300km between the Great Kei River
in the south and the Umtamvuna River in
the north and was formerly part of the
Transkei bantustan (since 1994 re-incorpo-
rated into the Eastern Cape). Ironically,
given that the area is characterised by
poorly developed infrastructure and acute
poverty, the Wild Coast has been widely
regarded as an area of great ‘unspoilt’ or
‘undisturbed’ natural beauty since the late
19th century (Schmidt & Doonan 1997).
Features of attraction include its rare
vegetation with many endemic species and
its rugged, rocky shores with violent
waves reaching to heights of up to ten
metres.
Climate
In general, the Wild Coast has a warm,
temperate and humid climate, with mini-
mal temperature fluctuations. Compared to
the rest of the province, this coastal area
experiences a relatively high rainfall with
an annual mean exceeding 1 000mm and
reaching 1 200mm in places. A minimum
of 50mm is expected every month of the
year. More than 50 per cent of the rainfall
occurs in spring and summer, between
October and March, with the latter month
experiencing the highest average. The low
rainfall period is between July and August.
Rain fronts which last for a number of
days are characteristic of the Wild Coast
(Nicolson 1993), and records from
Mkambati Hospital/Nature Reserve show
that a maximum of about 150 rainy days
can be expected. Thunderstorms are
common, especially in early spring.
Temperatures are moderate with both
day-night and seasonal fluctuations being
small. The mean annual temperature is
about 20°C, with seasonal highest means
of up to 23°C and lowest daily means of
about 16°C close to the coast. Cool night
temperatures are experienced at higher
altitudes away from the coastline (Van
Wyk 1994). The area is generally hail and
frost-free.
To the south of Port St Johns the soils
that are underlain by Beaufort and Ecca
beds are generally weak and shallow.
Those further east and closest to the coast,
particularly in the Lusikisiki area, are
underlain by Natal Group sandstone and
are consequently sandy, highly leached
and relatively shallow. In general these
soils are not suitable for intensive agricul-
ture (Nicolson et al. 1996a). Further from
the coastline, patches of rich clay soils of
Dwayka origin are common (Feely 1987).
Vegetation
Amongst other things, the Wild Coast is
known for its unique floral endowments.
This vegetation can be broadly divided
into forest and open grassland, although
many different types occur (Nicolson et al.
1996a). Cawe (1992) contends that about
three-quarters of the indigenous forests of
the former Transkei occur on the Wild
Coast. According to Cooper and Swart
(1992) the Indian Ocean Coastal Belt
Forest which is characteristic of the Wild
Coast can be sub-divided into six different
types ie. (i) dune forest, (ii) swamp forest,
(iii) Pondoland Coast forest, (iv) South
Coast forest, (v) coast scarp forest and (vi)
mangrove communities.
Most of the Pondoland Coast forest,
especially that which is found between
Port St Johns in the south and Mtamvuna
River in the north, fall within the
Pondoland centre of endemism (Van Wyk
1994). Patches of subtropical, evergreen
forests in the major river gorges, including
endemic plant species, dominate these.
The South Coast forest, which occurs
mainly between Umngazi River and the
Kei Mouth, is not as rich in species diver-
sity as the Pondoland Coastal forest. The
largest sections of this type occur within
the Dwesa Nature Reserve and in Manubi.
Chapter Two: Environment, land and development:
The policy context and background
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Dune forests are less common along the
coast, but where there are suitable sand
dunes, they form a narrow band adjacent
to the coast. Similarly, swamp forest only
occurs in small patches within Mkambati
Nature Reserve and its vicinity to the south
and it represents the southernmost occur-
rence of this type in Southern Africa. The
coast scarp forest is a transitional type
between coastal and afromontane, while
the mangrove communities on the Wild
Coast represent the largest stands of this
type found anywhere in Southern Africa.
The grasslands along the Wild Coast are
largely influenced by edaphic factors,
particularly where the shoreline is rocky
(Nicolson et al. 1996a). To the north of
Port St Johns these grasslands are exten-
sive, sometimes covering as much as 80
per cent of the coastal vegetation and are
particularly vigorous. In this part of the
coast, these grasslands coincide with the
Pondoland centre of endemism and are
considered the densest in Southern Africa
(Van Wyk 1994). In most of the communal
areas of Eastern Pondoland, the unpalat-
able Aristida junciformis has become a
dominant species. But these grasslands are
still floristically rich, containing a number
of endemic/near-endemic species, includ-
ing those used for medical purposes and in
craft-making (Cooper 1991; Van Wyk
1994).
Land issues3
Early twentieth century colonialists divided
the Transkei administrative areas along the
coast into ‘tribal’ (administrative) and
resort areas.4  The former were set aside for
rural African occupation under the indirect
rule of traditional authorities, while the
resort areas were reserved for white resi-
dents of the Transkei.
In terms of the law, land in the adminis-
trative areas of the Wild Coast is nominally
owned by the state and administered by
tribal authorities as agents of the state. The
only exception is the town of Port St
Johns, which grants freehold titles to those
who buy land. In terms of the 1936 Native
Land Act, occupation of land was based on
a permission to occupy (PTO) system.
While the PTO guaranteed permanent
occupation, the government could forcibly
remove the holder, as it became the case
during the implementation rehabilitation
scheme (betterment planning) from the late
1950s to the early 1980s, or when projects
such as nature reserves and tea plantations
were introduced. Thus rural people who
live in these communal areas currently
have informal rights to the land. Since
1996 these people’s informal rights have
been protected on paper by the Interim
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act.
According to this Act, occupants of the
land cannot be removed from the land they
occupy without their freely-given consent.
In the meantime government plans to
transfer this land to its rightful owners,
while at the same time creating frame-
works to make people’s rights legally
enforceable. This is the aim of the govern-
ment’s tenure reform programme as stated
in the White Paper on South African Land
Reform (Department of Land Affairs
1997).
Tenure reform has not yet been imple-
mented in most of the former Transkei and
this has resulted in many uncertainties and
the unfair treatment of the rural poor.
Traditional authorities are still charging
villagers between R30 and R40 for new
sites, although in some instances the rates
are higher. Villagers needing extra land can
‘buy’ it by paying cash or in kind to the
chief or headman of the area in question.
When these transactions take place, there
is never any written record retained by the
buyer. Women remain the most discrimi-
nated-against group in terms of site alloca-
tion.
In addition, many wealthy individuals,
mostly white, continued to build cottages
illegally, even though a moratorium on this
activity had been in place for some time.
Corrupt chiefs and headmen accepted
anything from a bottle of brandy to a few
hundred rands each to allow a person to
build a cottage by the coast. In the late
1990s the seaside cottages and hotels on
the Wild Coast came under the scrutiny of
the Heath special investigating unit.5
According to reports, the occupants of the
illegal cottages found a series of legal
loopholes which impacted adversely on
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efforts to remove them (Kokstad Advertiser
2000). By the middle of 2000, the provin-
cial Department of Economic Affairs,
Environment and Tourism had taken over
the fight. This resulted in conservation
officials, backed by the army and police,
arresting many of the illegal occupants
(Mercury 2000). In a media statement, the
Ministry of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism revealed that, by 14 December
2000, legal action had been taken against
20 illegal cottage owners.6
The delays in the implementation of
tenure reform have also posed problems
for investors in the area. Investments
targeting land in communal areas are
currently complicated by the tenure status
of this land. Rural people are not in a
position to negotiate with investors, as they
do not legally own the land. In the mean-
time, it is proposed that the Minister of
Land Affairs enter into negotiations with
investors on behalf of the rural people. It is
envisaged that once land is transferred to
them, they will inherit whatever the Minis-
ter negotiated. With conflict over land
characterising rural life in the Wild Coast
area, it is unlikely that negotiations by a
third party (government) will satisfy all the
interested parties.
The delays in the implementation of
tenure reform and the battle with illegal
cottage owners are not the only land-
related problems affecting development in
the Wild Coast. Commissioned studies
revealed that by the end of 1997 there
were over 65 land claims in the Wild Coast
area, which the Eastern Cape Land Claims
Commission was struggling to deal with
(Webb 1997). A significant number of
these are in areas targeted for investment
under the SDI programme. These are at
different stages of resolution, with the
Dwesa/Cwebe claim being the only one to
date to have achieved some level of suc-
cess. Others which have been treated with
less urgency by the Land Claims Commis-
sion, Department of Land Affairs and the
SDI include those by the Khanyayo for
Mkambati Nature Reserve and Tracor7
land; Caguba for Mt Thesiger; Sicambeni
village for sections of Silaka Nature Re-
serve, and Lambasi for sections of Magwa
Tea Estate. While it was clear from as early
as 1996 that many claims exist in this area,
the SDI went ahead with its implementa-
tion plans, thereby increasing tension
between government, local people and
potential investors. Because of the SDI’s
promises, or intimidation by factions, some
individuals or groups never lodged claims
for pieces of land they believed were
rightfully theirs. This is significant in view
of the slow progress of the Wild Coast SDI
because many of these communities still
maintain rights to the lands in question, but
had agreed not to lodge claims because of
promises made and the hope of alternative
wealth through the SDI.
Land reform and rural development in
communal areas of the Transkei, including
the Wild Coast, also has to be understood
in the context of betterment planning
which took place in the area for almost
three decades. Betterment planning was
introduced in the bantustans during the
1950s, as a measure to control rangeland
degradation in communal areas. It rede-
fined land use patterns by dividing areas
into residential, arable and grazing land
(De Wet 1995). Rural people were nega-
tively affected in many ways as they had
to move to new residential sites and also
received smaller fields, among other
inconveniences. There was much resist-
ance against betterment in the former
Transkei and in some cases this even led to
violence (see Harrison 1988; Mbeki 1984).
In some of the areas that were affected by
betterment planning, people are still scepti-
cal of government interventions that have
anything to do with land, especially in
light of the fact that betterment was intro-
duced as a development project that was
meant to benefit people in future. The
introduction of the SDI on the Wild Coast
must thus be understood in that context.
This chapter has focused on the rele-
vant national policy frameworks, as well as
an overview of issues pertaining to the
Eastern Cape and the Wild Coast. These
sections have highlighted the urgent need
for development, as well as the resolution
of land and local government issues. Yet
neither of these issues can be fully appreci-
ated without an understanding of rural
Chapter Two: Environment, land and development:
The policy context and background
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livelihoods on the Wild Coast, particularly
the utilisation of natural resources. This is
the focus of the next chapter.
Notes
1 The Fish River SDI is also located in the
Eastern Cape.
2 Most of the information used in this
section is taken from Ecsecc (2000).
3 Parts of this section draw on work done
with Lungisile Ntsebeza and Linda
Pithers (Kepe et al. 2000b).
4 The only exception in this regard is Port
St Johns which was established as a
town with its own municipality.
5 A statutory commission established
under the leadership of Judge Willem
Heath to investigate corruption involv-
ing state assets and undertake civil legal
action to recover lost assets. After a
court ruled that a serving judge could
not head such a unit, the law under
which the unit was operating was
changed to permit someone other than a
judge to be the head, and Heath seemed
to be on the way out.
6 http://www.environment.gov.za/
speeches/2000/14dec2000.htm
7 Transkei Agricultural Corporation, a
now-defunct agricultural parastatal.
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In the Wild Coast, as elsewhere, differ-
ent households combine livelihood sources
along distinct lines of social difference
including wealth, age, health status, loca-
tion and so forth. They generate their
livelihoods through variable combinations
of arable and livestock farming, the collec-
tion of a range of natural resources, and
various off-farm sources, including remit-
tances and pensions. These variables help
to identify a variety of livelihood ‘clus-
ters’.
Kepe (1997a) identified several clusters
of livelihood sources in the Mkambati
area, grouped around activities which are
supplementary to those considered as basic
by the majority of local people. Most
livelihood sources within these clusters are
consistent with those observed elsewhere
in the Wild Coast and other parts of the
former Transkei (see IMDS 1986; Heron
1991; Hendricks 1991; Fen & Smart 1997;
Palmer et al. 1997). Fuel wood collection,
the use of water resources, the collection
of thatch grass for domestic purposes and
subsistence agriculture tend to be present
in all clusters. Building outward from these
basic activities, the inclination of most
households is to seek various opportunities
for cash income.
In the first cluster, the livelihoods of
households are centred on migrant remit-
tances, state welfare grants or pensions,
and agriculture. Elderly people who re-
ceive old-age pensions or remittances from
their children head most of these house-
holds. Cash received from these sources
allows households the opportunity to
practice a form of agriculture which is
slightly above subsistence level. The last
two decades has, however, seen a signifi-
cant decline in the amount of cash reach-
ing the villages from remittances. This can
be attributed to a number of factors, such
as massive losses of jobs due to economic
sanctions against South Africa and politi-
cally-related strikes in the 1980s
(Donaldson 1992), increasing urbanisation
as a result of the abolition of influx control
laws in the mid-1980s, and most recently
losses of jobs due to the restructuring of
parastatals and retrenchments in the min-
ing industry.
In the second cluster, the main focus is
on commuter employment combined with
other activities, but time away from home
limits crop and livestock production,
unless there is a very strong kinship assist-
ance network. Commuter employment is
more important to people who live in the
Chapter Three:
Rural livelihoods on the
Wild Coast
Introduction
Chambers and Conway (1992) suggest that a livelihood comprises the
capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and ac-
tivities required for means of living, and that rural peoples livelihoods are
diverse and complex. This diversity and complexity extends to the rights
and claims to natural resources that people make use of in securing those
livelihoods; resource tenure is thus also highly differentiated.
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vicinity of towns or government institu-
tions (for example, conservation areas,
hospitals and schools). A third important
cluster is focused around skilled labour
and self-employment. Most households
associated with this cluster are headed by
males who gained skills such as building
while they were migrant workers. Plough-
ing other people’s fields for cash is another
major activity in this cluster. When jobs
within the village are scarce, some of the
people associated with this cluster may
become involved in other income-generat-
ing activities such as fishing and hunting.
A fourth cluster that is fast gaining
prominence, particularly for female-
headed households, is beer brewing and
small grocery sales. Beer brewing in
particular has a long history in the area, as
it is often associated with numerous an-
cient ritual activities. Many households,
often the poorest, are found within a fifth
cluster with piece jobs and kin dependency
as the main livelihood sources. Most of the
households in this cluster are headed by
widowed or unmarried women, who do
jobs like weeding, house cleaning, baby-
sitting and so forth for cash or food, and
also depend on support from kin.
A sixth livelihood cluster of increasing
significance for the rural poor who live in
high rainfall areas along the coast, particu-
larly women, is centred on plant material
trade including medicinal plants, thatch
grass, fuel wood and baskets made from
sedges. People in this cluster are generally
involved in the trade of all products men-
tioned above. In certain localities, the sale
of seaweed tends to be more popular than
the sale of medicinal plants. Availability of
the plant material, as well as the accessibil-
ity of markets, determines the intensity of
the harvest. People living close to nature
reserves, indigenous forests and the coast-
line tend to dominate this cluster.
The women found in livelihood cluster
five and six share certain similarities: they
are usually de facto heads of their house-
holds for various reasons, and tend to be
stronger, more active and to have young
children. What marks out the women in
cluster six is the fact that they are willing
or well positioned to travel to distant
markets. For most of these women, the
heavy labour and time demands of their
trade increase the burden imposed by their
other domestic duties, which usually
includes cultivation and collection of fuel
wood and water.
It is clear that rural livelihoods are
diverse and complex and that this applies
to households of varying income levels.
For wealthier households, diversity is key
to remaining wealthy, although less
wealthy households tend to diversify more.
Time and energy invested in crop and
livestock production is highly variable and
is crucially influenced by the wealth status
of the household, with the wealthier house-
holds cultivating larger fields than others.
Commercial agriculture is, nevertheless,
limited as a main source of livelihood.
Access to cash income from wage
labour and pensions is also important,
although most poor households do not
have access to these sources of cash
income. Wealthy households, on the other
hand, usually have access to wage income
and pensions or have had access to these
in the past whilst they were building up
their current asset base.
Understanding the nature of these rural
livelihoods, particularly those based in
local natural resources, is crucial for those
seeking to improve the welfare of rural
people in South Africa. Both policy makers
and implementers often poorly understand
the complexity and diversity of natural
resource-based livelihoods. The next
section presents the case of thatch material
as one of the key livelihood sources in
Mkambati area. The case attempts to show
that in order to understand the value of a
resource to people in an area, an under-
standing of the livelihood context, the
ecological and social dynamics is crucial.
The case of thatch material
Introduction
Thatch material is an important resource
for poorer people who live in rural areas of
South Africa. Firstly, it is used extensively
in building the dwelling huts (izindlu
zokuhlala) used as kitchens and bedrooms.
Secondly, thatched huts are also built to
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keep livestock (sheep, goats and fowls) at
night or during bad weather conditions.
These livestock huts (izindlu zemfuyo) are
built with the same material as that used
for dwelling huts, but less care is taken in
relation to certain features (for example,
there are no proper windows). More often
than not a livestock hut is a disused dwell-
ing hut. Thirdly, the store-hut (uvimba or
inyango or ikoyi) is used to store maize
that has already been shelled. Like the
livestock hut, uvimba often starts off as a
dwelling hut. Even people who are not
poor usually build at least one hut as they
argue it connects them to their roots.
All the surveyed households in the
Mkambati area had at least one thatched
hut in their homestead, while almost half
(49 per cent) of the households did not
have any form of roofing other than
thatch. The most popular thatch material
used in the area are the two grasses
Cymbopogon validus (Umqungu) and
Aristida junciformis (Inkonkoni). Certain
sedges are also used.
The best thatch grass, C. validus, is
very scarce in the villages. It is mostly
found inside the Mkambati Nature Reserve
and Tracor state farm, or in protected
patches in the villages. In general the grass
is very patchily distributed, growing
largely on heavier soils or in areas with
previous disturbance (for example, settle-
ment sites, termite mounds and old fields).
A. junciformis, on the other hand, is abun-
dant in the villages, the only problem
being that livestock owners seek to destroy
it, as it is unpalatable when mature.
Thatch material collectors are able-
bodied women from the village, including
those who collect for personal use; those
who collect for sale; and those who collect
for others (as hired labourers). Men be-
come involved in grass collection and
trade only when they have planted C.
validus to sell to other people.
Resource tenure of thatch material8
Since thatch material grows in sites under
three different land tenure regimes (pri-
vate, common property, and state land),
individuals use different strategies or
arrangements to gain access to it. Thus
thatch material growing in people’s gar-
dens or protected by individuals is re-
garded as private. People can access these
resources through buying, ukucela (to ask
for) and receiving a donation from the
owner as a result of being related to him or
her (kin or friend). If one has to buy it, one
isithungu (head load) of about 10kg costs
R8.50.9 It is important to note that this
price is much higher than the R1.10 (in
1998) quoted for Bushbuckridge area by
Shackleton and Shackleton (2000). This
difference in price may be an indication of
the degree to which thatch has been com-
mercialised, as well as the cost involved in
collecting it in Mkambati area.
With regard to areas which are held as
common property by all villagers, people
from within Mkambati area do not have to
ask for permission to collect thatch mate-
rial. While uncommon, outsiders who want
to collect from Mkambati can only do so if
they have an arrangement with a local
person. Unlike resources such as wild
edible leaves (imifino), civic and traditional
leaders become involved in matters involv-
ing thatch material, especially when out-
siders are involved. Following the death of
the local chief (Ngxolo Makita) in 1997,
Chief Mlindazwe of the Bumbantaba
kingdom presided over discussions about
the mourning rituals for Bumbantaba
chiefs. During the funeral attended by
hundreds of villagers, he gave many
instructions including an instruction that
‘for the next year all resources such as
thatch grass and trees should ideally not
leave the village. If any of these resources
have to be taken away, say to your rela-
tives who live in other villages, they must
come to the chief’s place to apologise.
This they must do by bringing along R2.’
In the areas controlled by the state,
villagers have to follow regulations laid
down by the governing agencies. Payment
of cash to the reserve or state farm man-
ager for unlimited head loads of grass is
formally required. However, theft of grass
from these areas has been common for
many decades. Some of this theft is politi-
cally motivated, as the villagers claim that
the land belongs to them. They call this
ukujola (legitimate stealing). The theft is
Chapter Three: Rural livelihoods on the Wild Coast
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also motivated by poverty. Those who do
not have the money to pay simply collect
without asking.
Labour-related institutions of thatch
collection
In all the environments where thatch
material is collected, various local institu-
tions are important for mobilising labour
for its collection or transportation to the
site where it will be used. Women take the
sole responsibility for cutting thatch grass
in the village, Mkambati and Tracor, while
men may be occasionally involved in
planting and protection of grass patches in
the villages. Other people within the
village, who are not able to collect thatch
grass themselves, due to various disabili-
ties, are able to call on their kinship link-
ages for collection labour. Elderly women,
for instance, can send their daughters
(whether married or not) to do the cutting
for them. Trading and hiring arrangements
are among the range of institutions that
mediate access to thatch grass for those
who cannot collect.
However, villagers who are much closer
to a source of thatch material (for example,
within the village) make use of other local
institutions. Amalima (work parties) are
organised by the host household, where
the participants cut and carry the thatch
material to the homestead before enjoying
the beer or food that is provided. The
provision of beer or food requires that the
hosts should have some resources to be
able to provide these. Those who are not in
a position to provide the beer or food but
still need help to collect thatch material,
call on another institution – mutual aid or
ukuncedisana. With ukuncedisana, a
group of friends or neighbours rotate
cutting for one another as a group. This
institution, therefore, is most relevant when
there is more than one social actor inter-
ested in thatch material.
Dynamics and interpretations of value
of thatch material
Box 1 presents cases of five households
who use thatch material as a livelihood
source. The first thing to note about these
households is that three of them have
protected grass patches, while two do not.
The household of informant number one
(case 1) does not have a protected patch
because the head of the household is
heavily involved in plant material trade.
With her children in school and herself
spending most of her days collecting and
selling other plant species (for example,
medicinal plants), the thatch material
would not receive the protection it re-
quires. Similarly, in household of inform-
ant number five (case 5) there is no labour
available to protect a thatch patch as all
children attend school and the widowed
household head is too old to run around
watching for fires and livestock. Both
households did indicate, through inter-
views, however, that they would have
preferred to have planted or protected
thatch material, especially C. validus.
The second thing to note is that all the
case study households in Box 1 have built
at least one thatched hut over the last four
years. Usually, one hut is all a household
can afford to build in one year, mainly
because of the scarcity of appropriate
thatch material. The only exception in this
case is household number 1 (case 1) where
three huts were built in one year. The
reason was that the homestead was moved
from a damp area to the present location.
However, collecting thatch material for
three huts was a very difficult task. The
household head had to collect the grass
over a period of one year. Many other
tasks were postponed or less time was
devoted to them. This alone is an indica-
tion of the centrality of thatch material to
the livelihoods of the poor. This action by
household number one also further con-
firms the relevance of Maslow’s theory of
needs and motivation (Maslow 1970),
which puts shelter as one of the most basic
needs which people would seek to satisfy
before many other needs.10
Thirdly, the average number of 10kg
thatch bundles needed to build one hut
with a diameter of at least 4.6m is 150.
Most huts in the village are that size.
However, depending on the needs and
capability of different households, there
are huts which require about 250 bundles
to build (for example, case 2, Box 1). The
huts built by this household had diameters
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Box 1: Case studies: Value of thatch material
Case 1: Household of informant 1 (Mavumba)
· Planted or protected thatch material patches = None
· Thatched huts built over the last four years = 3
· Thatched huts repaired over the last four years = 0
· Trade in thatch material = Yes
· Most recent one-year’s gross value from selling or using thatch
150 bundles/hut x3 @ R8.50 = R3 825
Case 2: Household of informant 2 (Nkubele)
· Planted or protected thatch material patches = Yes (1 hectare planted)
· Thatched huts built over the last four years = 2
· Thatched huts repaired over the last four years = 0
· Trade in thatch material = Yes
· Most recent one-year’s gross value from selling or using thatch
250 bundles/hut x1 @R8.50 + rope @ R50 = R2 175
Case 3: Household of informant 3 (Machenge)
· Planted or protected thatch material patches = Yes (protected)
· Thatched huts built over the last four years = 2
· Thatched huts repaired over the last four years = 0
· Trade in thatch material = No
· Most recent one-year’s gross value from selling or using thatch
150 bundles/hut x1 @8.50 = R1 275
Case 4: Household of informant 4 (Majola)
· Planted or protected thatch material patches = Yes (protected)
· Thatched huts built over the last four years = 1
· Thatched huts repaired over the last four years = 1
· Trade in thatch material = No
· Most recent one-year’s gross value from selling or using thatch
150 bundles/hut x1 @R8.50 + 5 bundles/repair work x1 @R8.50 = R1 317.50
Case 5: Household of informant 5 (Kewu – Mathunzi)
· Planted or protected thatch material patches = None
· Thatched huts built over the last four years = 1
· Thatched huts repaired over the last four years = 1
· Trade in thatch material = No
· Most recent one-year’s gross value from selling or using thatch
150 bundles/hut x1 @R8.50 + 10 bundles/repair work x1 @R8.50 = R1 360
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of about 8m. This household built two of
such huts, but at different times. Further-
more, this particular household could
afford to build such big huts as they have a
whole field planted to C. validus.
Fourthly, the price used to calculate
gross income here is R8.50 per 10kg
bundle. This is the price of C. validus
when somebody buys it in the village.
When bought in Mkambati Nature Reserve
or Tracor, a bundle of C. validus costs R5.
The discrepancy is due to the cost of
transport. People who buy in Mkambati or
Tracor have to organise their own transport
to fetch the grass. When grass is bought in
the village, the assumption is that the seller
would have paid for transport to the vil-
lage. If the grass was collected from the
village, meaning there are no transport
costs, the price remains R8.50, apparently
as a charge for protecting the grass or
forsaking growing other crops in the case
of planted grass. A 7kg bundle of Aristida
junciformis costs about R5 in the village.
No extra charges for transport, labour or
opportunity costs are added to the price, as
A. junciformis is plentiful in the village and
is never planted in gardens. If any thatch
material is mixed with C. validus, which is
a common practice, the maximum price is
charged.
Lastly, some households widen the
value they derive from thatch material as
much as they can. For instance household
number three (see case 2, Box 1) also
makes and sells ropes made from Digitaria
eriantha, used for tying the grass to the
roofing poles. While many women know
how to make these ropes, great skill is
needed to ensure that they last as long as
the thatch material put on the roof. The
poorer the household, the more likely are
they to develop more skills to utilise as
much of the available resources as they
can, compared to the relatively wealthier
households.
In conclusion, thatch material is one of
the few resources used by local people
which spreads the benefit to a wide range
of people. Collectors, owners of transport
and skilled thatchers can benefit from the
same batch of thatch material if the grass is
collected from the state land. Even when
the thatch material is collected from the
village area, people involved in work party
arrangement benefit from the resource,
even if it is through ‘in kind’ remuneration.
A skilled thatcher charges R150 per aver-
age roof.
Lessons from the thatch material case
study
This case study analysed data on the
contribution of thatch material to the
livelihoods of rural people living in
Mkambati. Several plant species ranging
from grasses to sedges and reeds were
identified as being the most important
thatch material and provided different
benefits to different people. To some, they
are important as a resource to build differ-
ent structures, including dwelling huts,
while to some, in addition to their impor-
tance in own thatching requirements, they
also served as a source of cash income. It
is difficult to draw conclusions about the
future of thatch material in this area. But
one thing is clear – unless there is a major
shake-up in the country’s economy and
government policies on rural development,
thatch material is likely to remain a key
resource to the poorest of the poor for
many years to come.
When this importance of thatch material
is acknowledged by policy makers, the
next step should be to ensure that resource
(land and plants) tenure rights of the poor
and the previously disadvantaged (for
example, women) are secure.
Lastly, further research needs to con-
sider all aspects of diversity of rural liveli-
hoods. As this case study has shown,
thatch material is not only limited to one or
two popular grass species present in an
area. A wide range of plant species does
serve similar purposes. Too much focus on
individual species could easily result in an
inaccurate reflection of this diversity, in a
way which could, in the long run, nega-
tively affect rural livelihoods. Long-term
interdisciplinary studies on rural liveli-
hoods seem to be most important in this
case.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that rural liveli-
hoods in the Wild Coast area are complex
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and diverse, and has presented an example
of the use of thatch material to illustrate
this diversity and complexity. Understand-
ing the nature of rural livelihoods in the
Wild Coast is necessary in order to analyse
the impact of the SDI in the area. The
question remains whether developments
brought by the SDI will limit or enhance the
scope of diversity in livelihood strategies.
This chapter has also highlighted the
importance of certain vegetation to rural
livelihoods, as well as how its use and
perceptions of its value are socially differ-
entiated at local level. With the environ-
ment being widely declared as crucial for
development on the Wild Coast, the next
chapter will explore different notions about
its potential contribution to economic
development and rural livelihoods.
Notes
8 For references to Mkambati Nature
Reserve and Tracor land see Chapter 8.
9 This price only applies to
Cymbopogon validus.
10 With the exception of food.
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The Wild Coast is an area of deep con-
trasts. On the one hand it is characterised
by extreme poverty with poor infrastruc-
ture, high levels of unemployment and
very poor health care (see Anderson &
Galt 1998; Donaldson 1992). At the same
time, the area rates highly as an area of
extremely rich biodiversity and has one of
the most beautiful natural environments in
Southern Africa (Briers et al. 1996). Some
sectors within government have declared
the environment of the Wild Coast as the
region’s most valuable economic resource
(Nicolson et al. 1996a; CIMEC 1999).
Both poverty and the natural environment
in this area have become central to the
development debates. Natural resources in
particular are widely accepted as being a
key contributor to the livelihoods of rural
people. The natural environment is there-
fore a major tool in development efforts in
the region; this is reflected in both current
and proposed initiatives.
But views on how poverty and the
environment interact on the Wild Coast
differ widely. Some see the environment as
the victim of extreme local poverty, while
others see it as part of the solution to that
poverty. Studies have also shown that
views held by powerful people11  about the
condition and value of the environment are
closely linked to the way in which those
environments are managed (Leach &
Mearns 1996; Hoben 1995). It is thus
argued here that the projects being planned
or implemented – involving direct or
indirect utilisation of the environment –
reflect the perspective of the powerful
actors backing those processes. It is also
important to note that in almost all projects
Chapter Four:
Debates on environment and land
use on the Wild Coast
Introduction
In Chapter 2 the key policy thrusts of the post-apartheid government
were discussed, revealing the governments aims of rectifying the damage
caused by apartheid through the implementation of policies to improve
the lives of previously disadvantaged people. These key policy aspects
include economic development, land, environment and local governance.
Chapter 2 also showed how rural people of the Eastern Cape are
among the most disadvantaged in the country. The last chapter provided
a detailed analysis of how people in rural areas make use of vegetation in
their livelihood strategies, and illustrated that differing interpretations of
the use-benefits of vegetation determine management practices. This chap-
ter seeks to explore the range of (local and external) views on how the
local environment should be used in order to contribute to livelihoods.
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involving environmental management,
irrespective of the view held by the differ-
ent actors, people – including future
generations – are regarded as potential
beneficiaries in the long-term.
In practice, however, where the need to
enhance livelihoods of previously disad-
vantaged rural people is urgent, differing
views held by powerful people about the
environment of the Wild Coast can easily
translate into conflict between individuals,
government departments or NGOs work-
ing in the area. Where these differences are
irreconcilable, the end-result may be
numerous unco-ordinated initiatives which
may ultimately fail to achieve the objective
of improving human welfare. The situation
is exacerbated when conflicting views are
either not acknowledged or are dismissed
as unimportant: this often appears to be the
situation in South Africa (see Kepe et al.
1998). The Wild Coast is a prime example
of a situation where conflicting views
about current and proposed management
of the environment could have negative
effects on development, especially in light
of the prevailing lack of openness about
the differences.
This chapter therefore seeks to examine
an array of views held by different power-
ful people about the Wild Coast environ-
ment, and aims to consider the range of
perceptions of value and propositions for
suitable land use of the Wild Coast and the
ultimate benefits accruing to the people of
the region flowing from these various
discourses. Current and proposed projects
on ecotourism, agriculture, forestry and
community-based wildlife management are
examined in an effort to draw out both the
positive and negative aspects of each of
the dominant discourses, especially with
regard to the livelihoods of rural people in
the Wild Coast.
The chapter begins with a review of the
debate on the origins, condition and value
of the Wild Coast’s grassland vegetation.
Grasslands, which account for over 60 per
cent of the Wild Coast vegetation (Cooper
1991), have been the subject of intense
controversy over the last hundred years or
so. Discussion around the history and
significance of grasslands is followed by
an examination of current debates on the
dominant views about the best land use for
this environment. Lessons for policy are
discussed under conclusions.
The Wild Coast grasslands debate
Pure or false coastal grasslands?
Scientists have offered different explana-
tions for the abundance of grassland
vegetation in a coastal area where the
climate favours extensive forest. Some
commentators regard these grasslands to
be secondary, with the forest patches being
relics of a former extensive forest (Acocks
1953; Tainton 1981; White 1983). This
view is largely based on the reigning
successional model (Clements 1916)
which views the climax (for example, a
forest) as the highest expression of vegeta-
tion in a climatic region (Ellery & Mentis
1992). Thus, according to Acocks (1953)
the Wild Coast climate with fairly warm
winters would be dominated by forest, had
the forest not been plundered by both
African and European farmers over the last
600 years. There is, however, extensive
archaeological evidence to show that the
coastal grasslands have been in existence
for at least 10 000 years (Feely 1987;
Mckenzie 1984; Ellery & Mentis 1992).
This recent evidence further reveals that
these grasslands are edaphic, possibly
related to the well-developed and unbro-
ken B-horizon (the layer immediately
below the top soil) in most of the coastal
belt (Feely 1987). In other words, contrary
to Acock’s view, these are not ‘false’
grasslands.
Other evidence contradicting the idea
that these grasslands are of anthropogenic
origin comes from early accounts of
people who visited the area. For instance
the description of the landscape given by
Perestrello (1554), a shipwreck survivor
who trekked across the area in that year,
highlights the prominence of grassland
vegetation rather than forest. This leaves
an impression of a rather patchy distribu-
tion of woody vegetation. Much later,
other travellers passing through the coast
of eastern Pondoland commented on the
grasslands and their use. For example,
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Sampson wrote in 1882:
Before us, and as far as the eye
could see, lay a vast panorama of
undulating grassland, delicately
wreathed with low lying mist and
dotted irregularly with dark patches
of forest. It was a fair scene, and
made one dream of the day when it
will be enhanced by the presence of
many white, and many waving
cornfields (Sampson 1882:105).
Recent studies also suggest that the coastal
forests have never been more substantial
than they are at present (for example,
Shackleton et al. 1991; Nicolson et al.
1996a; Kepe & Scoones 1999). Acock’s
views may, however, still influence policy-
makers and scholars.
Condition of the coastal grasslands
According to Shackleton (1993) there is a
persistent general perception that commu-
nal grasslands in the former bantustans of
South Africa are overstocked and thus
degraded beyond recovery. This view
persists in spite of a scarcity of empirical
data drawn from study of communal
grasslands. Unsurprisingly, the grasslands
of the Wild Coast are also perceived as
degraded. Back in the early part of the 20th
century, alarm bells were sounded on the
imminent danger of overstocking in the
former Transkei. This argument is well
phrased by Fred Kockott in his proposal
for combating soil erosion in the area:
We know that it is characteristic of
the Natives that they are happy-go-
lucky; an admirable trait if not
overdone. But what of this trait when
it prevents them from stirring them-
selves and facing a danger? It is not
like a man to allow danger to come
openly upon him while he sits still
and fails to protect himself. Now the
main idea of my motion is that the
Natives of these Territories should be
aroused and made to realise the very
real danger which is coming upon
them, not slowly any longer, but in
leaps and bounds. The position
today is already grave, next year it
will be worse.... Did anyone ever
farm on a desert?... and yet that is
what their country is being turned
into (cited in Pim 1933:78–9).
As Kockott’s warnings were for the
Transkei in general, it presumably included
areas that are situated well inland and
which are drier due to less rainfall. He did,
however, have a special warning for the
Wild Coast communal areas:
Some Natives who live in coastal
districts and particularly those in
Pondoland will regard all this as an
alarm where no danger is. If they
feel so secure let them look at some
districts which are already faced
with the problem but in which not
many years ago the residents were
no less confident of their safety, and
then decide whether they can ignore
the warning (cited in Pim 1933:79).
The introduction of betterment planning, a
measure to control rangeland degradation
in the coastal areas during the 1950s, was
another testimony to the perception and
concern that the communal grasslands
were declining in quality due to misman-
agement.12  More recently, Van Wyk
(1994:230), commenting on the state of
grasslands within the Pondoland centre of
endemism, argues that ‘management
practices of the rural population have
degraded most of these grasslands, leading
to a loss of floristic diversity and an in-
crease in the unpalatable grass Aristida
junciformis’. While acknowledging the
coastal grasslands’ better condition com-
pared with that of the rest of the former
Transkei, Briers et al. (1996) also express
concern about them, especially if they are
not urgently protected from the impact
caused by rural residents of the area.
Conclusions that can be drawn from these
outside professional perceptions are that
the poor state of these grasslands is having
a negative impact on rural people living in
communal areas due to depletion of a
valuable grazing resource.
Outside professionals are not, however,
alone in their view that coastal grasslands
are degraded. Sections of the rural popula-
tion, particularly livestock keepers, have
expressed concern that unpalatable species
are increasing in the communal areas. In
eastern Pondoland, Aristida junciformis
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and Sporobulus africanus are seen by
many as the two most undesirable species.
But the perceptions a range of other grass-
land users are also important. Users with
interests other than grazing often have
alternative views on the state of the
grasslands. Those who collect thatch grass
for trading purposes, for example, have no
problem with the increase of Aristida
junciformis in communal areas. Hence
individuals or groups of people are pur-
posefully engaged in the transformation of
grasslands to sometimes opposing desired
states (Kepe & Scoones 1999).
Views on the best land use for
the Wild Coast environment
Having argued that environmental man-
agement is primarily influenced by the
views on its condition and value held by
powerful social actors, the following
section examines those views relating to
the Wild Coast environment. Based on a
review of policy documents, other second-
ary literature and personal interaction with
people within and outside the Wild Coast,
there appear to be four dominant views on
how the coastal environment should be
managed to the benefit of people. These
are the ‘conservation’, ‘profit-making’,
‘alternative’, and ‘local’ views.13
The conservation view
The perceived threat to global biodiversity
is largely responsible for the widespread
view that nature conservation should be a
key land use strategy in South Africa and
beyond, if sustainable livelihoods are a
goal. The main objective of this strategy is
to conserve and protect the country’s
natural sites and other wildlife. The physi-
cal rural environment is protected in order
to restore elements of it, as close as possi-
ble, to a previous preferred state or to
prevent damage of unaltered portions in
order to derive future benefits. There are
two main approaches to conserving nature.
The first is the ‘hands off’ approach
(Ruijgrok et al. 1999), where it is argued
that the best way to conserve nature is not
to touch it; the natural restoration capacity
of the ecosystems should prevail. The
second approach is the American National
Park model, also known as the ‘fences-
and-fines’ (Songorwa 1999) or the ‘classi-
cal’ approach. In this approach human
intervention is considered necessary to
protect the environment against threats
from society (for example, through fenc-
ing, policing, pruning or culling). Pro-
tected area management using these two
approaches can be found in many coun-
tries, including South Africa.
Following the Earth Summit in Brazil,
and the ratification of the Biodiversity
Convention, many less-industrialised
countries are seeking to transform as much
land as possible into strictly protected
areas. South Africa is no exception, with
almost a thousand protected areas in state
and private land, covering over 6 per cent
of the total land area. The first formal
conservation areas were forest reserves,
demarcated in terms of the Cape Forest Act
of 1888 (Government of South Africa
1997). Since then a host of other environ-
ments and individual species have been
afforded high conservation status.
In the former Transkei (formerly
‘Transkeian Territories’) the colonial
government took the view that the indig-
enous forests ‘suffered grievous injury at
the hands of natives’ and that ‘extensive
damage was also being caused by saw-
yers’, and introduced tough conservation
regulations (King 1938:7). Thus, following
the passing of the Cape Forest Act 28 of
1888, a large number of indigenous forests
were demarcated. Beside the almost
100 000ha of indigenous forests currently
under protection in the former Transkei,
almost 30 000ha of less important forests
are designated as ‘headmen’s forests’,
where traditional local authorities in the
villages have de jure control over them
(Cooper & Swart 1992). In order to ‘wean
the natives from the (indigenous) forests’,
Conservator of Forests in the Transkeian
Territories Caesar Henkel and his succes-
sor A Heywood introduced wattle planta-
tions to meet rural wood requirements
(King 1938:7).
Nature conservation in the Transkeian
Territories was not, however, limited to
forest protection only. Early demarcation
of important forests included sections of
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the communal grassland to provide graz-
ing for government cattle used for working
in the forest. The inclusion of communal
grasslands in the demarcated forest areas
was also to ensure land for future affores-
tation (King 1941). Later, wide grassland
strips were demarcated along the perim-
eters of the forests to serve as buffer zones
between rural people and the protected
forests.
At present an array of plant and animal
species (both terrestrial and aquatic) are
afforded protection in nature and marine
reserves along the Wild Coast. Of the
former Transkei’s 10 nature reserves, six
are situated on the Wild Coast. These are
Dwesa, Cwebe, Hluleka, Silaka, Mkambati
and Mtamvuna nature reserves (Butchart
1989). In spite of there being so many
nature reserves in a coastal stretch of only
300km, conservationists were not satisfied
with the extent of protection on the Wild
Coast (see Box 2).
In spite of the existence of alternative
proposals on land use in the Wild Coast
(for example, the planting of exotic trees),
conservation areas do not seem to be
adversely affected. Instead they seem,
ironically, to be enjoying continued protec-
tion under what appear to be inconsisten-
cies in government policies and implemen-
tation. One such situation is the govern-
ment’s land reform programme, particu-
larly the restitution component. Among the
65 land claims along the Wild Coast noted
in 1997 (Webb 1997), three fall within
important Wild Coast nature reserves
(Dwesa-Cwebe, Mkambati and Silaka).14
But environmental protection, as well as
land restitution, is enshrined in the coun-
try’s Bill of Rights (Sections 24 and 25
respectively). Consequently land claims in
Box 2: Planning of a conservation area on the Wild Coast
A 1996 report written by some well-known proponents of nature conservation in the
former Transkei (Briers et al. 1996) is probably the best representative of conservation
narratives currently prevailing on the Wild Coast. The study on which the report was
based was mainly to evaluate the conservation potential of the area and to select priority
conservation areas. The area studied stretched from Umtamvuna River to just south of
Umngazi River, approximately 18km south of Port St Johns on the Wild Coast. From the
reasons and conclusions given for the selection of this area for the study, the concern of
the Eastern Cape Nature Conservation and other proponents of conservation becomes
clear. Some of their reasons and conclusions are listed below:
· The Wild Coast is poorly conserved.
· It includes a large portion of the Pondoland centre of endemism, which has an excep-
tionally high conservation value.
· The Pondoland coastal area has been negatively affected by subsistence grazing,
sugar cane and exotic tree plantations and squatter settlements close to the Wild Coast
Sun.
· A number of development agencies working in the area plan to change the land use
of the area to satisfy short-term interests and that these initiatives are carried out
without an integrated strategic plan.
· The area is the least densely populated of the former Transkei (thus there is potential
to expand the land area under nature conservation).
The consequence of the study is a proposal for a continuous 60 000ha protected area,
covering more than a third of the Wild Coast between Umngazi Estuary and Umtamvuna
River. The size of the proposed park would represent a significant addition to the area
currently under conservation.
Source: Briers et al. 1996
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protected areas have presented the state
with a dilemma. A recent study found that
conservation officials were against any
change in land use following a successful
land claim (see Wynberg & Kepe 1999).
Mkambati, Silaka and Dwesa/Cwebe
nature reserves have all maintained their
conservation status, following initial
attempts by different social groupings to
allow the incorporation of alternative land
uses.
But how are conservation views sus-
tained and supported over time on the Wild
Coast? Firstly, the government, through its
different state agencies and the individuals
working within them, it puts its weight
behind conservation through the develop-
ment of relevant policies and legislation.
The White Paper on Conservation and
Sustainable Use of South Africa’s Biologi-
cal Diversity (Department of Environmen-
tal Affairs and Tourism 1997) provides one
example of the government’s commitment
to conservation. In addition to general
policy issues discussed in the White Paper,
an array of Acts regarding the management
of protected areas were passed before and
after the 1994 democratic elections.
Secondly, the influence on nature
conservation efforts in any locality
stretches far beyond its boundaries. A host
of national and international NGOs pro-
vide both moral and material support to
various conservation causes, including
through research on and protection of
certain species or landscapes. Within South
Africa, the Wildlife and Environment
Society (Formerly Wildlife Society of
South Africa) is probably the best-known
organisation. With membership drawn
from both academic and non-academic
fields, this organisation has for many years
been a powerful voice for conservation
through its many publications and other
publicity channels. Internationally, organi-
sations like the IUCN (the World Conser-
vation Union), the WWF (World Wide
Fund for Nature) and UNEP (United
Nations Environment Programme) are
amongst the better-known conservation
bodies. The IUCN’s six protected area
categories, which serve as a guideline in
many countries, are an illustration of the
impact the international NGOs are having
on particular local areas. In addition to
these, there are a number of environmental
campaigning organisations such as the
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth,
whose radical lobbying ranges from
campaigning for the survival of certain
species to opposing nuclear weapons
testing. At a broader level, environmental
conventions between countries under the
auspices of organisations like the United
Nations (UN) provide the most powerful
ammunition to proponents of nature
conservation.
Thirdly, formal education contributes to
individual awareness about nature conser-
vation issues. From primary school to
university, textbooks are laced with con-
servation narratives and are a reliable
method of reproducing (often unchal-
lenged) ideas about conservation. Fourthly,
and probably the most important factor in
support of the conservation discourse in
South Africa, was the politics of race in
South Africa (and other former colonies
throughout the continent). Both colonial
and apartheid policies with little regard for
the welfare of African people, provided a
vociferous protection of nature by forcibly
removing many people from their ancestral
lands (Carruthers 1993; Kepe 1999;
Fabricius & De Wet 1999). On the Wild
Coast, many rural residents were repeat-
edly fined for ‘trespassing’ in forest re-
serves throughout the 20th century. Most
notable though was the violent crushing of
revolts against betterment planning in
Pondoland in 1960, all in the name of
conserving the land. In north-eastern
Pondoland, many were shot dead by
government forces, while others were
sentenced to death (Mbeki 1984). More
recently, observers such as Wells (1996),
have argued that most protected areas in
South Africa are firmly associated with the
former apartheid regime.
However, during the early 1990s after
the unbanning of the liberation move-
ments, conservation in South Africa be-
came more vulnerable than ever before.
The media and various pressure groups,
such as the Group for Environmental
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Monitoring (GEM), began to criticise and
question the conservation approach that
had existed for many decades. As a result
of this pressure, conservation in South
Africa is currently going through funda-
mental change, with a view to ‘addressing
the inequalities of the past’. It has become
necessary for the conservation agencies to
spell out precisely how the protected areas
will benefit people, particularly those
neighbouring the reserves. On the Wild
Coast, like in the rest of the world where
protected areas exist, there are many
claims about how biodiversity contributes
to human welfare in general, hence the
need to protect it. These range from the
maintenance of the hydrological cycle to
the maintenance of genetic material from
which crops, domestic animals, medicines
and industrial products are developed, as
well as acting as an important buffer
against poverty (Department of Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism 1997).
But since many of these benefits are not
immediately and clearly visible to the
majority of the rural poor, local support for
conservation on the Wild Coast remains
minimal. Illegal use of protected plant and
animal species was commonplace through-
out the twentieth century, and seemed to
intensify during the 1990s (Kepe 1997a).
Following a worldwide trend, protected
area management on the Wild Coast is
currently adopting an approach commonly
known as community-based wildlife
management (CWM). The argument
behind this approach is that rural people
have for too long been alienated from
resources which they should rightfully
have been controlling, managing and
benefiting from (Songorwa 1999). The
CWM approach therefore aims to reverse
this pervasive alienation and to maximise
benefits for local people from the sustain-
able utilisation of wildlife. The underlying
assumption (and perhaps hope) is that
people’s attitudes towards biodiversity
conservation will change. Whether this
approach is succeeding in its goals is still
an open question. Detailed critiques of this
approach have been made and backed up
with extensive research in many parts of
Africa (for example, see Barret & Arcese
1995; Songorwa 1999). Experience has
also shown that there are differing ‘ver-
sions’ of CWM, with protected area man-
agers and at times policy-makers deciding
which will prevail in a particular area.
Such decisions are often based on the
political situation at local, regional and
national level. Hence some CWM pro-
grammes are limited to allowing villagers
to harvest certain animal and plant species
under management control (even though
this can hardly be termed a community-
controlled initiative). Some CWM pro-
grammes are more ambitious, with local
people managing the resource area with
the aim of deriving a livelihood.
On the Wild Coast, however, the view
that the Wild Coast environment should be
protected, primarily against abuse from
local people, persists and shows no signs
of imminent revision. The view is based on
the perception – held by powerful people –
that the environment is under threat and if
it is not protected it will completely disap-
pear. Biodiversity protection therefore –
applied with different intensities which
include fenced nature reserves, demarcated
forest areas and locally-controlled use of
vegetation (for example, non-harvesting of
green wood) – is seen as the most appro-
priate land use for the Wild Coast’s
‘unique’ vegetation. Counter views are
systematically dismissed by both the state
and a range of supporting institutions (for
example, universities, NGOs and others).
But these counter views are also persistent,
mainly due to their wide-ranging cross-
sector support. The next section of this
chapter is therefore going to look at how
the environment of the Wild Coast –
whether protected or not – is increasingly
seen as a potential profit-making venture.
The profit-making view
Some have seen the Wild Coast’s environ-
ment as a tool for gain, not only for the
rural poor who live in the area, but also for
the country as a whole. This emanates
from the neo-liberal view that nature has to
be viewed in economic terms (Nygren
1998; Harvey 1996). The main objective
in this view is to maximise direct and
indirect benefits derived from the environ-
27
ment. Several methods are of utilising the
environment for profit are currently being
promoted, including ecotourism, forest
extraction, mining, agriculture and so
forth. Of these, however, ecotourism15  is
internationally recognised as the single
most important venture for making the
country’s biodiversity an economically
profitable commodity (Nygren 1998;
Ceballos-Lascurain 1996; Goodwin et al.
1998). Nature-based tourism in less indus-
trialised countries is regarded as one of the
fastest-growing sectors of the economy,
generating 10 per cent of the world income
and employing 10 per cent of the world’s
workforce (Ashley & Roe 1998). While
not exclusively so, most ecotourism ven-
tures are within protected environments
such as nature reserves, national parks,
demarcated forests and so forth. Yet, it is
only recently that some studies have begun
to look at the impact of tourism on the
(protected) environment (for example see
Boo 1990; Ceballos-Lascurain 1996; Price
1996; Roe et al. 1997).
The perceived importance of protected
areas in ecotourism has over the last few
decades been coupled with resistance to a
‘fences-and-fines’ conservation approach
by local residents in favour of community-
based wildlife management. From the
conservation point of view, CWM ensures
protection of the environment by local
people, while from the economic point of
view it justifies profit-making ventures by
external investors in the name of uplifting
local people. While ecotourism is certainly
a popular choice for making CWM eco-
nomically viable, it is not the only one.
There are now programmes in other parts
of Africa which see trophy-hunting by the
rich, for example, as a means of making
the environment profitable. Established
Southern African programmes that come to
mind are the Administrative Management
Design for Game Management Areas
(Admade) in Zambia; the Communal Area
Management Programme for Indigenous
Resources (Campfire) in Zimbabwe and
Tchuma Tchato (‘our wealth’) in Mozam-
bique.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a major
government-driven project in the form of
Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs)
seeks to take advantage of the favourable
environment in the Wild Coast by introduc-
ing ecotourism to the region. The six
nature reserves and a range of natural sites
(including demarcated forests) along the
Wild Coast are a focal point for national
and international investment in ecotourism.
It is the view of the relevant provincial and
national departments responsible for
economic development and investment
that profiting from the environment
through ecotourism offers the best solution
to the area’s poverty. While it is still too
early to judge the success of this venture, it
has been observed that the private sector is
not rushing to invest in the Wild Coast as
the programme had hoped. This is prob-
ably due to the expectation that investors
must not merely profit from their invest-
ment, but must also ensure that their efforts
result in direct benefits to local
populations. Other areas of probable
concern to potential investors include
unresolved land issues, (at times violent)
community conflict and unco-ordinated
efforts on the part of government (Kepe
1999).
It must be said that tourists are not
rushing into the area in large numbers.
While wealthy overseas tourists are the
main targets of the Wild Coast ecotourism
venture, domestic tourists (who make up
the bulk of current visitors to the area) are
not particularly excited about the new
plans. This conclusion is drawn from
responses to a questionnaire about tourism
in Mkambati Nature Reserve (Kepe
2000a). From these responses it is clear
that, unlike their overseas counterparts,
local tourists do not generally care to
include visits to neighbouring villages in
their itinerary. Local tourists are also
concerned about the impact that
ecotourism will have on the environment;
in the attempt to lure overseas tourists,
they fear that the secluded and peaceful
spots along the coast will be destroyed by
modern conveniences (including large
buildings, paved roads and waste material
from the facilities).
But what do local communities say
about ecotourism? In view of the dearth of
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information available to local people about
government programmes, it is argued that
it is extremely difficult for them to make
any informed decision about ecotourism.
This said, the people of the Wild Coast
lean towards welcoming projects perceived
as potentially providing secure livelihoods.
Research experience in this area shows
that most ventures that can supply long-
term jobs to the masses of unemployed
villagers are likely to be viewed favour-
ably. However, although ecotourism on the
Wild Coast is closely linked to protected
area management, it should not be as-
sumed that local villagers make this link in
their acceptance of ecotourism. Songorwa
(1999) has warned that it would be a
mistake to think that all local communities
are interested in CWM. Research on the
Wild Coast is showing that there are
broadly two types of local communities
involved in CWM (Kepe 1997a). Firstly,
there are those who are, or may be, fortu-
nate enough to benefit directly from
ecotourism, either through employment or
some other service that they offer for a fee.
Secondly, there are those who know that
they do not stand good chances of benefit-
ing from ecotourism and thus continue to
maintain the same relationship with pro-
tected areas as before (for example, by
using protected resources illegally). It is
almost impossible to convince this latter
group that they should restrict their natural
resource usage in the interests of
ecotourism. Even in cases where the
majority of community members are
accommodated in ecotourism benefits,
experience has shown that those benefits
are more often than not very small com-
pared with those of the ecotourism opera-
tors (Pleumaron 1994).
Two other profitable land uses being
promoted as suitable for the Wild Coast
environment are forestry and agriculture.
The Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry (DWAF) estimates that there are at
least 120 000ha of land that can be affor-
ested in the Eastern Cape Province, mostly
in the communal areas of the Wild Coast.
Private companies are being encouraged to
enter into agreements with ‘communities’
in these areas, with government acting as
facilitators of the process. This declaration
of forestry as a key land use in the Wild
Coast is based on evidence that environ-
mental factors such as water and soil are
favourable for growing commercial for-
ests. In a recent study conducted to exam-
ine stakeholder perceptions about forestry
as a key land use in the Eastern Cape
(Evans & Shackleton 1998), it was found
that government and private companies
strongly favoured commercial forestry as
an important livelihood strategy. While
partly agreeing with this, NGOs and
academics argued that alternative forms of
land use were not being given adequate
consideration at either local or regional
levels. Yet, in the Wild Coast SDI plans,
forestry is being promoted as one of the
few viable options that can bring economic
development to the area. Furthermore, an
array of concerns associated with commer-
cial forestry as a key land use (for exam-
ple, land tenure and environmental impact)
are not being addressed adequately.
Similarly, government and partners
regard environmental factors on the Wild
Coast as suitable for agriculture as a
primary land use. It is envisaged that
agriculture can be profitable in at least two
ways. Firstly, through growing new crops
(for example, hemp) on state, private and
communal land, the government hopes to
encourage a new breed of farmers, mostly
from rural areas, to enter agriculture and
improve their livelihoods (Daily Dispatch
2000c). Secondly, it is intended to revive
crops such as tea that have good potential
for profit-making, but for various reasons
are not realising that potential. Prime land
for these agricultural projects lies between
Port St Johns and the Umtamvuna River.
The Department of Land Affairs has a new
policy focus which favours ‘emerging’
commercial farmers (Mertens 2000). This
is seen by key external role players as
important for these agricultural initiatives
on the Wild Coast.
In conclusion, this section has argued
that the ‘profit-making’ approach is closely
linked to a form of industrialisation of
nature. Whether this is done by planting
new crops (including exotic forests),
hunting or ecotourism, concerns are being
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raised about the impact of these projects
on the livelihoods of the local rural
populations. These plans to industrialise
the environment on the Wild Coast do not,
however, go unchallenged, as the next
section illustrates.
Alternative environmental views
‘Alternative’ views here are those which
advocate neither a hands-off approach nor
a high intensity exploitation of natural
resources. The main thrust of ‘alternative’
views is to restore, as far as possible, the
‘harmonious’ relationship between local
people and their environment (Nygren
1998). Some alternative views have strong
links with the conservation approach,
because they also seek to maintain a
certain status quo in nature, but they also
go much further. Elements which could be
considered characteristic of alternative
viewpoints (and are particularly relevant to
the Wild Coast) include:
· Modern environmental problems and, to
a certain extent poverty, are viewed as
originating from the Western division
between nature and culture. This divi-
sion allows for environmentally aggres-
sive human action (Nygren 1998).
· Nature is seen as having an inherent
value equal to that of humans (Ruijgrok
et al. 1999).
· Natural resource extraction by industry
is seen as destructive (Blignaut &
Heyman 1998; Daily Dispatch 1998;
Nygren 1998).
· The view that certain areas are ‘undis-
turbed’, ‘untouched’, ‘pristine’, ‘wild’,
and so forth.
· University academics and an array of
NGOs are the most visible supporters of
these views.
In areas like the Wild Coast where the
main concern is rural poverty, alternative
views, it is argued, have an inferior posi-
tion in development debates. Ideas around
harmonious relationships between people
and the environment find their currency in
the midst of potentially destructive devel-
opment initiatives. Under calls for sustain-
able use of the Wild Coast environment,
radical alternative views are creeping in. A
good example in the Wild Coast is the
rallying of support against dune mining in
Wavecrest area in Centani by a group
comprising people from the NGO, aca-
demic, government and independent
sectors (see Box 3).
As this example of lobbying in
Wavecrest shows, it is easy for govern-
ments to dismiss alternative views and
go ahead with projects as planned. But
the strength of the opposition lies in
Box 3: Mining in Wavecrest
Iscor Heavy Minerals has had a long-term mining interest in the Wavecrest area, Centane
district, Wild Coast. It has been known for many years that heavy mineral deposits ex-
isted in the sand dunes of this area. In 1997 Iscor was granted the prospecting permit by
the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. Earlier plans by Rombos, a prospecting
company that bought the lease during apartheid years, were rejected on the grounds that
the area has a sensitive ecosystem. The Wildlife Society of South Africa played a big role
in opposing prospecting in this area. Following the granting of the prospecting permit,
the Wildlife and Environment Society and many other people formed a lobby group
called Friends of Wavecrest. This group opposed mining in the area, arguing that the
environment and local people will be worse off. The provincial government commis-
sioned a scientific study to identify the land use most suitable to the area. Coastal &
Environmental Services, a consulting company based in Grahamstown, completed the
study in July 2000. The final recommendations included that mining would be a more
viable option than ecotourism and agriculture alone, as was being proposed by the lobby
groups and some locals. Friends of Wavecrest have not given up hope despite this set-
back. They have already distributed several responses to the study through the Internet.
Sources: Macleod 2000; Coastal and Environmental Services 2000
Chapter Four: Debates on environment and land use on the Wild Coast
30
Waking up from the dream: The pitfalls of fast-track
development on the Wild Coast of South Africa
persistence and the rallying of wider
support. For instance, the resistance to
mining enjoys the support of local commu-
nities who express concern over potential
disruption of their ‘historical relationship
with the environment’. Somewhat romantic
terminology – for example, ‘untouched’
and ‘unspoilt’ – is drawn upon, but is
couched within the current calls for a
sustainable form of development. Ironi-
cally, the movement against mining in this
area has brought together people who
would not otherwise see eye to eye on
suitable forms of sustainable environmen-
tal use for the Wild Coast area (including
conservationists, agriculturists, ecotourism
operators and academics).
North of Wavecrest, alternative views
have been less influential. Even where
forest plantations were planned on areas of
extreme biodiversity (for example, the
Natal sandstone region near Mkambati
Nature Reserve), the main call against the
move came from the conservation sector. It
is therefore concluded that alternative
views about suitable land use enjoy cur-
rency only in isolated areas about which
there is significant public awareness (for
example, Wavecrest) and where there are
sound plans for sustainable livelihoods.
This next section looks at how rural people
on the Wild Coast view their environment
and the land uses these views give rise to.
Local views
Having presented views of different
(mostly external) people on the environ-
ment of the Wild Coast and, in particular,
how it may best benefit rural people’s
livelihoods, this section explores the views
at local level. Several questions need to be
asked: How do different people at local
level perceive the state of their local
environment? What the local views are on
suitable land uses of the Wild Coast envi-
ronment, both in specific localities and
further afield? Are these views dynamic or
static and what, if anything, influences
them to change? As a starting point it is
necessary to acknowledge the important
role played by social difference in deter-
mining local perceptions about the envi-
ronment.
Local views often differ widely depend-
ing on several lines of social difference
(for example, wealth status, sex, health and
age). These differing views were illustrated
in the consideration of the grasslands
around Mkambati (Kepe & Scoones 1999)
where the landscape was shown to have
been shaped by a range of social institu-
tions and associated actors with different
goals and visions of what the environment
should look like.
But it would be misleading to suggest
that social differences such as wealth and
gender are the only influences on the way
people view their environment. In fact, a
combination of both ecological and social
dynamics affects views on the condition
and importance of the environment, and
these two streams of influence relate
closely to livelihood practices.
People view different parts of the
environment differently, depending on
what livelihood sources are important to
them (see, for example, the conflicting
views held by grazing and thatching
interests on the changing condition of
grasslands in Chapter 3). Local views of
the environment can also differ geographi-
cally or from site to site: for instance the
way people view trees in the forest area
further away from the village could differ
from the way they view trees in the resi-
dential areas. Similarly, views on the
grazing area close to the homesteads could
differ from those about stock posts
(amathanga) which are often further away
from established residential areas. Thirdly,
people’s views about the environment are
determined by specific time-related prac-
tices such as weeding, harvesting, mussel
collection and so forth. For instance,
certain leaves may need to be destroyed
during weeding, while at other times they
could be seen as a source of food (for
example, wild edible leaves). Fourthly, the
way local people think about conservation
tends to be different to the views prevalent
amongst external people. Local people
seek to protect their livelihoods, not
merely the environment. If local people are
convinced that the protection of their
livelihood means protecting the environ-
ment, then they see conservation of the
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selected ecological sites as important. But
this does require no longer using the
ecological site in the pursuit of their liveli-
hoods.
We have therefore seen that livelihood
practice, social and ecological factors play
an important role in determining local
views of the environment. On the Wild
Coast, like in most places around the
world, perceptions of local people about
the environment determine how that
environment will be used. However,
Matose and Mukamuri (1994) correctly
argue that decision making about environ-
mental use is strongly affected by power
relations. Local level views of powerful
people often prevail in the end. People for
instance draw from politics, wealth status,
culture, religion and so forth to ensure that
their views dominate and men are more
often than not the beneficiaries of the
resulting power imbalances. On the Wild
Coast, for example, Kepe (1997a) dis-
cusses how hunters see the grass within
Mkambati Nature Reserve as a bait for
wild animals after it has been burnt and
starts to regrow, while women from the
same area see mature grass as beneficial
for thatching. In this resource use conflict
men are the victors, as the grass continues
to be burnt for hunting purposes.
It has been alluded to in earlier sections
that views on the environment are dy-
namic, not only over space, but also over
time. Both social and ecological dynamics
may result in changes in views held by
people about the environment. A change in
the wealth status of a social actor from rich
to poor, for instance, may result in a
completely different outlook on the state
and value of the environment with more
thought being given to how the local
environment can contribute to their liveli-
hoods. Yet previously their environment
may have been nothing more than a place
to live. Similarly, someone who developed
the means to make use of a particular
environment (through the purchase of
tools, for example) will attach more value
to that environment than was the case
previously. In other words, the view that
person has of the environment would have
changed. An environment that has deterio-
rated (due to, for example, abuse or natural
disasters) or has improved significantly
could also have similar effect on people’s
perceptions. So may political changes that
affect access to and control over certain
environments. Taking the protected envi-
ronments as an example, legislation may
have prevented people from making use of
natural resources within these areas,
resulting in certain views about that envi-
ronment. But political changes and new
legislation allowing people to utilise the
environment could change the way they
think about environmental management.
Conclusion
In this chapter it has been argued that the
views held by different interest groups
about the environment will help to deter-
mine land use, and that the Wild Coast
environment is at the mercy of the most
dominant views or discourses. Because
views on the environment range from
seeing it as a victim of human actions to a
solution for rural poverty, the environment
represents in itself a powerful discourse
within debates about development (Nygren
1998). At the same time, it is noted that all
people justify their views by arguing that
their proposals are for the ultimate benefit
of human populations.
Over the last century or so, the conser-
vation view has been the most dominant
on the Wild Coast. For the large part of that
period protection of nature was obsessive
and involved the use of harsh policies and
methods of enforcement that demonstrated
a blatant disregard for human rights.
Government policies concerning protected
forests and the rehabilitation of communal
landscapes (betterment planning) even led
to violent revolts against the state. While
there is now a new ‘democratic’ political
dispensation in the country, there are still
no guarantees that nature conservation
programmes will be any less hostile to-
wards local people. Instead there has been
a mounting case for more land to be put
under protection (Briers et al. 1996).
National and international conservation
NGOs have also provided the government
with a range of support mechanisms,
including funding of research and some
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programmes, publicity and lobbying. The
argument for a review of the way conser-
vation programmes are implemented is
given little consideration. It is therefore
possible to conclude that future genera-
tions – for which the environment is being
conserved – are currently regarded as
more important than present ones.
It has also been shown in this chapter
that people who argue for the use of nature
for profit can be divided into two groups.
There are those who strongly favour the
conservation of nature, but also argue
(with varying degrees of sincerity) that
people can also benefit through controlled
harvesting of resources (including com-
mercial hunting) or through ecotourism
(initiatives often grouped under the term
‘community-based wildlife management’
or CWM). The second group comprises
people who make no claim to campaigning
for conservation of nature. Their view is
purely that nature is an economic resource
that should be exploited to maximise
profit. However, since they are aware of
the powerful conservation narrative, they
often make allowances for external moni-
toring of their activities (for example,
through environmental impact assessment).
Mining and forestry companies interested
in the Wild Coast are, for instance, high-
lighting the sustainable nature of their
enterprises more than their potentially
destructive aspects.
The third ‘alternative’ view advocates
the ‘harmonious’ relationship between
local people and their environment
(Nygren 1998), but rarely produces a solid
land use proposal. The view does, how-
ever, give rise to aggressive campaigning
against what are seen as atrocities against
the environment (disrupting to nature’s
harmony with human beings) in what may
be considered a welcome strategy in light
of industrialisation of the environment.
The last view on the environment of the
Wild Coast discussed in this chapter is that
of local people. In a nutshell it has been
argued that local views of the environment
are closely linked to people’s livelihoods.
Livelihoods in turn are dependent on
social and ecological dynamics. Factors of
social difference such as wealth status or
gender enhance or restrict access to and
control over resources, to determine the
range of livelihood sources a particular
social actor will be drawing from. Simi-
larly, environmental dynamics affect the
livelihood possibilities over time and
space. Thus at any one time different local
people see different parts of the environ-
ment differently and their goals also differ
depending on what livelihood sources are
important to them. In general, local people
welcome externally-introduced land uses
which will contribute to their livelihoods,
yet a dilemma arises in the face of a flood
of proposed land uses reflecting widely
differing ideologies on nature and deve-
lopment.
Aside from being an issue for local
people, the situation represents a funda-
mental impasse in the country’s policy
development. Ruijgrok et al. (1999) argue
that popular views about the environment
can directly explain trends in environmen-
tal policy-making. But when these views
conflict – although conflict is not necessar-
ily negative – policy implementation in the
form of projects can be confusing and, at
times, disastrous. It is easy to conclude that
most views about the environment on the
Wild Coast can co-exist. It is, however, the
implementation of land use options as
guided by perceptions of powerful people
– by different government departments
and other related organisations – that is of
concern. Experience in South Africa has
shown that the departmentalisation of
policy implementation processes results in
unco-ordinated efforts, although success
might have been achieved had there been
honesty and openness between the key
people (Wynberg & Kepe 1999).
It is important to remember that dis-
courses on the environment and develop-
ment are ultimately about people who, for
the most part, are living in poverty. Those
involved in the debates need to appreciate
the realities on the ground and focus on
how injustices to rural people can be
minimised. Discourses favoured by the
powerful should never give reason to




11 These range from international or
national NGOs and national govern-
ments to individual household mem-
bers at village level.
12 Cape Town archives, 1/LSK 142.
13 With the exception of the ‘local view’,
this typology has adapted and ex-
panded earlier propositions by
Ruijgrok et al. 1999 and Nygren 1998.
14 Silaka Nature Reserve is near Port St
Johns.
15 ‘Alternative tourism’, ‘sustainable
tourism’ and ‘green tourism’ are
alternative terms for ecotourism. (Roe
et al. 1997).
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Background
The Wild Coast Spatial Development
Initiative
The two contrasting features (extreme
poverty and natural beauty) of the Wild
Coast area have combined to result in this
area being declared a focal point for
economic development, due to its potential
and need for development (see Chapter 4).
It is assumed that the area’s natural beauty
presents a window of opportunity to
encourage ecotourism-related investment,
which will in turn result in improvements
to infrastructure and services as well as the
quality of life in general. The current Wild
Coast SDI was initiated by the Department
of Trade and Industry in 1996, and was
based on similar plans which were initiated
by the former Transkeian government but
never implemented (Government of
Transkei 1982; Nicolson 1993). A docu-
ment outlining a similar initiative was
produced by the Eastern Cape Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Environment and Tour-
ism as recently as 1995, with the intention
of gaining financial backing from the
national government, parastatals and the
private sector (Government of the Eastern
Cape 1995). For the current SDI initiative,
three baseline reports were commissioned
to focus attention on the environmental
(Nicolson et al. 1996a), tourism (Nicolson
et al. 1996b) and land issues (Land and
Agriculture Policy Centre 1996).
Several development nodes have been
identified by the Wild Coast SDI, including
Dwesa/Cwebe/Nqabara, Coffee Bay/Hole
in the Wall, Port St Johns Projects, Magwa
and Mkambati areas (see Figure 2). The
aim is to attract ecotourism ventures in
these ‘anchor’ project areas, with the hope
that the improvement in infrastructure and
other investments will encourage a range
of economic initiatives in the surrounding
areas. It is hoped that the five nature
reserves (Dwesa, Cwebe, Hluleka, Silaka
and Mkambati), together with areas such
as Hole-in-the-Wall, will attract both
national and international tourists to the
Wild Coast.
While the main focus of the Wild Coast
SDI is tourism, agriculture and forestry
have been identified as enterprises with a
potential to contribute to development. In
1997, for instance, the Department of
Chapter Five:
Debating the Wild Coast SDI
Introduction
Previous chapters made only brief reference to the Wild Coast SDI. The
primary aim of this report is to analyse the dynamics of the Wild Coast
SDI, mainly through the case studies (Chapters 68), and this chapter is
devoted to providing more detailed background on the initiative. This is
accomplished by focusing on the brief history and geographical location
of the SDI projects in the former Transkei, the debates that have emerged
since their introduction, and analysis of the implementation process. The
chapter concludes by drawing lessons and implications for policy, and
emphasises the central role of social processes in development.
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Water Affairs and Forestry began a drive to
encourage forestry in the Eastern Cape.
This department estimated that there are at
least 120 000ha of land that can be affor-
ested, mostly in the communal areas of the
Wild Coast. Private companies are encour-
aged to enter into partnerships with com-
munities in these areas, with the govern-
ment acting as facilitator of the process.
These plans have been discussed and
publicised at several consultative meetings
for forestry development and investor
conferences which focused on the Wild
Coast SDI. These consultative meetings
and conferences attracted media attention,
which added to the ongoing debate on
some of the challenges faced by the Wild
Coast SDI.
Debates on the Wild Coast SDI
Like many other development projects all
over the world, the Wild Coast SDI has
attracted both optimistic and sceptical
reactions from different sectors in South
Africa. The supporters, mainly politicians
of the ruling African National Congress
government at both provincial and national
levels, clearly put their weight behind the
project, seeing it as part of the answer to
the economic woes of one of the poorest
regions of the country. This positive
outlook has largely been based on the
perceived successes of similar endeavours
in countries like Kenya, India, Dominica
and others (Koch et al. 1998a). The vari-
ous departments and agencies tasked with
planning and implementing the project (for
Chapter Five: Debating the Wild Coast SDI
Figure 2: Map of the Wild Coast from Dwesa to Mkambati
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example, the Department of Trade and
Industry and the Development Bank of
Southern Africa) shared their optimism
enthusiastically with the public through the
media, public gatherings and other promo-
tional activities. Interestingly, this opti-
mism (genuine or otherwise) is shared by
people in or close to the immediate anchor
project areas (for example, local govern-
ment officials and potential beneficiaries).
On the other hand, sceptics raise doubts
about the SDI concept, with both opposi-
tion politicians and independent econo-
mists such as Marais (1998) arguing that
very few people will actually benefit from
the Wild Coast SDI. Bantu Holomisa, a
leading opposition politician, even labelled
the concept ‘neo-colonialism of a special
kind’ (Bishop 1997a). Some are more
concerned about the negative environmen-
tal impact which the proposed large-scale
investments will have on the Wild Coast
(Webb 1997; Schmidt & Doonan 1997;
Bishop 1997b). However, most of these
concerns are raised by or through the
media, largely by journalists who spend
little time and effort in gathering sufficient
details about the real issues and conse-
quently focus merely on the basic concept
of SDIs, with little attention to the process
of implementation.
It is possible, however, that the emer-
gence of a new programme, the Commu-
nity Public Private Partnerships (CPPP),
launched by the Department of Trade and
Industry late in 1999, was a response to
criticism levelled at the SDIs nationally.
According to Streek (2000) the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry ‘discovered
during the spatial development initiative
that private-sector involvement alone was
not sufficient to promote economic devel-
opment in rural areas’. However, govern-
ment and SDI co-ordinators have always
emphatically denied that private sector, to
the exclusion of poor communities, had a
special place in the SDI programme (see
Mahlati 1998). Yet the CPPP is now her-
alded as a strategy designed to achieve the
very goals that the SDIs should have
realised. For instance according to Umnoto
(2000) the CPPP ‘is committed to unlock-
ing the economic value of state or commu-
nity-owned land and, in so doing, revitalis-
ing rural economies, reducing poverty,
increasing community empowerment and
promoting sustainable resource use in
some of the country’s poorest regions’. It
is possible to discern clear overlap in both
the language and vision of the two pro-
grammes, yet those behind the initiatives
have thus far been unable to clarify the
relationship between them.
Nevertheless, since the SDIs arise from
and are embedded within a macro-eco-
nomic policy that is fully supported by
government, and that resources have
already been invested in planning and
marketing the idea, criticism of the SDI (or
CPPP) concept is unlikely to yield any
positive results. The alternative view is that
efforts should rather be directed at making
positive contributions to the processes of
implementation in the targeted areas. Thus,
current challenges in the Wild Coast SDI in
relation to the interest of the potential rural
beneficiaries are more about practical
details which are related to local social
dynamics and how outside development
agents respond to them. These challenges
are evident throughout the coast, but not
all of them are fully acknowledged by
those attempting to implement the SDI.
In elaborating on these process-related
challenges, the next section draws on
findings from the three case study areas
which are all anchor projects of the Wild
Coast SDI (Port St Johns, Magwa and
Mkambati – see Chapters 6–8). This
section aims to complement earlier argu-
ments for a process approach to develop-
ment projects by exploring the unfolding
of the processes and the impact of the
social dynamics, such as communication
and conflict management strategies em-
ployed by the SDI to relate to potential
beneficiaries. The focus is on dynamics at
the local level, but analysis also draws on
processes at regional, provincial and
national levels. This discussion is not an
attempt to evaluate the merits of the SDI as
a strategy to improve the welfare of poor
rural people. Rather, it seeks to make a
positive contribution by highlighting areas
which are often under-emphasised during
project implementation, but which are
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crucial in both the foundational and subse-
quent stages of the development process.
The discussion begins with a brief review
of literature regarding process approaches
to development. This is followed by an
analysis of process-related activities of the
Wild Coast SDI.
Analysing process on the
Wild Coast SDI
When the SDIs were first introduced in
1996, formerly disadvantaged rural people
were the main targets in terms of benefits.
For this reason, concepts such as ‘commu-
nity-based development’, ‘empowerment’,
‘participation’ and so forth became familiar
rhetoric within the SDI (for example see
Mahlati 1999; Anderson & Galt 1998;
Koch et al. 1998a). However, since devel-
opment is about people, concepts have to
be translated into practice in ways which
will eventually benefit people. It is argued
therefore that viewing development as a
process should be a key requirement for all
projects.
Development as a process
Process approaches to development gained
prominence as a response to the ineffec-
tiveness of development projects which
took a blueprint or top-down approach to
development (Bond & Hulme 1999). Over
the last two decades, a rich body of litera-
ture has been devoted to process ap-
proaches in development (for example,
Korten 1980; Hulme 1989; Chambers
1997; Mosse 1998; Bond & Hulme 1999).
According to Bond and Hulme (1999)
there are two main schools of thought in
which the proponents of process ap-
proaches fall. The ‘purists’, on the one
hand, argue for the abandonment of the
concept of ‘project’ and see process as
synonymous with local institutional devel-
opment in which the role of the external
agent and resources are kept to a mini-
mum. The ‘managerialists’ conversely see
the role of external agents as key, but
argue that projects, managers and manage-
ment systems must be more flexible and
adaptive. Some writers have played it safe
by making arguments that fuse both
schools of thought. Mosse (1998), for
instance, argues that viewing development
as a process means being conscious that all
projects have permeable boundaries and
are influenced by a wider social and
institutional environment. This could then
lead to the treatment of development
projects as flexible systems with dynamic
procedures and processes. Mosse further
argues that this conception of development
as a process marks an important shift away
from the focus on project inputs and
outputs and the assumed mechanical link
between them, and instead provides a
device for thinking and talking about
complex social realities in new ways. This
line of thought met with popular interest
and it has come to be acknowledged that a
more plausible approach for analysing
development projects at micro-level is to
view them as a dynamic concept of inter-
action between strategic groups,
(Bierschenk 1988). Thus, project imple-
mentation becomes less of a planned
programme, and more a constant process
of negotiation between people who have
their own respective ‘projects’. A similar
view is offered by Crehan and Von Oppen
(1988) who argue that development
projects should not be seen only in terms
of their goals and their achievement or
non-achievement, but rather as a social
event and an arena of struggle between
different groups with diverse interests.
While the role of the outsider (develop-
ment agent) may be influential, it is not the
only role.
Arguments for a process approach are
based on the premise that what matters
isn’t what is done, but how it is done.
Bond and Hulme (1999) extend this by
arguing that it is not only the way you do
it, it is whom you do it with. Thus process
approach to intervention does not merely
incorporate participation of beneficiaries; it
entails re-arrangement of the involvement
of stakeholders in objective-setting, de-
sign, implementation and monitoring of
the programme. This should entail a
redistribution of power and influence over
decision-making. Therefore a strategic
involvement of external agents becomes a
necessity if social dynamics that could
make or break a project are to be taken
seriously.
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In spite of increased efforts to encour-
age process-oriented approaches to devel-
opment over the last few decades, many
projects in South Africa are characterised
by a lack of understanding of key social
processes and their vital role in develop-
ment. Instead, social dynamics are often
under-recognised, treated lightly or viewed
as sources of problems which delay or
disrupt project implementation (Mosse
1998; Kepe 1999). This is not to say that
project planners and implementers are not
concerned about the people for whom
development projects are initiated. The fact
remains that project deadlines and techni-
cal notions of successful implementation
are often held by external agents at the
expense of attention to social dynamics in
development projects. Contributing social
factors such as the poor social training
background of project planners and imple-
menters, lack or improper use of relevant
social research findings, political pressure
and lack of co-ordination of activities by
the agencies involved in the project are
understated. It cannot be overemphasised
that the agencies that initiate development
projects should stress an interest in peo-
ple’s participation in them. Apparently, an
array of attitudinal factors at external and
local levels can directly or indirectly affect
the quality of people’s participation in
projects. It is therefore obvious that with
good and honest intentions on the part of
development agents, people’s participation
is not a factor to be treated lightly. Finan-
cial and human capital investments, even
those with frustratingly minimal returns,
should not lose sight of the many chal-
lenges involved in encouraging fair partici-
pation of people in projects. The adoption
of the process approach is equivalent to
clearing the ground for effective develop-
ment. This clearing of the ground through-
out the life of the project should therefore
be seen as a way of enhancing the chances
of success.
Cases of Wild Coast SDI processes
Two issues can be singled out as having
resulted in intense debate about the SDI
process on the Wild Coast. The first one
concerns land rights of local people in the
targeted project areas. In addition to
numerous land claims that existed in
targeted areas along the coast, the delays
in the implementation of the government’s
tenure reform programme have resulted in
many uncertainties in relation to who holds
what kind of land rights, and whether these
rights are secure or not. This uncertainty
has made difficult the establishment of
deals between communities and investors.
However, the issue that has mostly affected
the implementation of the projects and
which is closely tied with land reform in
these areas is the definition of beneficiary
‘communities’ (Kepe 1999). In their
statements, the SDI emphasises that pri-
mary benefits would go to communities
who are the rightful owners of the land that
are affected by the projects. Consequently,
conflicts have arisen among potential
beneficiaries in certain localities, deeply
affecting the implementation of the SDI.
This is not to say that all conflicts in these
areas are related to land issues. A host of
other issues including political affiliations
are responsible for SDI-related conflicts.
What has become clear is that conflict
management within the SDI is crucial if
any success is to be achieved.
The second issue that has been debated
intensely, albeit at a very general level, is
the question of the communication strategy
employed by the SDI to make people
aware of the planned development. News-
paper reports have insinuated that people
are not well informed about the SDI (Webb
1997; Schmidt & Doonan 1997). These
reports have been fiercely denied by SDI
personnel and have been labelled as
uninformed and irresponsible (see Mahlati
1998). As mentioned earlier in this report,
the limited time spent by journalists in any
particular area may lend itself to unfair
presentation of the realities. Hence a closer
look at the dynamics in the selected case
study areas through social research could
shed some light. It is only on the basis of
such (research) efforts that one can make
well-informed statements about realities on
the ground. Thus the next section will
explore local experiences of the communi-
cation strategy of the SDI which affected
the consultation process, as well as how
conflicts are dealt with.
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Communication in the Wild Coast SDI
That information constitutes one of the
most important links in the development
chain is an understatement. If it is agreed
that knowledge is power (Davies 1994),
then adequate information must be both
given and received in the development
arena if empowerment and participation is
to take place. In the context of develop-
ment projects such as SDIs, planners and
implementers need physical and social
information about the geographical area of
the planned intervention. People in that
particular locality also need as much
information as possible about the project,
both before and during implementation.
Information for local people is even more
crucial in cases where, as with the SDIs,
the project did not originate from a local-
ity-specific needs assessment, but from a
national strategy that makes assumptions
about the needs of people in general.16
Gow and Vansant (1983) correctly point
out that information is a necessary ingredi-
ent in encouraging local people to partici-
pate in and embrace a development
project. One may ask: ‘How will local
people benefit if they do not participate
actively in the project?’ If inadequate
information is considered as only one of
the barriers to active participation, how can
they participate if they do not have ad-
equate knowledge about the project? How
will they gain adequate knowledge about
the project if they have not been ade-
quately informed? This list could be
expanded, but the main focus of this
section is to establish whether or not local
people were adequately informed about
the SDI and what the consequences were.
While the Wild Coast SDI was con-
ceived by the cabinet in 1995 (Jourdan
1998) and groundwork in the form of
background studies began seriously in
1996, it can be argued that the potential
beneficiaries in the rural areas did not hear
about it until 1997. Like any other process
within the development arena, the initial
communication strategy of the Wild Coast
SDI was faced with numerous constraints.
Even in a case where simply informing
people about the already planned interven-
tion in the Wild Coast was the main objec-
tive, two categories of constraints were
evident, namely, the message and the
channels of communication.
The message
Apart from senior government officials,
relevant project personnel and consultants,
very few people knew about the origins
and detailed plans of the SDI at first. The
baseline reports on land, environment and
tourism which were produced in 1996
were too technical, lacked basic informa-
tion on the SDI and were never widely
available to the public. Even civil servants
within the government sectors affected by
the Wild Coast SDI (for example, conser-
vation officials) have confessed their
limited knowledge of the project plans.
The two investor conferences in November
1997 and April 1998 and several consulta-
tion meetings organised by the Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry provided
packages of information which were
mainly targeted to potential investors.
These meetings served to introduce oppor-
tunities that existed for investment on the
Wild Coast, and provide information on
how investors might be involved. Other
than this, and until a website for the Wild
Coast SDI was introduced in May 1998
and a special issue on the SDIs in general
was published by the journal Development
Southern Africa in December 1998, the
public knew very little about the Wild
Coast SDI. While brief reports of state-
ments made by government officials on
the project were reported in the Daily
Dispatch regional newspaper, the Wild
Coast SDI process of implementation was
already at an advanced stage.
It was therefore not surprising that even
those who were tasked with informing or
consulting with the people in the anchor
project areas did not have much informa-
tion about what the SDI on the Wild Coast
meant for the people. In July 1997 for
example, a facilitator who was supposed to
inform people living in the vicinity of an
anchor project area confessed: ‘I have not
heard from the people who sent me for
about a month now and I have no clue
about what to say to people about this
SDI’. When specific plans about particular
projects were eventually communicated to
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some people in the affected localities,
news of further developments in these
projects did not always reach the same
people. A good example of this is the plan
to build a toll road between Port St Johns
and Port Edward which was shelved in late
1997. By June 1999 there were still villag-
ers in the affected areas who were not
aware of the change of plans.
At times the content of an SDI message
to affected communities would be detailed,
but transmission was rushed, ill-placed in
terms of process, and with minimal follow-
up. A good example of this is the presenta-
tion of models for promoting local empow-
erment in tourism-led SDI projects. These
were detailed models which included
several options for local people to choose
from (for examples see Koch et al. 1998b)
in the form of Power Point presentations.
Slide shows, primarily in English with
limited translation into local languages,
were given by SDI consultants. In most
cases, only a morning or an afternoon
would be devoted to the presentations,
resulting in people having to make hasty
choices. In some areas (for example,
Mkambati) the presentation of these em-
powerment models represented the first
opportunity people had of hearing about
the Wild Coast SDI. Nevertheless these
sessions presumed that people had prior
detailed knowledge about the concept and
nature of SDIs.
Consequently, these detailed informa-
tion sessions fell short of achieving their
objectives as people were left confused or
had to rush their decisions. In other words,
on the rare occasions when information
was detailed, it failed to serve the desired
purpose because of questionable planning
of the process, and the inappropriateness
of the channels through which information
was provided.
Channels of communication
The channel through which any informa-
tion is shared is crucial to the effectiveness
of any communication strategy. It should
be borne in mind, however, that the choice
of the communication channel often
depends on who is communicating what
message to whom (Bembridge 1991). In
the case of the Wild Coast SDI, community
facilitators seconded from the Independent
Development Trust (IDT) and the provin-
cial Department of Local Government and
Housing were seen as key to the communi-
cation strategy for this development
project. Consultants were hired to manage
the facilitators and the entire community
consultation process. These facilitators
were to introduce the Wild Coast SDI to
local people and assist in the establishment
of local committees to deal with subse-
quent SDI-related issues.
Direct contact between the beneficiary
communities and the facilitators was to be
the main channel of communication. A
study by Anderson and Galt (1998),
however, showed that reliance on radio (37
per cent) took precedence over direct
channel of communication (17 per cent) as
means of engagement among the actors.
The functional ability of these facilitators
to effectively engage the communities was
inhibited by two main factors:
1. A lack of understanding of the prevail-
ing local social dynamics by virtue of
being ‘outsiders’.
2. An apparent lack of knowledge about
SDIs in general, and the SDI process in
the Wild Coast in particular.
In Port St Johns and Mkambati, tensions
existed between the local government
officials and the traditional leaders. Sup-
porters of traditional authorities, therefore,
viewed these facilitators with great suspi-
cion. The situation worsened as the
facilitators reneged on their duties, blam-
ing the hostility of local people and the
lack of transport on the fact that they live
in widely-dispersed settlements.
Secondly, in cases where no apparent
hostility existed between local people and
the facilitators, there were problems related
to the organisation of meetings. Scheduled
meetings were not well advertised, notices
were often within a day or two of the
scheduled meeting and in most cases,
meetings would be cancelled on short
notice. Poorly planned (and advertised)
meetings (Terblanche 1997) reduced the
effectiveness of the entire consultation
strategy.
In a few cases where a fair amount of
advertising did take place well ahead of a
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facilitator’s meeting, encouraging people
to attend was a challenge where people
didn’t have a vested interest in the issues at
stake. This situation became worse during
the growing season, when people often
pass comments such as ‘abantwana bam’
abatyi zintlanganiso, baty’ umbona’ (my
children don’t eat meetings, they eat
maize).
Political affiliations also tended to affect
participation in the Wild Coast SDI meet-
ings. In cases where political parties were
used to organise a meeting, people belong-
ing to opposing parties would either not be
informed or feel not welcome at the meet-
ing. This has been a big problem in certain
areas where local people were divided
between the African National Congress
and the United Democratic Movement
(UDM), as is the case in Port St Johns and
Mkambati. For fear of intimidation and in
some cases as a means of safeguarding
themselves, facilitators would identify with
the dominant party. In the run-up to the
second democratic elections of 1999, it
was rumoured that some community
facilitation meetings were used for cam-
paigning by certain organisations rather
than consulting on the Wild Coast SDI.
It is thus not surprising that only 23 per
cent of households on the Wild Coast,
most of whom are in the anchor project
areas had ever heard of the SDI (Anderson
& Galt 1998). Most important of all,
Andersen and Galt concluded, ‘access to
information about the SDI is dangerously
low’ (Ecsecc 1998:4).
The effects of this sloppy communica-
tion strategy on the Wild Coast SDI are
likely to be felt for a long time to come.
Improved information exchange would
have positive effects at any stage of the
process, but this would require better
planning and proper utilisation of available
information on local dynamics. Dealing
with these constraints requires a unified
effort from both local and external people.
Even though the importance of infor-
mation and knowledge has been empha-
sised as being crucial for encouraging
active local participation in the Wild Coast
SDI, it should be emphasised that there are
numerous other development processes in
need of similar attention. Managing con-
flicts related to projects is another area of
concern. The next section reviews experi-
ences of the Wild Coast SDI in this regard.
Conflict management in the Wild Coast SDI
Conflict within development contexts has
become a force to contend with, because it
is complex, dynamic, widespread and
often destructive (Swift 1996). As the three
case studies show (see Chapters 6–8),
conflict has been part of life within the
Wild Coast rural areas for many decades.
However, developments such as land
reform and the SDI have resulted in new
dynamics. Conflicts which the Wild Coast
SDI has been confronted with include
those between the people (i) who claim
rights to the same piece of land; (ii) who
redefine, for reasons of benefit, the
boundaries of the ‘local community’; (iii)
who have unequal representation in struc-
tures, which is perceived to directly benefit
the individuals concerned; and (iv) who
have different political affiliations. All
these conflicts have made it impossible for
the SDI to continue smoothly on the Wild
Coast. Individuals working within the Wild
Coast SDI have thus developed strategies
for dealing with these conflicts. Some of
these strategies have worked, others have
not. In cases where conflict management
strategies used by the SDI team have not
achieved much success, the intervention
and expertise of other actors, including
government departments and consultan-
cies, have been solicited. A number of
conflict management strategies have been
employed.
Denial
When the SDI was first introduced to the
villagers of the Wild Coast, it appeared that
the project planners and implementers
were not prepared for potential conflicts. It
was only after studies were commissioned
by the provincial Department of Land
Affairs to look at the land situation in the
anchor project areas (for example,
Ntsebeza 1997; Kepe 1997b; Manona &
Manona 1997), that the conflict situation
was brought to the attention of the SDI
team. Their initial response to the evidence
of conflict in these areas was to deny its
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existence. This suited very well the ‘fast-
track’ approach that had been adopted by
the SDI. Denying that real conflict existed
in these areas would allow plans to be
implemented without complication.
As Howard and Baker (1984) argue,
denying the existence of conflict does not
make it go away, but they also argue that
when the issue in conflict is not a crucial
one, denial may be the appropriate choice.
Assuming that the SDI team was fully
informed on when and why conflict issues
could be denied, it could be concluded that
land issues were not seen initially as being
a serious source of conflict on the Wild
Coast.
Unfortunately, the strategy of denying
the existence of conflict from land-based
issues on the Wild Coast proved to be
unsuccessful, as the conflict escalated
instead of abating. Other strategies were
therefore needed.
Playing down the conflict
Following the failure of the denial strategy,
the SDI team adopted an approach to ‘play
down’ the conflict. For instance, some
community facilitators and officials from
the Department of Land Affairs working in
conflict areas were so anxious to see
progress in their work that they went on to
make passionate pleas to conflicting
groups to put differences aside and work
together so that they could all benefit from
this development. These pleas, however,
were not accompanied by any serious
effort to address the causes of the conflict.
Howard and Baker (1984) argue that
where people who are involved are not in a
position to handle the conflict positively
(as was the case with the facilitators), this
strategy may be the best choice. However,
on the Wild Coast this approach did not
work either.
Mediation
In areas where the conflict did not dimin-
ish, such as in Mkambati where different
groups were contesting the same land for
restitution, the SDI resorted to independent
mediation. In Mkambati, under the aus-
pices of an independent mediator, the
conflicting groups reached certain agree-
ments intended to allow for unity of pur-
pose and togetherness. However, the SDI
team and facilitators failed to enforce the
implementation of the agreed resolutions,
with the result that no meaningful inroads
were made towards resolving the conflicts.
In some cases, however, the SDI team
encouraged other departments, which have
responsibility for issues directly related to
the causes of the conflict, to get involved.
In all the three case study areas, govern-
ment departments such as the Department
of Land Affairs and the Eastern Cape
Department of Local Government and
Housing were brought in to deal with
specific conflicts. This seemed to work
very well.
Use of power
Power, whether political or economic, was
sometimes used to ‘manage’ conflicts
which appeared complicated. While the
SDI team cannot be directly implicated,
they have on many occasions continued to
work in situations where they were aware
that political power was being used to
either intimidate or marginalise certain
groupings. This was the case in Port St
Johns and in Mkambati. In both cases,
groups or individuals opposed to certain
actions related to the implementation of the
SDI were labelled by their opponents as
having ‘political motives’ or being ‘anti-
development’. During the run-up to the
elections, conflicting factions invited
leaders from different political parties to
speak as a way of strengthening their own
positions. Unfortunately, this seemed
convenient to several SDI personnel who
capitalised on the labelling, perhaps seeing
it as an opportunity to get rid of voices that
challenged the SDI process. This seemed
to work for a while as some opposing
factions simply withdrew from participat-
ing in the SDI-related activities in their
areas. The question that remains is why
sustainable strategies for conflict resolution
were never employed.
Most recently, some SDI and Depart-
ment of Land Affairs personnel were
alleged to have told conflicting factions
that if they would not stop the in-fighting,
they would lose out on development. It is
also alleged that villagers were told that
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investors would look for alternative sites
where people were not fighting over
control of resources (for example, land) or
who should represent them. In this way
conflicting groups were forced to work
together without resolving the conflicts.
There is no doubt that, in all these
examples, the main goal of the SDI and
partners has remained that of speeding up
the delivery of benefits to residents of one
of the poorest areas in South Africa. Unfor-
tunately, this honest intention was not
coupled with problem-free processes.
Commitment of financial and human
resources, patience, and willingness to
learn from existing information on local
dynamics could contribute positively to the
processes of dealing with conflict. In this
situation of groups who do not always see
eye to eye, Bierschenk (1988) argues that
projects represent arenas of negotiation for
strategic groups, who act according to their
own interests, using different frames of
reference for social interaction. He there-
fore argues that projects are never com-
plete failures nor complete successes.
Appreciation of this fact by project plan-
ners and implementers could lead to more
positive ways of dealing with conflict.
Conclusion
In this chapter the government’s efforts to
redress past inequalities by implementing
economic development programmes to
improve the welfare of the poor is ac-
knowledged. However, it is evident that
greater commitment is needed if people’s
participation in projects like the Wild Coast
SDI is to be more than a ‘trendy slogan’
(Cernea 1985). This can be achieved
through seeing development as a process,
where the social relationship dimensions of
a project are not always treated as having a
secondary importance, or viewed as a
source of problems. The planners of
national strategies like the SDI in which
initial planning is done based on general
perceptions of need rather than site-spe-
cific needs should realise the shortcomings
of their approach. They need to invest
more effort in facilitating the processes that
will better impact on national development
as well as stimulate local interest in sus-
tainable projects.
In this case, investing in intensive local
consultation or information dissemination
about the project and how people can get
involved, as well as a serious commitment
to managing conflicts which may arise, is
seen as a worthwhile endeavour. These
two aspects of the development process
crucial if the ground is to be cleared for
people to participate fully in the project.
While the hasty pace at which the Wild
Coast SDI seems to have been imple-
mented could be justified in many ways,
there are no real excuses for overlooking
crucial issues in the development process.
While poor infrastructure in the area has
contributed to poor communication, better
planning and co-ordination of resources
(including those made available by other
government departments) could (and still
can) improve information flows about the
Wild Coast SDI. Similarly, as Mahlati
(1999) puts it, conflict arising from the
communities should be seen as part both
of the solution and of the problem. This
can change the over-negative attitude
about conflict in the development process.
Needless to say, it should be realised that
not all conflicts can be resolved, but they
can be managed in such a way that
progress can be ensured without alienating
any social actor from the development
process.
Notes
16 In fairness, it needs to be acknowl-
edged that the origins of the SDI are
based on a well-documented history
of the marginalisation of black rural
people in South Africa. That the rural
poor are impoverised and the situation
needs to be rectified is generally
acknowledged. However, the specific
needs of each locality are unique.
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The information presented in this chapter
was collected using various sources.
Firstly, secondary sources such as the Wild
Coast SDI planning documents, consultant
reports, newspaper reports and other
historical material were consulted. Sec-
ondly, regular visits over a two-year period
were made to Port St Johns, Mtumbane
and Sicambeni. During these visits key
people were interviewed where possible.
In Sicambeni, village focus group meet-
ings, attendance of imbizo at the head-
man’s place and household interviews
formed the main research strategies. The
household interviews were conducted as
part of a University of the Western Cape
student’s anthropology honours project
(see Nqeketo 2000). The student spent
about ten days in Sicambeni.
Part One: Port St Johns and
the SDI
Overview
Port St Johns is located approximately
100km from Umtata, almost at the centre
of the Wild Coast area. Administratively it
falls within the Umzimvubu Magisterial
District. It is thought to derive its name
from the Sao Joao, a ship that sank on this
coastline in 1552 (Wild Coast SDI 1998).
Established in the late 19th century as a
natural sea port of the Transkeian Territo-
ries (Henkel 1903), Port St Johns is the
only town in the Wild Coast area with its
own municipality. After being reserved as
a white enclave by the apartheid govern-
ment the town was handed over to the
‘independent’ Transkei in 1978 (Ntsebeza
Chapter Six:
Port St Johns area: Land, politics
and unheard voices
Introduction
This chapter aims to explore the politics of economic development and
land reform in the Port St Johns area. The chapter is divided into three
parts. The first focuses on the general background of Port St Johns as
one of the anchor projects for the Wild Coast SDI. The second part
considers the political dynamics of the SDI in Mtumbane, the township
of Port St Johns, and the final section focuses on Sicambeni village, a
coastal communal area next to the town of Port St Johns. Issues of
economic development and land conflict with regard to Sicambeni village
are explored in some detail. The case study concludes by identifying
challenges and opportunities for policy and implementation processes in
both land reform and economic development.
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1997). There are an estimated 7 000
people living in Port St Johns town (Daily
Dispatch 2000c).
The Port St Johns area receives more
than 1 200mm of rainfall per annum,
mostly in spring and summer. It is an area
of exceptional plant diversity, with some
80 patches of state forests, some as large
as 934ha each and numerous patches of
headmen’s forests (Cawe & Ntloko 1997).
The richness of the vegetation, together
with the shore and estuaries that are en-
dowed with a range of marine resources
enhances the attractiveness of Port St
Johns as a tourist destination (Stavrou et al.
1996).
In 1996 Port St Johns, together with
four other sites along the coast, was identi-
fied as a primary node for tourism devel-
opment within the Wild Coast SDI. The
development of Port St Johns as a prime
tourist destination had been mooted over
several decades. The former Transkei
government commissioned several studies
that looked at how Port St Johns and other
coastal areas could be revitalised and
developed (Vandeverre et al. 1989; Gov-
ernment of Transkei 1982; Nicolson 1993).
Then, after 1994, the government of the
new Eastern Cape province conducted
another study for coastal development in
which Port St Johns was again proposed as
a key tourist attraction in need of develop-
ment (Government of the Eastern Cape
1995).
Other than these homeland and provin-
cial plans, Port St Johns has managed to
attract other forms of attention relating to
its economic development potential.
Firstly, in 1995 there was an attempt by
former Deputy Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism Bantu Holomisa to get
funding to convert the disused Mt Thesiger
army base into an environmental education
centre. Secondly, in 1996 a World Wide
Fund-South Africa (WWF-SA) participa-
tory planning workshop resulted in propo-
sition and endorsement of over 22 socio-
economic development projects by local
people (Environment and Development
Report 1998).17  According to Hugh
Tyrell, one of the co-ordinators of these
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initiatives, some of these projects have
been implemented in one form or another.
Thirdly, Port St Johns was chosen as one
of five pilot towns in the former Transkei
region as a Presidential Lead Project. A
Presidential Project Task Team was set up
to focus on local government capacity
building and other forms of economic
development.
The Wild Coast SDI had the following
objectives in Port St Johns:
· promotion of investment
· promotion of small, medium and micro-
enterprises (SMMEs) around Port St
Johns to facilitate local economic
growth
· empowerment of the Port St Johns
community and surrounding areas
through involvement in decision mak-
ing, job opportunities, providing skills
and involvement in business operations
· facilitation of infrastructure develop-
ment in the town and its surrounding
villages.
There are several key SDI projects in Port
St Johns and its surroundings. There is a
project that focuses on upgrading and
beautifying the entrance to the town.18
This includes the upgrading of ablution
facilities, the taxi rank, hawker stalls and
the establishment of a tourism office. This
work was underway at the time of writing.
The second major proposal is the upgrad-
ing of First Beach, including the campsite,
golf course and bowling green. Here the
town’s municipality owns the campsite and
the golf course, while the existing Cape
Hermes hotel is privately owned. Failure to
reach agreement between the owner of the
hotel and the SDI contributed to delays in
the progress of this project. The third
major proposal is to encourage investment
and revitalisation on over 70 commercial
farms surrounding Port St Johns. The
farms, totalling almost 4 000ha, are state-
owned and are currently on five-year
leases. Fourthly, there are plans to have
tourist facilities improved and operated by
private investors. According to SDI public-
ity, there are already three investors show-
ing great interest in the area. In addition to
other minor projects, there is a plan to
improve overall infrastructure in the town
and its surrounding areas.
Key challenges of the Port St Johns
SDI
Land ownership is one of the key chal-
lenges facing the SDI in Port St Johns.
Firstly, with the exception of the commer-
cial state farms, most of the land outside
the town of Port St Johns which is targeted
by the SDI is not controlled by the town’s
Transitional Local Council, but by the
Umzimvubu Transitional Council
(Ntsebeza 1997). Secondly, as the SDI was
getting ready to implement some of its
projects, it learnt that land claims for Silaka
Nature Reserve and Mt Thesiger had been
lodged by Caguba Administrative Area
with the Eastern Cape Regional Land
Claims Commission. Even though these
claims were prioritised, the SDI still put
pressure on both the Department of Land
Affairs and the Commission to resolve the
land claims as soon as possible. Thus in
1998 the claims were ‘fast-tracked’ by the
Commission, in collaboration with senior
DLA officials from Pretoria as ‘tenure
reform’ cases (Wild Coast SDI 1999). As
the case study of Sicambeni (below)
shows, this move did not please some of
the land rights holders. The other key
challenge for the Port St Johns SDI is the
political divisions with potential beneficiar-
ies at the local level as the case study of
Mtumbane shows (below).
Part Two: Mtumbane township
Background
Mtumbane township is located about 3km
outside the town of Port St Johns (see
Figure 3). There are 425 residential sites,
divided into seven sections. There is one
primary school and no high school. It is
the only formal township of Port St
Johns.19  According to local oral history20
this township, like many others around the
country, has its origins in apartheid’s
segregation policies. It is said that, during
the early half of the 20th century, many
women from the neighbouring villages
came to look for work as domestics in the
town’s white households. Many of them
came with families who needed a place to
stay. In accordance with the segregation
policies of the time, the municipality
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allocated a piece of land for these families
outside the town. This was to become
Mtumbane township. Many other villagers
also came looking for jobs. The influx
control laws were the only thing prevent-
ing even larger numbers of people from
coming to settle in Mtumbane.
Unlike many other townships around
the country, Mtumbane has always had a
headman. In that sense, and in many other
ways, it has operated as a rural settlement.
Following the ‘independence’ of Transkei,
one property owner from Mtumbane was
allowed to represent Mtumbane people in
the town’s municipality. (Currently there
are two representatives on the town coun-
cil.) This did not help much, as living
conditions continued to be of very low
standard. It was only after Major-General
Bantu Holomisa took over as the leader of
Transkei that things started improving.
According to informants, some of the
notable improvements included allotment
of erf numbers to each home, creation of
streets, erection of water taps and the
building of a community hall.
After the advent of democracy in 1994,
the situation continued to improve in
Mtumbane. Residents were able to now
elect people to represent Mtumbane onto
the town council. Several new develop-
ment projects were initiated, including
electrification, improved pit toilets, water
taps inside people’s properties and a low-
cost ‘RDP’ housing programme.
Mtumbane and the Wild Coast SDI
As in most of the rural communities falling
within the Wild Coast SDI area, the infor-
mation about the Wild Coast SDI project
was slow in coming and minimal. Accord-
ing to local informants, the first commu-
nity meeting where information about the
SDI was provided took place on 15 July
1997 in the community hall. It is said that
this was the very first time that the commu-
nity had ever heard about the Wild Coast
SDI. Residents were told about the pro-
posed development and then asked to
suggest projects they would be interested
in. Apparently, they told the facilitator that
as coastal people they were interested in
improving the way in which they benefited
from the coast. They suggested projects
such as a fish processing plant, a seaweed
factory and tourism so that people could
get jobs.
One of the informants argued that even
after the initial explanation of what the SDI
was all about, the majority of the people in
the meeting still did not understand how it
was supposed to affect their lives. It was
only when there was talk of a coastal road
from Port St Johns that people began to
understand the implication of the SDI.
They were looking forward to the opportu-
nities they were told would be brought by
the road, but were later that year disap-
pointed to read in the newspapers that
plans for the road had been shelved.
The second meeting, to which a se-
lected number of Mtumbane residents were
invited, was on 5 August 1997 in the Port
St Johns Town Hall. The co-ordinator of
the SDI’s Community Participation Co-
ordinating Committee (CPCC) and the
facilitator of this meeting again introduced
the Wild Coast SDI and highlighted some
of the challenges. Key among these were
the land claims for Silaka and Mt Thesiger.
The facilitator is said to have told the
meeting that these land claims were ‘dis-
turbing’ the SDI plans in the area and that
something had to be done to resolve them.
The second major challenge mentioned
was the ongoing investigation by the Heath
Commission into parcels of land which
had allegedly been irregularly obtained.
Some of the parcels of land under investi-
gation were those targeted for the Wild
Coast SDI. It was suggested that Judge
Heath should be invited to future meetings
to help to explain the investigation.
Following this meeting things became
tense in Mtumbane. For more than two
years no SDI meetings were held at
Mtumbane’s community hall. For the
whole of 1998 people who were inter-
viewed argued that there was no informa-
tion available to most residents about the
SDI. It has been confirmed by various
studies (Anderson & Galt 1998; Kepe
2000b), that the lack of information to
potential beneficiaries about the progress
of the SDI was one of the most serious
shortcomings of the project. The less
information people had about the project,
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the more conflict arose, and the easier it
became for those who had access to
information to exploit opportunities meant
for all the people.
Towards the end of 1998 and through-
out the first half of 1999, another tense
issue for Mtumbane emerged. The political
tension between the African National
Congress and the United Democratic
Movement affected the way in which SDI
was being viewed and implemented. There
was a growing perception among some
residents that decisions about the SDI were
being made in town by ANC followers.
Informants said they would hear that a
beneficiaries’ meeting had taken place in
town and decisions had been made, but
they never got any feedback. One inform-
ant commented: ‘If you are not an ANC
member you must just forget about this
SDI. Even the facilitators are ANC acti-
vists’. Another added:
The sad thing is that not all people
who are not ANC members are
UDM. There are many people here in
Mtumbane who don’t care about
politics. They are neither ANC nor
UDM, but they are made to suffer
because of this political tension. So
we have now almost given up hope
that we can ever benefit from the
SDI.
Even the (ANC) council representatives of
Mtumbane township claim to feel like
‘puppets of the elite’ (see Box 4).
When the European Union project in
support of the Wild Coast SDI was intro-
duced during 2000, things did not change
much. A young man who is affiliated to
the UDM told the story of how people
working under this new programme came
to the community hall once, after claiming
to have announced the meeting before-
hand. On attending the meeting, he noticed
that those present were the same few ANC
people who were always involved in the
Wild Coast SDI meetings. He said he
objected to the meeting going ahead
without the residents of Mtumbane. After a
long debate, the meeting was postponed
and was re-announced to people of all
political persuasions. The young man
continued to complain that despite a list
that was drawn up of all the people who
are available for new job opportunities, it
still appeared that ANC members are the
main beneficiaries of short-term employ-
ment supposedly coming to Port St Johns.
The other issue that has caused dissatis-
faction among residents of Mtumbane was
the representation in the Port St Johns SDI
committee. A local businessman who was
also a member of the ANC at the time, was
elected onto the SDI committee to repre-
Box 4: No SDI progress in Mtumbane
Verbatim comments about the SDI’s progress from a Mtumbane council representa-
tive21
Things are really confusing about this SDI. Residents do not know much be-
cause there are no general meetings. Meetings are held at the municipality
hall. During the last meeting we raised the question that there was much talk
and less action in the Wild Coast SDI. As councillors from Mtumbane we know
that water, electricity, the streets and the houses did not come with the SDI. All
these were in process before we heard about the SDI. So we have nothing new
to tell people. In these meetings they ask us to take down people’s names for
jobs, but nothing happens after that. People are getting upset giving names
and nothing happens after that. This puts us leaders on the spot. We are also
surprised that the same businesspeople who were opposing the SDI as they
felt it threatened their businesses are now running ahead of everybody. The
problem here is that people are not honest and politics are worshipped more
than the development of poor people.
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sent the Mtumbane community. Residents
of Mtumbane say they were puzzled as to
how a person who lived in town could
claim to represent people he did not even
know. They added that it was ironic that
the same businessman who was once
feeling threatened by the Wild Coast SDI
was now playing a leading role in it.
In conclusion, political differences
seemed to have succeeded in alienating a
large section of potential beneficiaries in
Mtumbane. This resulted in many people
disowning the SDI and simply waiting and
hoping that they might benefit somehow in
the future. Clearly, combining fairly
wealthy residents of an urban area (Port St
Johns town) and the largely poor residents
of a peri-urban area (Mtumbane) into one
‘community’ of beneficiaries is problem-
atic. In spite of the SDI’s claim that
SMMEs (small, medium and micro-enter-
prises) are to be encouraged among all
beneficiaries, it soon became clear that in
Port St Johns and Mtumbane the wealthy
saw business opportunities for themselves,
while the poor were left hoping for jobs.
The concept of a ‘community of benefici-
aries’ continues to pose problems for most
large-scale development projects in so-
cially heterogeneous areas (Kepe 1999).
This issue is explored further in the case
that follows of land claims and the SDI in
Sicambeni.
Part Three: Sicambeni Village
and the Caguba land claim
Background
Sicambeni is one of several villages falling
under the Caguba Administrative Area. It is
situated about 15km from the town of Port
St Johns by road and about 2km from the
coastline. By July 2000 there were 250
households, divided into six sub-villages
or mat associations (izithebe). Each
isithebe has a leader (unondlu or
unozithetyana) who reports to the village’s
sub-headman, Sobantu Kalimashe.
Kalimashe in turn reports to the headman
of Caguba Administrative Area. Unem-
ployment is very high, with only a few
jobs in Port St Johns, Silaka Nature Re-
serve and the nearby Mgazi Resort camp.
A combination of crop and livestock
farming, the collection of natural re-
sources, as well as off-farm sources of
income such as remittances and state
pensions form the livelihood complex.
Close proximity to the coast makes collec-
tion of marine resources (for example,
finfish and shellfish) one of the most
popular activities in as far as natural
resource utilisation is concerned, and a
growing number of women make grass
and sedge hand work to sell to tourists in
Port St Johns (see Cawe & Ntloko 1997).
While women do most of the natural
resource collection, men’s interest in this is
also high. The importance of certain
resources transcends gender lines, and
occupies an important place in village
politics. These resources include crop and
grazing land, as well as highly commer-
cialised resources. One such resource is
alluvial sand used for building purposes.
So important is this sand to local liveli-
hoods that villagers are prepared to take up
arms to defend the resource. For example,
over the last two years there has been a
conflict over this sand between Sicambeni
and the neighbouring village, Vukandlule.
So high profile was the conflict, that it
received extensive coverage in the media
(for example, in the Daily Dispatch and
Voice of the Coast). It is said that the
conflict began when people of Vukandlule
(also a village of Caguba Administrative
Area), as an economic development
project, fenced off the area from which
sand was previously used by both villages
as a common property resource. Each
truck load cost the buyer R40. When
people of Sicambeni objected to the sand
being fenced and sold to benefit only one
village, trouble began. The conflict needed
the intervention of the Caguba headman
and one of his councillors. In this context,
it was important for the Wild Coast SDI to
first attempt to understand the social
dynamics of livelihoods in the area. In
particular it was important to understand
the importance of local natural resources.
The next section looks at the interaction
(or non-interaction) between the Wild
Coast SDI and the people of Sicambeni.
Central to this discussion is the land issue.
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The Wild Coast SDI and the land claim
By June 1999 the residents of Sicambeni,
including the headman, had yet to be
officially informed about the Wild Coast
SDI. It was only in March 1999 that one
villager from Sicambeni was recruited to
represent the villagers in SDI meetings in
Port St Johns. During a meeting held on 15
June 1999 at the sub-headman’s residence,
the villagers displayed their anger at being
treated disrespectfully by the organisers of
the SDI. They argued that they ought to
have been informed about plans to encour-
age investment in Silaka Nature Reserve,
as the land belonged to them. They re-
called how in 1981 the new nature re-
serve’s fence cut into their fields and
grazing land without any discussion with
them. According to one of the men at the
meeting, this event marked the beginning
of an era of disrespect and exploitation,
which continues to this day.
The land claim in this area is very
complicated. The claim currently being
investigated by the Regional Land Claims
Commission indicates that the claim for the
Mt. Thesiger Forest Reserve (erf 646) is for
the entire Caguba ‘community’. While the
residents of Sicambeni had earlier initiated
a land claim for Silaka Nature Reserve, this
had apparently not been recorded properly
by the Commission. Consequently,
Sicambeni villagers do not have a claim of
their own, but are part of the Caguba claim
for Mt Thesiger. They are indeed part of
the larger Caguba Administrative Area and,
of the 53 descendent households who
qualify for compensation in that area, 44
are associated with Silaka Nature Reserve
and Sicambeni. The non-recording of the
claim for Silaka Nature Reserve, which
had apparently come to the Commission’s
notice, has prejudiced local people’s claim
to their land rights. While the people of
Sicambeni are fully integrated into Caguba
Administrative Area, they maintain that
they were the ones who lost grazing land
when Silaka Nature Reserve was estab-
lished.
The people of Sicambeni said they were
disturbed by reports attributed to nature
conservation officials, DLA, SDI and the
Regional Land Claims Commission that
the land was given willingly when none of
the villagers were part of the discussions.
They argued that while the headman and
chiefs might have given the land willingly,
they were not the ones suffering at the
moment. One man commented: ‘The land
that was taken does not belong to Caguba
or chiefs, it belongs to the people of
Sicambeni’. Another recalled how the
Caguba headman had come to them and
said he had given the land to nature con-
servation and would give them new fields
in Mampumbe, near Ndwalana Forest:
We refused to go to Mampumbe for
two reasons. One, the place was too
far from Sicambeni. We would have
spent the entire day just walking to
the fields and have no time left to
plough or weed them. Secondly,
there were already people using the
land. We did not feel it was right to
cause problems there.
It appears the problems around land
between the Caguba Administrative Area
and Sicambeni village were not confined
to the handing over of the land in 1981.
When the people of Sicambeni decided to
lodge a claim for their land rights, it was
the headman of Caguba and his council-
lors who again took control of the process.
With the exception of the conservation
officials in Silaka Nature Reserve, most
other key agencies including DLA, the
SDI, and consultants all talked about the
‘Caguba claim’. Consequently almost all
the visits made by the Commission and
DLA between 1997 and 1999 were to
Caguba village where the headman of
Caguba Administrative Area resides. It was
only late in 2000 that the people of
Sicambeni were finally recognised, when a
consultant hired by the Regional land
Claims Commission to document details of
potential beneficiaries for the purposes of
compensation decided to deal with
Sicambeni people separately from the rest
of Caguba ‘community’. The move ap-
pears to have been motivated more by the
conflict prevailing among leaders of
Caguba village than by mandate from the
Commission.
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In Caguba both Sanco and the tradi-
tional authorities have been fighting for the
control of the land claims process. Sanco’s
claim is that they had initiated the land
claim for Mt Thesiger and should therefore
see the process to its conclusion. Tradi-
tional authorities, on the other hand, claim
that they are responsible for all the land in
the area. However, what has become
apparent is that former Sanco strongman
Mpengesi originally signed for claimants at
the time it was lodged, but has since
become one of the trusted men of the local
headman. Naturally, the person who was
the signatory is included in meetings to
discuss the claim, hence the attention
focused on the traditional authorities. This
does not mean that the traditional authori-
ties were unhappy about this coincidence,
but rather relished being in the driving seat
for the Caguba land claim.
In the meantime, the marginalisation of
the Sicambeni people’s complaint about
their grazing rights in Silaka Nature Re-
serve, coupled with the leadership conflict
in Caguba village being allowed to simmer
unattended, could be attributed to the
SDI’s fast-track approach to planning and
consultation. Had the SDI not attempted to
set the pace of land reform programme in
the SDI target areas, the DLA and the
Commission might have picked up the
dissatisfactions and the conflict among
people of Sicambeni and Caguba respec-
tively. Between 1997 and 1998, the SDI
organisers became increasingly frustrated
with the slow pace of the restitution pro-
cess in the Port St Johns area and conse-
quently applied pressure on the DLA and
the Commission to resolve the land issues
in the Port St Johns area as quickly as
possible. For that reason, in 1998 DLA
officials, working with the staff of the
Commission, went to Caguba and asked
the headman and his people to ‘withdraw’
the claim if they wanted development to
take place in their area.22  Following these
visits to Caguba, DLA promised to come
up with an alternative way of resolving the
claim (Wild Coast SDI 1999). The villagers
of Sicambeni were not involved in any of
these discussions, and were for a long time
not aware that their claim for grazing rights
to portions of Silaka had been changed
into a tenure reform case.
Residents of Sicambeni were very
disappointed that their views were not
sought or taken into consideration when
even during the bantustan/apartheid years
there was some room for voicing their
concerns. They told of how the land lost to
Silaka Nature Reserve was not the only
land that used to belong to their village.
When Umngazi Bungalows were built, the
Transkei Development Corporation (TDC)
took some of Sicambeni land, without
compensation, to hand over to the new
owners. However, despite the fact that the
Transkei government ignored their objec-
tions to their land being taken, the
Sicambeni villagers argued that over the
years they managed to work things out
with the Umngazi owner, Mr Goss, who
had recognised the injustice done to them.
Mr Goss had done several things to im-
prove their conditions including building
schools and roads and employing people
from the village. They explained that Mr
Goss’s remorse, his willingness to negoti-
ate with them and the visible benefits from
the development discouraged them from
laying an official land claim with the
Commission. They also felt that the land
they lost to Umngazi was much smaller in
size than that lost to the nature reserve.
Clearly, the people of Sicambeni need
the kind of development promised by the
Wild Coast SDI. Proof of this can be
deduced from their relative satisfaction
with benefits from the Umngazi develop-
ment. However, at time of writing, they
had not been given an opportunity to
indicate how they would see their partici-
pation in the Wild Coast SDI. They also
expressed the need for their situation to be
understood and respected by the Wild
Coast SDI, the DLA and the Commission.
They found it difficult to understand why
those government agencies had never
bothered to find out about the history of
settlement and dispossession in the area.
The disrespect shown to them, they ar-
gued, made Mr Goss even more deserving
of their praise. In an interview on 20
December 2000, a group of men expressed
high hopes that conflict over the land
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claim among leaders of Caguba village
could be a blessing in disguise as it re-
sulted in the consultant treating them as a
separate entity from Caguba.23
Conclusion
There are three main conclusions that can
be drawn from the Port St Johns case
study. The first is that, despite the area’s
long-term reputation as a tourist attraction
and the numerous planning studies done
there over the years, there was not suffi-
cient information about the establishment
of the Wild Coast SDI there. As shown by
Ntsebeza (1997) and by this report, most
previous situational analyses had largely
ignored the land question. The impact of
the land-related problems currently experi-
enced by the Wild Coast SDI could have
been minimised had there been proper
situational analysis before intensive plan-
ning. Previous studies seemed to have
focused too much on the town itself at the
expense of surrounding settlements (urban
and rural) that were part of the SDI project.
In particular, there was little or no insight
into the social dynamics of these areas.
The second conclusion from this case
study concerns the Wild Coast SDI’s
response to the land problems that
emerged. Rather than making its plans fall
in line with the other government pro-
grammes being implemented at the same
time (for example, land reform), the SDI
elected to interfere with them, advocating
short cuts. The land claims for Mt Thesiger
and Silaka Nature Reserve are good exam-
ples of the SDI team favouring a rather
fuzzy ‘alternative’ approach in which
people agreed to development on the basis
that they would benefit from the land at a
later stage. As a result of this haste, ques-
tions of representation and consensus were
raised. Clearly this approach proved costly
for the SDI as it has achieved very little
thus far, and almost fours years after its
introduction into the area, the Commission
is still trying to sort out the land claims
(following the failure of the SDI ‘alterna-
tive’ approach).
The third conclusion is that party poli-
tics among potential beneficiaries could
discredit the Wild Coast SDI in Port St
Johns. The perception which currently
exist in Mtumbane, that the SDI is a project
run by the ANC for the benefit of ANC
members, could negatively affect commu-
nity support for the SDI. It would be good
for the Wild Coast SDI and any other
project that seeks to reach all people
irrespective of their political affiliation to
distance themselves from individuals who
politicise development processes. They
should speak out against intimidatory
behaviour by those seeking to monopolise
benefits.
With the area’s established reputation as
a beautiful tourist destination, and the
progress already made in renovating the
town’s entrance, the SDI in Port St Johns
has great potential which will not be fully
realised without the resolution of the
problems highlighted in the case study.
Notes
17 An art and craft production project
co-ordinated by Hugh Tyrell Associ-
ates was initiated from these recom-
mendations.
18 Although this was initiated by the
Presidential Project Task Team.
19 Green’s farm informal settlement
being the other township.
20 Group interview conducted in
Mtumbane on 9 February 1999.
21 Interview 15 July 1999, Mtumbane
township.
22 Interview with the Caguba headman
and Mr Mpengesi, Caguba, 20 De-
cember 2000.
23 Meeting at Mr Kalimashe’s home-
stead, Caguba, 20 December 2000.
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Firstly, a somewhat detailed history of the
establishment of the tea enterprise in the
area is presented which highlights the
forceful manner in which the land for
growing tea was acquired by the govern-
ment, and how those residing on the land
were forcefully removed. The history also
shows how the political changes of the late
1980s and early 1990s resulted in the
improvement of working conditions, but at
the same time brought doubts about the
sustainability of this government-funded
enterprise. Secondly, the provincial gov-
ernment’s plans to transform Magwa Tea
into a co-operative within the framework
of the Wild Coast SDI is discussed briefly.
Finally, the challenges facing the transfor-
mation process of the tea enterprise are
discussed with a particular focus on:
· the question of land ownership and the
uncertainty with which it was handled
in the process
· the question of who should benefit from
development projects (including the tea
venture) in the area
· which people or institutions (should)
represent the interests of potential
beneficiaries.
In the light of the history of the area and
the current obstructions to a successful
development, a call is made for govern-
ment agencies to take a step back and seek
a better understanding of social dynamics
and local history ahead of planning and
implementation of any kind of develop-
ment.
The information presented in this
chapter was collected using various
sources. Secondary sources such as books,
consultant reports and newspaper articles
were consulted. A substantial amount of
information on state plans (including those
of the DLA) was drawn from government
documentation, although not all existing
documentation was made available to the
researcher. Attempts made to access addi-
tional documents and interview key people
were unsuccessful. Primary material
comprises interviews with people in the
area, including managers at Magwa and
people from the different villages of
Lambasi (including members of the devel-
opment forum). No attempt was made to
interview the Paramount Chief (king) of
Eastern Pondoland.
Background
Magwa area is situated in north-eastern
Pondoland in the district of Lusikisiki,
along the Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape.
For the purposes of this study, as well as
numerous government-initiated economic
development projects, this area comprises
seven administrative areas, which include
Lambasi, Hombe, Nkunzimbini,
Malangeni, Matheko, Mbotyi and Goso
Forest (see Figure 4). With the exception of
Mbotyi Administrative Area, which is
under Lower Ntafufu Tribal Authority, all
these areas fall under Qawukeni Tribal
Authority. The Paramount Chief of Eastern
Pondoland is the highest-ranking tradi-
Chapter Seven:
Magwa: The land of tea
Introduction
This chapter explores challenges facing the transformation of a former
parastatal, Magwa Tea, within the context of the Wild Coast SDI.
This is done in three ways.
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tional authority for all these administrative
areas. Each administrative area is under the
administrative control of a government-
paid headman who in turn reports to the
chief of the tribal authority. The district
magistrate located in the town of Lusikisiki
is the formal administrative head of the
administrative areas in the Magwa area. In
addition to this, elected councillors have
been engaged in a bitter struggle with
traditional authorities, mostly at village level,
over administrative roles since late 1995.
During the 1990s the area became one
of the targets for government-driven
development projects. Firstly, as part of the
Wild Coast SDI, the area was identified as
being suitable for ecotourism, afforestation
and commercial agriculture. It was envis-
aged that Magwa Tea, a tea-growing
project in Lambasi Administrative Area,
would serve as a nucleus for other forms
of development. Until 1997 Magwa Tea
had been heavily subsidised by the state,
first by the Transkei government and then
the new Eastern Cape Provincial Adminis-
tration. Running at a loss, the plantation
was liquidated along with other parastatals
towards the end of 1997.
Secondly, Lambasi Farms, which were
jointly owned and managed by Tracor and
Magwa, were also targeted for develop-
ment under the auspices of the Wild Coast
SDI. Plans for this land include forestry
and planting of new crops (beans,
anatoni’s bush and others). Thirdly, the
Ntsubane Forest is in the process of being
privatised by the Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry, in the hope that this
will open opportunities for local develop-
ment. In addition, there are other smaller
projects in the vicinity which are not
directly linked to the Wild Coast SDI (for
example, mining).
However, all the current economic
development plans should be seen in the
context of wider socio-economic and
political issues, both past and present.
These include the history of land dispos-
session by successive governments and
reactions to it; the apartheid government’s
attempts at developing the area; and the
post-apartheid government’s national plans
Figure 4: Map of the Magwa area
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to improve the welfare of formerly
marginalised rural people. The next section
provides a historical background of the
area, particularly on government interven-
tions and conflicts that arose over the last
40 years or so. The section which follows
focuses specifically on the plans of the
Wild Coast SDI, Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry and the provincial
Department of Land Affairs and Agricul-
ture for developing the area.
Historical background
The case study area has a long history as a
cattle-raising area. By the 19th century, the
area was being used extensively for
transhuman cattle grazing (Beinart 1982).
Large herds of cattle, many associated with
the Paramount Chief (then resident some
30km inland at Qawukeni) were herded to
the coastal grasslands in the winter months
when the upland grazing was limited.
There is evidence suggesting that the
Lambasi plain was one of the most impor-
tant grazing areas in Eastern Pondoland
(Harrison 1988). Herding outposts
(amathanga) were established, but most
settlement at this time was temporary. It
was only later, following annexation of
Pondoland in 1894 and the subsequent
large-scale immigration into the area, that
settlements became more permanent with
people beginning to keep their livestock in
the area year-round and farming activity
becoming more common. Yet the reputa-
tion of the area as grazing land is remem-
bered by many elderly people and some
still refer to it as ‘the paramount chief’s
land’ or umhlaba wakomkhulu (Manona &
Manona 1997).
Land dispossession and resistance
The Magwa area has a rich history of
conflict between rural people, traditional
authorities and the state over the last 50
years or so. A sketchy but useful history of
development-related land conflict in the
Magwa area is found in an unpublished
manuscript by Harrison (1988), tracing the
history of tea growing in the former
Transkei, with a special focus on the early
years of Magwa Tea. Although not the
main focus of the manuscript, the history
of land dispossession and resistance during
the early 1960s emerges in the text which
identifies conflict over land in Magwa as
the result of two interventions by the state.
The first of these was betterment planning
for Lambasi Administrative Area. Accord-
ing to Harrison, a senior agricultural
officer and avid nature lover, Miles
Roberts, was impressed by the traditional
use of Lambasi as grazing land. Fearing
that the influx of people to the Lusikisiki
area would result in increased settlement in
Lambasi, Roberts convinced Paramount
Chief Botha Sigcawu24  that a survey of the
area was necessary for conservation
reasons and a study was conducted from
1960–63.25  But rumours soon circulated
about the motives for the study and suspi-
cions grew. There had been fierce opposi-
tion to betterment in this area. One man
says:
We still don’t understand why we
were forced away from our fertile
fields to these barren lands. That is
why we were prepared to fight. We
are also still crying for the graves of
obawomkhulu (our forefathers)
which were destroyed by whites and
no compensation was given.26
When local people saw researchers in the
villages conducting the study, talk was rife
that the Paramount Chief was in the proc-
ess of selling land to the whites and this
suspicion fuelled further mistrust between
the villagers and those in places of author-
ity (including the Paramount Chief).
The second state intervention that
resulted in conflict over land in Magwa
was that of tea growing. Negotiation and
planning for this venture took place at
about the same time as the introduction of
betterment planning. Johan Mills, who was
then the secretary to the Chief Minister of
Transkei, made the initial suggestion that
Pondoland needed a commercial venture
to provide a local alternative to migrant
labour in the sugar cane fields of Natal.
Mills discussed this idea with the Para-
mount Chief and his councillors in
Qawukeni and it is said that it was well
received.27  What remained was to con-
vince the local villagers to move off the
land Botha Sigcawu had set aside for the
venture.
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The task of convincing residents of
Lambasi that they should move was left to
the Paramount Chief himself, with assist-
ance from a Transkei member of Parlia-
ment, Columbus Madikizela from Bizana.
When people rejected the notion that tea
was good for the Mpondos, Sigcawu is
said to have intimidated the residents,
claiming that the land anyway belonged to
his father and implying that he could force
them to move. When the Paramount Chief
failed to convince the villagers, the district
magistrate in Lusikisiki, a Mr Fanwick,
intervened by persuading people to accept
cash compensation in lieu of land rights
and promising them jobs on the tea estate.
Residents continued to resist the idea and
rallied the support of outsiders. According
to Harrison (1988) the villagers received
help from people in Natal, including a
Durban lawyer by the name of Roland
Arenstein.28  The resistance to betterment
and relocation was in effect the Magwa/
Lambasi ‘contribution’ to the famous
‘Mpondo revolts’ which are described in
great detail in Copelyn (1974), Beinart
(1982) and Mbeki (1984). It is said that by
the middle of 1960 the Pondoland resist-
ance became violent and an unsuccessful
attempt was made to topple Sigcawu
(Mbeki 1984; Harrison 1988). In the
process, however, attacks on Sigcawu’s
supporters led to the burning of houses
and some were even killed, including the
Paramount Chief’s brother chief
Vukuyibambe Sigcawu.29  Following the
Ngquza hill massacre on 6 June 1960
where Mpondo rebels were killed or
arrested, resistance in Magwa area sub-
sided and residents finally gave way to the
tea plantation. According to Harrison, cash
amounting to less than R20 was paid per hut.
Problems with the tea venture: 1963
to 1997
Since its contentious establishment,
Magwa Tea experienced numerous prob-
lems and failed to live up to expectations.
The project, intended to uplift the
economy and create employment opportu-
nities for the Mpondo, was hampered by a
series of planning, managerial and political
problems that lasted for over 40 years.
In relation to planning, the area given
over to tea was never large enough to
absorb a sizeable labour force or become
profitable. Five hundred ha of tea were
planted in 1963, increasing by a mere
200ha over the next ten years (Harrison
1988). Today the extent of the plantation at
Magwa is 1 750ha and is, according to
Porter and Phillips-Howard (1996), not in
the best area for successful cultivation
because of low winter temperatures which
prevent continuous harvesting. Profit has,
therefore, always been limited by environ-
mental conditions.
Other complications resulted from poor
planning, including a ten-year delay in the
construction of worker’s accommodation.30
Unhygienic temporary structures were
therefore put up by workers from distant
Eastern Pondoland. The housing issue also
resulted in harvesting delays, and loss of
potential produce, as workers had to be
transported from many kilometres away.
But perhaps the most ironic decision,
given the desire to create jobs, was the
design of labour-saving machinery in the
factory, effectively reducing the number of
people who could be employed for
processing the tea (Harrison 1988).
The establishment of the tea small-
holder section within Magwa was perhaps
another planning error which failed to
meet its goals. In 1983 a hundred village
families from Lambasi were each given
one hectare of land in Mazizi estate to
plant tea. The project drew on a Kenyan
model and was aimed at expanding tea
production to partially compensate families
of villagers who were removed from the
land during the early 1960s and to contrib-
ute to local development (Harrison 1988;
Porter & Phillips-Howard 1996). Magwa
Tea committed itself to providing technical
expertise, as well as subsidising some of
the inputs. The smallholders were respon-
sible for providing their own labour. The
tea was sold to Magwa. However, land
tenure issues were left vague. What was
made clear was that the smallholders had
usufruct rights to the land, but it appears
that nobody knew where land ownership
vested (Department of Land Affairs 1998).
According to Magwa Tea Co-operative
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(1999), the smallholder scheme was
unsuccessful because the tea was of very
low quality. From this assessment it is clear
that the goal of contributing to local eco-
nomic development through smallholder
tea production was not achieved. Commit-
ment from Magwa management and
uncertainty about land ownership continue
to remain stumbling blocks to smallholder
tea production in the area.
Poor management practices were also a
factor in the failure of Magwa Tea. Early
managers at Magwa were often outsiders
or foreigners with little understanding of
local dynamics (Harrison 1988; Transkei
Chamber of Commerce 1996). In the
1960s and 1970s management and labour
relations were at times so poor they jeop-
ardised the future of the tea enterprise. In
1972 it appeared the Transkei budget was
being severely drained by the unprofitable
tea enterprise and workers were stealing so
much tea (sold to dealers in the nearby
towns) that the officially appointed market-
ers threatened to withdraw. Mismanage-
ment continued into the 1990s and mil-
lions were lost to corruption (Department
of Land Affairs 1998) and loss of produc-
tivity, partly caused by labour disputes
(Magwa Tea Co-operative 1999).
From the late 1980s to the late 1990s,
political changes in South Africa mani-
fested themselves in a radical form in
Magwa. In the Transkei, where political
repression was intense and labour unions
were not allowed to legally organise
workers until 1989, Magwa soon found
itself regularly plagued by workers’ strikes
(Porter & Phillips-Howard 1996). Through
the Food and Allied Workers’ Union
(Fawu), the workers at Magwa demanded
higher wages. According to Porter and
Phillips-Howard, during the 1990s the
Fawu office in Umtata had particularly
targeted agricultural schemes, as it was
thought the state-run enterprises should be
setting a good example in their labour
practices. Initially Magwa management
was resistant but the pressure of strikes
resulting in the loss of millions31  soon saw
Magwa workers becoming some of the
highest paid tea estate workers in Southern
Africa (Magwa Tea Co-operative 1999).
However, the combination of high pay
and unprofitability plunged Magwa into
deeper financial troubles. It was no sur-
prise that the new Eastern Cape govern-
ment concluded that Magwa (as well as
other agricultural government-funded
schemes) was a financial drain on the
province. While the government was
reviewing its relationship with Magwa,
there were widely reported allegations of
financial misappropriation by the estate’s
managers (Department of Land Affairs
1998). Following an extensive review by
consultants hired by the province, the
closure of the scheme was proposed in
February 1997. Although there was talk of
privatising the tea enterprise in an effort to
make it profitable and save jobs, the
Magwa Tea Co-operative was liquidated in
July 1997. The estate did, however, con-
tinue to trade under the supervision of the
Transformation Authority, and it was
widely thought that Magwa might even-
tually become profitable and complement
provincial and national plans to develop
the previously disadvantaged areas such as
the Wild Coast. By 1996, it was decided
that Magwa would become an anchor
project of the Wild Coast SDI. The next
section explores social dynamics of the
Wild Coast SDI in the Magwa area.
Magwa Tea Co-operative and
the Wild Coast SDI
It is not clear from SDI documents why
Magwa was chosen as a development
node. The only clue is found in a strategic
document produced by the Eastern Cape
provincial government in 1995, which
outlines development plans for the
Transkei Coast, including Magwa and
other agricultural enterprises in existence
at the time (Government of the Eastern
Cape 1995). Although the status of Magwa
as an SDI anchor project had been in
doubt in 1997, perhaps because of the
pending provincial government review of
agricultural parastatals, once it became
clear that private investors could be sought
for Magwa, SDI interest was renewed.
Following Magwa’s liquidation at the
end of 1997, the drive by the Department
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of Land Affairs to transform Magwa Tea
into a co-operative with workers and
managers as co-owners was taking place
within the Wild Coast SDI framework. A
situational analysis on Magwa was com-
missioned by the DLA to provide both
DLA and the SDI team with background
information, particularly on the land issue
(see Manona & Manona 1997).
A Transformation Authority to oversee
the transition of Magwa and other
parastatals into co-operatives was estab-
lished by the Eastern Cape Premier. About
1 700 full-time workers and managers
became co-owners of Magwa Tea Co-
operative and a land company was formed
to benefit the communities around Magwa.
It was agreed that Magwa Tea Co-opera-
tive would pay R120 000 and 30 per cent
of profits each year to the land company.
The hopes of co-operative members and
villagers were further raised by the publi-
cation of details of numerous SDI invest-
ment opportunities which would bring
employment and share opportunities.
The tea estate was advertised together
with the Lambasi Farms – in which Magwa
and Tracor had a 50:50 share – as the
‘Magwa Package’, an invitation to invest in
the existing tea business ‘plus other agri-
cultural and related opportunities’ (Wild
Coast SDI 1998). Box 5 outlines the
investment opportunities advertised as part
of the Wild Coast SDI.
In addition to these agricultural invest-
ment opportunities, the Wild Coast SDI
and the management of Magwa Tea Co-
operative also hoped to attract ecotourism
investors into the nearby Mbotyi area. A
golf course was envisaged as a possible
major attraction for the area. Using its own
funds, and claiming to be contributing to
local development, Magwa started a
pottery project where young people from
the neighbouring villages were receiving
training. According to the managing
director, Mr Greathead, the provincial
government and European Union had
promised funding for the project.
Management reports of Magwa Tea Co-
operative and the enthusiasm of the SDI
combined to create a convincing impres-
sion that Magwa was destined for greater
things. The workers and managers had
willingly taken a pay cut, but were receiv-
ing better benefits, including pensions,
Box 5: Agricultural investment opportunities advertised in Magwa/Lambasi
· Planting of 1 000ha of clone tea as a replacement programme to introduce new
higher quality, higher yielding varieties. It is expected that 1 000 new jobs will be
created.
· Planting of 4 000ha of trees by Sappi. The exact location and final area is to be
finalised. It is proposed that technical expertise be provided by Sappi and adminis-
tration by Magwa. The leasing and profit-sharing arrangements are to be agreed.
The income after year 7 is estimated at R1 million per month.
Job creation:
Year 1–3: 500–1 000
Year 7 onward 500–1 000
Permanent staff 90–180 from year 1.
· Dairying. Kynoch and Telkom have offered to provide 200 dairy cows as a gift to
provide inexpensive milk direct to villages.
· Anatoni’s bush. The crushed nut produces a yellow dye which is used as a colorant
in margarine. The net income is estimated at R7 000/ha. An area of 2 000ha is
envisaged, creating 1 000 permanent new jobs. Flowers during the flowering
period will provide a tourist attraction.
· Ntsubane Forest. Bordering on Magwa Tea is 450ha of commercial land and a
massive pristine forest which needs to be preserved.
Source: Wild Coast SDI (1998)
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medical aid and improved housing
(Magwa Tea Co-operative 1999). The
villagers of Lambasi Administrative Area
formed the Lambasi Development Forum
to represent the land owners and to co-
ordinate development and benefit issues in
the villages in co-operation with the tradi-
tional authorities and the Magwa Tea Co-
operative.32  Notwithstanding this brighter
outlook, social dynamics in the area still
presented numerous challenges for the
Wild Coast SDI. The next section provides
an analysis of these challenges and puts
them into context of past, present and
future development in the area.
Challenges facing development
initiatives in the Magwa area
Five years after the Wild Coast SDI identi-
fied the Magwa area as a key investment
node and three years after Magwa Tea
became a co-operative, uncertainty and
confusion appear to prevail in the area.
Conflict (subtle or overt) is common
amongst villagers, as well as between
villagers and state agencies working in the
area. Several factors contribute to this.
When people first heard of the potential
benefits that were to come with the intro-
duction of the Wild Coast SDI and the
transformation of Magwa Tea into a co-
operative, they began to strategically
position themselves for maximum benefits.
This was followed by delays in some
projects and non-delivery of other prom-
ised developments. The resulting conflict
is, ironically, suggested by some govern-
ment and SDI personnel as the reason for
the delays (Kepe 2000b). But what is clear
is that it is necessary to deal with the
underlying causes of the conflict if devel-
opment is to take place in the Magwa area.
Some of these issues are dealt with in more
detail below.
The land question
The history of betterment in the area and
the establishment of Magwa Tea and
Lambasi Farms several decades ago are
relevant for understanding land issues (see
the section on land dispossession and
resistance above). These events took place
against the will of residents, but with the
blessing of some traditional authorities.
People who were removed from the land
were not given an opportunity to seek
redress through the provisions made in
land reform legislation. Those removed
under betterment planning do not have
valid restitution claims, according to the
White Paper on South African Land Policy
(Department of Land Affairs 1997); the
proposal was that these cases be dealt with
as part of the tenure reform process
(Westaway 2000). This may explain why a
formal claim was never lodged by the
people of Lambasi, yet some argue that
betterment was a violation of land rights,
equivalent to the Group Areas Act in urban
areas, and was therefore racially motivated
(Ngwanya 2000). Some claims of this type
were in fact lodged, and later interpreta-
tions of the Restitution Act allowed led to
the success of some of these, for example
the Chatha restitution claim in the Eastern
Cape (see Ngwanya 2000; Westaway
2000). This suggests that more of those
affected by betterment planning should
have been encouraged to lodge claims
before the cut-off date of 31 December
1998. Whether or not the earlier interpreta-
tion of the Restitution of Land Rights Act
22 of 1994 rendered them unqualified for
a formal land claim, victims of forced
removals in Magwa area appear never to
have doubted their rights to the land.
While the question of ownership of the
Magwa land is still unclear, few dispute
that the people of the area have rights in
respect of that land. While these rights
have been recognised for 40 years, and
various efforts have been made at redress,
people still have no formal land tenure
rights.
Some who lost their land were given
jobs at Magwa and were ‘to an extent now
mollified’ (Porter & Phillips-Howard
1996:293), as employment met their
immediate livelihood needs. One hundred
families were awarded 1ha each to grow
tea, a strategy that failed in its goal of
making the families financially independ-
ent. Furthermore, ownership of these plots
is currently unclear. Later, DLA advocated
the formation of a company to own land
on behalf of local villagers, which would
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receive shares from the tea enterprise, as
well as annual rent. Despite the clear
recognition of people’s rights to the land
on which Magwa Tea was built reflected in
the above initiatives, DLA has not yet
made a concerted effort to implement
security of tenure in this area.
Another confusing aspect of the land
question in Magwa area is the role of the
Mpondo king. As Manona and Manona
(1997) reported, many continue to refer to
the land in question as the ‘king’s land’.
DLA proposals included that the
Qawukeni Great Place become a share-
holding ‘stakeholder’ in the transformed
Magwa Tea venture. If the proposal puts
the king on the same footing as the pro-
posed land-owning company, this implies
that the king is also formally recognised as
having land rights to the area.
The beneficiaries in the Magwa area
As is the case in many other coastal areas
where SDI and land reform programmes
are being implemented, outsiders have
played a major role in defining the
boundaries of the beneficiary ‘community’
in Magwa. The resulting definition of
project beneficiaries has resulted in numer-
ous conflicts. Some people would prefer
the ‘community’ of beneficiaries to be
larger so that they can be included, while
others prefer a smaller ‘community’ in
order to maximise their own benefits. Thus
the ‘community’ of beneficiaries for the
Magwa area SDI and membership in the
land owning company include Goso
Forest, Hombe, Lambasi, Mbotyi,
Malangeni, Matheko and Nkunzimbini
administrative areas. While these areas all
neighbour on Magwa Tea, they do not
share a common history. The land on
which Magwa was established is part of
Lambasi Administrative Area and the
majority of those who were dispossessed
of their land still live there. Only a few
moved to one of the six other administra-
tive areas.
It is only possible to speculate on how
the DLA and the Wild Coast SDI decided
on its ‘community’ of beneficiaries, as this
is not clarified in documents accessed
during the research. The areas are all close
to Magwa Tea and the SDI team tend to
see inclusivity as a means of avoiding or
reducing potential conflict (see Kepe
1999). Yet the inclusion of all Magwa
neighbours in the land owning company
by DLA is inconsistent, given that rent to
be paid by Magwa Tea was intended for
‘land owners’. The only explanation for
this appears to be that some of those
dispossessed of their land now live in
those other areas.
The people of Lambasi were clearly
against an all-inclusive definition of ben-
eficiaries, as illustrated by the following
comment:
Land belongs to Lambasi, but they
say we must share the money. This is
not right. When other villages have a
project nobody tells us to join them.
At present, Nkunzimbini Administra-
tive Area has a mining project and
people are employed, but people
from Lambasi don’t get anything.33
Some question the inclusion of the king as
a share-holder in Magwa Tea. As one man
commented: ‘The king gave our forefa-
thers’ land away, but now his son has
shares from our land’.34  Local hostility to
traditional authority is reflected even more
strongly in the following statement:
What king? Don’t tell me about a
king here. We don’t have a king, we
are on our own. As far as I am
concerned Qawukeni (the Great
Place) does not exist. It stopped
existing when our land was taken
away through ucando (betterment)
and by this tea.35
These sentiments raise important questions
about ‘representation’ of interests in devel-
opment projects in this area. The next
section attempts to shed light on this.
Who represents whose interests in
Magwa?
While the DLA’s suggested ‘community’ of
beneficiaries included several administra-
tive areas, it appears that Lambasi Admin-
istrative Area was from the outset afforded
a superior status and, in relation to Magwa
Tea, it appears that people from other areas
also recognised Lambasi as having a
greater stake. In 1997 the people of
61
Lambasi formed the Lambasi Development
Forum (LDF) to represent the interests of
potential beneficiaries, primarily relating to
the tranformation of Magwa Tea. The
Forum soon became the only ‘community’
voice in negotiations: at numerous meet-
ings attended by the DLA and SDI consult-
ants at Magwa Tea estate, LDF members
were the only community representatives
present. The LDF continued to function as
the main community negotiating body
after SDI projects were mooted beyond the
boundaries of Lambasi.
At the time of the research, the LDF
was headed by a local businessman and
had two representatives on the Magwa
management committee. According to
Greathead,36  the organisation received
intellectual and political support from local
government politicians in Lusikisiki and
was considered a powerful force. Eventu-
ally, due to the need for broader represen-
tation on the ‘community’ negotiating
forum brought about the introduction of
projects outside Lambasi, a new structure –
including members nominated by several
administrative areas – was formed towards
the end of 2000. Members of the powerful
LDF, however, occupy key positions on
the new body.
Greathead37 says that the LDF always
misrepresented the interests of the people it
claimed to represent and that many of the
proposed agricultural investment projects,
including the Sappi initiative, failed be-
cause of the organisation. He alleges the
LDF received poor advice (from
‘Lusikisiki comrades’) and consequently
demanded a share in the Sappi Project far
larger than that held by the Magwa Tea
Co-operative. When Magwa decided to
pull out of the project, Sappi argued it
would be impossible to continue. Rumours
suggest similar problems may have de-
railed other potential investments in the
region.
In the meantime the LDF continued to
interact with high profile agencies and
individuals, including the President. On
Saturday 25 November 2000 President
Mbeki visited Lambasi to launch a Com-
munity Production Centre (CPC), an
agricultural project aimed at fighting
poverty. According to Daily Dispatch
(2000d) nearly 57 000 people in the area
stood to benefit from the development,
although it is unclear whether these are
people in Lambasi Administrative Area or
the wider ‘community’ in Lusikisiki Dis-
trict.38
The king’s role as a representative of
the people in the area is also not without
controversy. Some in Lambasi are critical
of the king’s involvement in discussions
about development in the area and of
government agencies for giving more
‘respect’ to the king than they give to his
‘subjects’. As one local leader said:
We hear that the king has been
sitting in meetings about Magwa.
What makes us angry is that he is
suddenly the hero and government
would rather please him than us. We
are the ones who lost land, not him.
Government does not come here, but
they go to Qawukeni all the time. If
the king says yes to something, we
hear from around that all the people
of this area also agree. This is not
right. We are the ones who suffered,
not the king.39
Unfortunately, this research was unable to
gauge the level of acceptance of the king
as a ‘representative’ in areas beyond
Lambasi. The strong feelings in Lambasi
should, however, be given serious consid-
eration.
Discussion: Magwa  a place
of dreams or nightmares?
Several issues emerge from the case study
of Magwa area which could provide useful
lessons. The first has to do with the politi-
cal origins of the current conflicts and
economic development initiatives. The
establishment of Magwa Tea was associ-
ated with the political power of the king
and his apartheid allies. Magwa and
Lambasi Farms, therefore, have long been
associated with violent politics; the prom-
ise of jobs and business partnerships was
not about to make people forget that past.
But outsiders are still generally blind to
this history and approach the development
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initiatives as if they are conducting the first
government interventions in the area.
Secondly, it appears that Magwa Tea –
unsuccessful from the outset – survived for
political reasons. In earlier years the
Transkei government promoted Magwa,
pouring millions of rands into the project
(Harrison 1988). The support continued
after 1994 when the Eastern Cape govern-
ment took over. Those who argued that
Magwa could become a profitable private
venture did so, it appears, in ignorance of
the understanding that the project had been
established as a job creation venture for
the Mpondos. To be profitable and to
provide good salaries, Magwa would have
to lay off workers (Magwa Tea Co-opera-
tive 1999). DLA’s motivation for a co-
operative to be formed is therefore puzzling
(see Department of Land Affairs 1998).
During 1999, the management of
Magwa reported that the tea enterprise was
starting to make profit for the first time in
many years (Magwa Tea Co-operative
1999). Yet by the middle of 2000 many
workers at Magwa had not been paid for
months. The acting managing director had
left Magwa, and an informant who worked
there claimed that the co-operative mem-
bers had chased him out.40  Once again the
future of Magwa Tea was uncertain.
Thirdly, in spite of the unhappiness
about what happened in the past and about
how government is handling the land
issue, people in the area are clear that if
economic opportunities emerge, they will
be met with enthusiasm. The following
comments reflect the urgent need for
development in the area:41
We are still crying for our forefa-
thers’ graves which are now on the
other side of the fence. But we would
go and work there if jobs can open
up. While graves mean a lot to us,
they are not food. Our children need
jobs now.
We don’t necessarily want to move
back to where our forefathers’
graves are. What would we do with
the graves we have now? If they can
bring this development that they
have been talking about for so long
now, we are not likely to be as bitter
as we are at present.
Taking our land away was not right,
but I am prepared to work on the
graves themselves if jobs become
available. Life without a job is very
difficult.
Jobs and land rights do not clash.
The two are both important. We can
get our land rights back and let
people with money develop the land.
It is unfortunate that we don’t see
this development and we still don’t
have our land.
Lastly, for all the agencies that seek to
work in this area, the uncertainty over the
Magwa tea venture as well as many other
development proposals (for example, the
Community Production Centre – CPC)
represents an opportunity to make a fresh
start. In addition to addressing the land
rights issue in the area, an opportunity is
presented to be more precise in identifying
potential beneficiaries. It is not enough to
simply say ‘people of the area’ or ‘the
community’ will benefit in a project.
Criteria for determining beneficiaries,
worked out with relevant people in the
affected areas, need to be established for
every development project. Finally, local
dynamics, including the role and influence
of traditional authorities need to be re-
viewed in the context of economic deve-
lopment.
Notes
24 According to Mbeki (1984) Botha
Sigcawu had already long been a
supporter of betterment planning and
was for that reason unpopular among
Mpondos in Eastern Pondoland. The
first attempt at introducing betterment
in areas around Lusikisiki during the
mid 1950s had failed following
resistance by local people.
25 Cape Town Archives 1/LSK, Vol 142.
26 A elderly man during a community
workshop in Ntlavukazi, Lambasi
Administrative Area, 17 July 2000.
27 Prime Minister KD Matanzima visited
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the area but remained in favour of
cattle farming rather than tea produc-
tion (Harrison 1988).
28 Arenstein was later banned by the
South African government for assist-
ing the rebels (Harrison 1988).
29 The three men who were charged for
the murder of Vukuyibambe Sigcawu
were executed in March 1962 (Mbeki
1984).
30 The delay in providing accommoda-
tion was also a violation of the earlier
promise that people who were origi-
nally removed from the land and
worked on the estate would also be
provided with housing there (Harrison
1988).
31 The first legal workers’ strike in 1990
lasted from May to September and
caused a tremendous loss of revenue
to Magwa (Porter & Phillips-Howard
1996). Earlier unrest in 1981 hinted at
ongoing unhappiness among workers
on the estate (Harrison 1988).
32 Personal communication, J Greathead,
Magwa Tea Estate, 9 August 1999.
33 Interview with a local leader,
Ntlavukazi, 10 July 2000.
34 Group discussion at headman’s place,
Lambasi, 17 July 2000.
35 Group discussion at headman’s place,
Lambasi, 17 July 2000.
36 Personal communication, Magwa Tea
Estate, 9 August 1999.
37 Personal communication, Magwa Tea
Estate, 9 August 1999.
38 Even this Community Production
Centre initiative is troubled by land
problems and planning blunders.
However, an in-depth analysis of this
project falls outside the scope of this
report.
39 Group discussion at headman’s place,
Lambasi, 17 July 2000.
40 Interview with a Magwa worker, 10
July 2000.
41 Group discussion at headman’s place,
Lambasi, 17 July 2000.
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However, it is also over the last five years
that the name Mkambati became synony-
mous with conflict over land. A range of
outsiders working in various government
departments (for example, DLA), NGOs
and consultancy companies have come to
acknowledge the complexity of the land
situation in this area. Land is a theme that
cuts across the entire history of Mkambati
and has been a force for both unity and
division in the post-apartheid era.
This case study examines the reaction
of local people to outsiders’ visions for
Mkambati, as well as the impact of these
visions on local livelihoods. The introduc-
tion provides an historical background
together with information about the natural
and social environment. The next section
deals with the introduction of the Wild
Coast SDI to the area and how that trig-
gered unintended consequences. The
analysis in this case study raises many
more questions than it answers, but given
the embryonic stage of most policies
dealing with rural areas in post-apartheid
South Africa, the questions raised could be
of assistance to policy makers and imple-
menters alike.
Description of case study area
Mkambati is situated in north-eastern
Pondoland between two rivers, the Mtentu
and the Msikaba, in the district of
Lusikisiki (see Figure 5). This case study
focuses on a unit comprising three areas
under different tenure regimes: communal
Chapter Eight:
Mkambati: Land conflict in
a pristine environment
Introduction
There was a time when the name Mkambati was synonymous with
leprosy, at least to rural people in Eastern Pondoland. The Mkambati
Leper Reserve was functional between 1920 and 1954. In the
succeeding decades, Mkambati has increasingly come to be associated
with issues of ecology and biodiversity. Mkambati Nature Reserve is one
of the key biodiversity hot spots in Southern Africa. So ecologically
important is Mkambati Nature Reserve that government has earmarked it
for expansion in the near future to a 30 000ha new national park
(Mail & Guardian 2000; Cape Argus 2000). The plan would satisfy
many environmental activists who have over the years campaigned for
strict conservation of this pristine environment (see Briers et al. 1996;
Cawe 1992). Mkambatis floral endowments are also important to its
ecotourism potential (see Kepe 2000a). For these reasons, the area was
earmarked as a key investment node within the Wild Coast SDI.
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tenure settlements to the west; 11 000ha of
state land in the centre, formerly used by
the now-defunct Transkei Agricultural
Corporation (Tracor) agricultural parastatal
project; and the 7 000ha state-owned
Mkambati Nature Reserve to the east. The
communal area falls under the Thaweni
Tribal Authority and comprises six admin-
istrative areas, each of which is headed by
a headman under the authority of the
Tribal Authority Chief. Each administrative
area is comprised of several villages,
which are further divided into several
izithebe or ‘mat associations’. The inhabit-
ants are Xhosa-speaking (amaMpondo)
and generate their livelihoods through a
mixture of arable and livestock farming,
the collection of a range of natural re-
sources, and a range of off-farm sources,
including remittances and pensions (Kepe
1997a). The area has also steadily received
immigrants from other parts of the former
Transkei as a result of population pressure
in those areas but also because of its
attractive coastal climatic conditions and
vegetation (Beinart 1982).
Mkambati receives a mean annual
rainfall of 1 200mm, peaking in summer.
While the area is rated highly by botanists
for its floristic diversity, it is largely sour
grassland with small patches of subtropi-
cal, evergreen forest along river gorges or
along the dune systems by the coast. The
coastal soil type favours high biodiversity
of plant species but limits extensive crop




Any discussion of rural livelihood strate-
gies and economic development in the
Mkambati area would be incomplete
without first providing some background
on land politics. This history is character-
ised by century-long conflict between
different groups of people.
In 1920 the government identified an
area of almost 18 000ha on the coast
between the Msikaba and Mtentu rivers as
being suitable for a leper institution.
Without consulting their subjects, Mpondo
chiefs agreed to these proposals. The
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Figure 5: Map of the Mkambati area
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Khanyayo people, who had earlier settled
on the southern banks of the Mtentu River
as part of the Bumbantaba chiefdom which
occupied both sides of the river, were
forcibly removed and resettled themselves
on the borders of the new leper colony.
Following many years of conflict between
villagers and leper reserve officials, includ-
ing conflict over illegal use of natural
resources within the reserve, about
5 500ha of the reserve were released to the
Khanyayo for ‘community’ grazing in
1959.42  According to archival sources43
and local oral testimony, the release of this
land for grazing was triggered by several
incidences of violence between the
Khanyayo residents and the managers of
the leper reserve. But the most serious of
these incidences occurred in 1956, when a
certain Mr Austin (known as ‘Wostile’)
from the leper reserve attempted to im-
pound cattle belonging to the villagers.
The boys who were looking after the cattle
ran to the village to tell their fathers. It is
said that one of these villagers was so
angry that he chased after Mr Austin and
wrestled his gun from him before repos-
sessing the cattle. Fearing similar incidents,
the management of the leper reserve
sought the intervention of the Eastern
Mpondo Paramount Chief Botha Sigcawu.
So tense was the situation after the gun
incident that both Sigcawu and the reserve
managers had to compromise. The now
rusty gun is still kept by the Khanyayo, at
the house belonging to one of the political
activists in the village. The villagers were
so impressed that the story of Wostile
(Austin) and the gun was recorded in the
archives. The story is told to the younger
generation whenever there reference is
made to the Mkambati land struggle.
The introduction of tribal authorities by
the state during the 1950s complicated
matters further. The Khanyayo people,
who until this time worked closely with the
Bumbantaba chiefdom in Bizana, were
required to divert their loyalties towards
Chief Mhlanga of the Thaweni Tribal
Authority within which Khanyayo’s
boundaries were located. To this day the
Khanyayo people have claimed sole land
rights to the land from which they were
removed in 1920. Members of the
Thaweni Tribal Authority, however, dispute
the Khanyayo’s version of the history of
the land in question, asserting that from the
time tribal authorities were introduced, the
land became the property of the chief and
that all the chief’s subjects therefore have
rights to it.
It was the finding of the cure for lep-
rosy during the 1950s (Vincent 1996) and
the subsequent closure of the leper institu-
tion that gave birth to the Mkambati Nature
Reserve. After a brief period as a tubercu-
losis hospital, the former leper institution
was handed over to the newly independent
Transkei in 1976, which closed the hospi-
tal and gave the land to the Department of
Agriculture and Forestry of the Transkei
‘homeland’ (bantustan). The inland two
thirds of the former leper reserve was used
by Tracor as a state farm, while the sea-
ward third was established as a nature
reserve in 1977 in terms of the Nature
Conservation Act of 1971 (Government
Notice 45 of 27 April 1977). Two suc-
cessive private companies were given a
49 per cent share to run the reserve as a
hunting concern, while the Transkei gov-
ernment held the other 51 per cent. In
1982, due to alleged gross mismanage-
ment of the reserve, and the neglect of its
ecology in particular, the Transkei govern-
ment terminated the partnership. Mkambati
Game Reserve (Pty) Ltd under the Depart-
ment of Finance (Transkei) continued to
manage the reserve, providing accommo-
dation and other facilities for non-hunting
visitors. In 1991, the company was dis-
solved, returning the nature reserve to the
control of the Department of Agriculture
and Forestry (Transkei), as was required by
the Transkeian Nature Conservation Act 6
of 1971.
The 7 000ha Mkambati Nature Reserve
is currently the property of the provincial
government and falls under the Eastern
Cape Department of Economic Affairs,
Environment and Tourism. Because of the
presence of numerous rare plants, includ-
ing the endemic Pondo coconut palm
(Jubaeopsis caffra), the reserve was de-
clared a national monument in 1936.44  The
marine reserve within Mkambati extends
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about 11km along the coast and 11km
offshore, making it the largest marine
reserve on the Wild Coast. The Nature
Reserve currently supports over 2 000 wild
herbivores, dominated by antelopes (for
example, blesbok) and provides self-
catering facilities to tourists involved
mainly in recreational fishing.
After an unsuccessful attempt at estab-
lishing a sugar cane project, Tracor planted
about 70ha of eucalyptus plantations for
commercial timber in 1990.45  By late
1999, Tracor was keeping about 500
Nguni cattle46  on the land, which it was
intending to sell to local people for both
breeding and slaughtering purposes. To
maintain integrity of its forestry and cattle
enterprises, Tracor attempted to exclude
the livestock from the neighbouring vil-
lages which formerly grazed the area (the
5 500ha given to them in 1956), and
impounded many animals found grazing
there. This resulted in numerous conflicts
with the Khanyayo people, who later
managed to get 3 500ha of Tracor land for
grazing. Following the closure of several
parastatals by the provincial government in
1997, the Tracor project was also closed
down and finally liquidated at the end of
1999.
The Wild Coast SDI in
Mkambati
Due to the Wild Coast SDI’s focus on agri-
tourism, all the protected areas along this
coast are viewed as crucial to the success
of the project. The Mkambati area – the
nature reserve in particular – was thus
identified as one of the few nodes on
which initial developments will concen-
trate. The unique vegetation, captivating
landscape and favourable coastal climate
were seen as features that could draw
visitors from different walks of life. There-
fore the private sector investment that is
envisaged for Mkambati includes upgrad-
ing and extension of existing tourist facili-
ties. The government’s contribution is to
improve infrastructure in the vicinity of the
reserve, including roads, telephones,
electricity and so forth. Outside the re-
serve, private companies are being encou-
raged to invest in agricultural and commer-
cial forestry enterprises. It is envisaged that
‘local communities’ will benefit from the
Wild Coast SDI in a number of ways
including through forming business part-
nerships with external investors, govern-
ment support for local business develop-
ment, rental payments for land leased to
investors, job opportunities, capacity
building and improved infrastructure.
Following the identification of
Mkambati as a key node in the Wild Coast
SDI, intensive planning took place in both
provincial and national government de-
partments tasked with implementing the
programme. Consultants briefly visited
Mkambati Nature Reserve in 1996 to get a
profile of the area and identify opportuni-
ties for investment. It was, however, only
in late 1997 that the neighbouring villagers
heard about the Wild Coast SDI in
Mkambati for the first time (Kepe 1999).
Even the first meeting convened by the
consultants and which was mostly attended
by the local elite, focused on helping
villagers to choose a development benefit
model. When one considers events since
the meeting (see Manona & Kepe 1997;
Kepe 1997b; 1999; Kepe et al. 1998), one
can easily conclude that the facilitators
were not aware that they were triggering a
range of primarily unintentional positive
and negative impacts on local livelihood
systems. The following sections deal with
those impacts on the livelihoods of people
in the area.
Land conflict
While land conflict is not new to the
people of Mkambati, the SDI has elevated
the importance of rights to land in the
Mkambati Nature Reserve and Tracor area.
Conflict exists between villagers and
outsiders (including government) as well
as amongst villagers who live in the vici-
nity of the areas identified for develop-
ment. The SDI has highlighted the urgent
need for land rights to be clarified ahead of
investment. This is particularly important
as it is clear that benefits to local commu-
nities will be strongly linked to land own-
ership, while investors will require secure
tenure on the land.
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The SDI’s emphasis on land-related
benefits triggered a land claim by the
Khanyayo people, but before the claim
could be lodged with the Commission for
Restitution of Land Rights, the Khanyayo’s
neighbours, who also fall under the
Thaweni Tribal Authority, objected to the
impending claim, arguing that no one
administrative area can claim land which
rightfully belongs to all the people of the
tribal authority. The neighbours further
argued that the community of beneficiaries
in the Mkambati SDI should include all six
administrative areas falling under Thaweni
Tribal Authority. This follows the SDI’s
initial reference to the ‘Mkambati commu-
nity’, intending to comprise inhabitants of
a village close to Mkambati Nature Re-
serve. It was not until late 1997 that outsid-
ers (including the SDI team) realised that
the ‘Mkambati community’ may be much
broader than initially thought (Wild Coast
SDI 1997). The Khanyayo people, on the
other hand, favoured a narrower definition
of local community which was tied more
closely to the history of occupation of the
land in question.
Recognising that land was a central
issue in the areas targeted by the Wild
Coast SDI, the provincial office of DLA
commissioned situational analyses in all
the development nodes, including
Mkambati. Based on oral history and
archival research, the Mkambati situational
analysis chronicled the tension, starting
from the time the leper reserve was estab-
lished to the middle of 1997 (see Kepe
1997a). The report also highlighted the
existing conflict among various people and
organisations about land rights in
Mkambati and Tracor. The study con-
cluded by recommending that this conflict
over land be dealt with ahead of invest-
ment in the area and a mediation process
was commissioned – after much hesitation
– by the SDI and DLA in July 1997. An
independent facilitator was hired to bring
the conflicting sides together and attempt
to find solutions. The facilitator subse-
quently contracted the author of the
situational analysis report to participate as
a resource person. In addition, various
people from relevant agencies were invited
as either resource people or observers.
Unfortunately there were no representa-
tives from the two key players from gov-
ernment (DLA and SDI). The Khanyayo
people, represented by the Khanyayo-
Mkambati Development Forum (KMDF)
and the other six administrative areas
under Thaweni Tribal Authority, repre-
sented by the Joint Management Commit-
tee (JMC) (see Box 6) were invited as the
key sides in the conflict. The three day
meeting took place inside Mkambati
Nature Reserve.
The first day concentrated on allowing
the conflicting sides to table their argu-
ments. The facilitator skilfully steered
people towards dealing with the issue at
hand, as it became clear that there were
bones of contention between people
unrelated to the land question (for exam-
ple, kangaroo court justice and alleged
embezzlement of organisational funds). On
the second day, the author of the
situational analysis report provided infor-
mation in the form of history. This was
followed by information from the repre-
sentative of the Regional Land Claims
Commission. After these information
sessions, a long discussion followed, with
both sides indicating their desire to have
the area developed. Compromises were
offered by both sides, with the Khanyayo
agreeing to share benefits from develop-
ment in Mkambati and the JMC agreeing
to withdraw its insistence that the land
belongs to all six administrative areas and
not to the Khanyayo alone. The SDI and
DLA were given the responsibility of
doing follow-up, where they would ensure
that the issues that resulted in the conflict
were systematically dealt with. These
agreements were taken to Khanyayo and
to Thaweni Great Place, where they were
presented to those who did not attend the
meeting. The SDI and DLA personnel
were very pleased that the conflict seemed
to have been dealt with.
Following mediation, the Khanyayo
were encouraged to claim the land they
lost in 1920, which now included
Mkambati Nature Reserve and Tracor land.
However, the slow pace of land restitution
in the country as a whole and the unco-
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ordinated efforts of several government
departments resulted in the conflict flaring
up again. For almost a year following the
mediation process neither the DLA or the
SDI were involved in Mkambati. Agree-
ments made during the mediation process
were therefore never enforced.
DLA – under pressure from the SDI –
attempted to conduct an inquiry to estab-
lish rights to land. The SDI team, however,
continued to refer to the ‘Mkambati com-
munity’, the geographical boundaries of
which were unclear to both outsiders and
local people. Both the Khanyayo and the
neighbouring areas waged a bitter struggle
to influence government agencies working
in the area. A range of (sometimes violent)
incidents soon made it almost impossible
for either government or NGOs to visit the
area. Those who sought to work in certain
communities were forced to take sides.
DLA and SDI personnel decided to work
with the rest of Thaweni Tribal Authority
areas, as they were most vocal and were
quick to threaten violence. By December
2000 the claim issue was still not resolved.
Committees, training and job lists
Playing a key role in the land struggle in
the Mkambati area were a number of local
committees, many of which were created
or strengthened by the SDI. While these
were originally formed for specific pur-
poses, responsibilities are unclear and the
same people appear to occupy positions in
all of them. The committees are also used
by the local elite as power bases.
The committees not only interfered with
the land situation but their members (with
the exception of the KMDF) were the first
to receive SDI training. Where more
trainees were required, committee mem-
bers identified ‘suitable’ candidates. A
popular perception developed that those
who were trained would be the first to get
jobs, resulting in conflict around who got
onto lists for training. Rumour has it that
certain committee leaders have identified
themselves as future managers of various
tourist facilities in Mkambati Nature Re-
serve. SDI consultants hired to conduct
training were either unaware of or delibe-
rately ignored the controversy.
Tracor land: Old struggle, new battles
When the Khanyayo felt excluded from
SDI processes and ignored by the DLA
and the Regional Land Claims Commis-
sion with regard to their land claim, they
resorted to using ‘weapons of the weak’
(Scott 1985). Historically it had been their
strategy to continue using any site even if
it did not officially belong to them, as long
as they believed that they had a right to it
which predated the new tenure arrange-
ment. Thus the Khanyayo allowed various
people and groups to make use of the
Tracor land. The late headman of the
Khanyayo (Ngxolo Makita), working with
the KMDF, allocated Tracor land to at least
four Mpondo commercial farmers. Squat-
ters looking for jobs in Mkambati were
also allowed to build houses on the land,
with the blessing of the headman and
KMDF, even before talk of any develop-
ment in the area. This ‘illegal’ use of the
Tracor land by the Khanyayo triggered
accusations of ‘selling’ plots against the
headman and KMDF. These accusations
mainly came from the SDI committee or
JMC, with support from the Lusikisiki
TRC. They argued that this action by the
Khanyayo would scare investors away.
The Khanyayo, on the other hand, were
arguing that as far as they were concerned
the land belong to them, and they were
waiting for somebody to prove that this
was not the case. They further argued that
this action would ensure SDI investors
knew who had rights to the land. This was
just the beginning, as the Tracor land was
later to become a new battleground be-
tween the Khanyayo, the JMC and the
state.
When Tracor was liquidated in 1997,
confusion reigned in the area. The JMC
and the SDI Committees (minus the
Khanyayo) had several discussions with
the provincial MEC47  responsible for
agriculture about how to make the former
Tracor land productive. There were ru-
mours that the MEC had told them that
Tracor currently belonged to the ‘commu-
nity’. These discussions with the MEC
could be directly responsible for the Tracor
manager’s constant harassment from the
JMC and the SDI committee. Tracor was
not finally closed down until late in 1999.
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Box 6: A selection of development committees in Mkambati
Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC):
Formed in 1992 between government officials and villagers to monitor the transforma-
tion of Mkambati Nature Reserve although the organisation never fulfilled its mandate
and didn’t hold a single general meeting to report back to people. It currently has no
mission statement, but operates as a political organisation. It claims to represent all the
six Thaweni administrative areas (including Khanyayo), plus a seventh adopted one
(Mtshayelo). When it started this was indeed the case, but Khanyayo people who were
part of the committee have since withdrawn, following conflict within the committee as
early as 1996. The JMC’s current leader is a local business person who also chairs many
other committees in the area. Two politicians who were past leaders of the JMC – a
member of the national Parliament and a member of the Lusikisiki Transitional Rural
Council – still act as its ‘brains’. JMC has also campaigned vigorously over the years to
gain more members from Khanyayo in order to make the committee appear to be a
legitimate representative of the entire Thaweni Tribal Authority. In this it has failed, but
a handful of Khanyayo elite are members of the committee.
Khanyayo-Mkambati Development Forum (KMDF):
A development forum set up by Khanyayo people in 1996. It has a constitution and
mission statement endorsed by the Paramount Chief and was set up to deal with deve-
lopment issues in Khanyayo and Mkambati, following the souring of relationships with
the JMC. Rumours are that it was formed with the blessing of the then president of the
JMC (now a mayor in one of the municipalities in the former Transkei), who allegedly
said ‘Khanyayo people we have now assisted you on your fight for Mkambati, it’s now
time for you to stand on your own and carry the struggle forward’. KMDF’s leadership
is, however, very weak and certain individuals participate to further their own interests.
When it was formed, it had the support of the local headman. This headman has since
passed away and his son, who took over the position, appears not to have given the
committee his full support. The main support for this committee comes from people
who live on the borders of the contested land. This committee has sought to represent
Khanyayo people’s interests in the SDI.
Mkambati SDI Committee:
The SDI facilitators formed this committee in 1997, mainly to act as a link between
‘local people’, the SDI and investors. Khanyayo activists saw this committee as an ex-
tension of the JMC and for years refused to be part of it. However, two male members of
the Khanyayo elite sit on the committee, but are there without the blessing of the majo-
rity of the community. The Mkambati SDI Committee has also involved itself in the fight
for Mkambati land on behalf of the entire tribal authority.
Mkambati Hospital Board:
This was formed in 1996, following the re-opening of a health centre in the place of the
former leprosy/tuberculosis hospital. Its mandate was to liaise with the provincial De-
partment of Health to arrange the practicalities of opening the centre. Most members of
the board are also JMC and SDI committee members. One of the most notable actions of
the hospital board was to take over the empty wards of the former leper hospital and hire
them out to teachers, students and workers of Mkambati Nature Reserve. All the pro-
ceeds have gone to the JMC.
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Large-scale looting at Tracor began on
the night the liquidators arrived. A few
days after Tracor was deserted by the
managers and workers, people from distant
villages came to collect natural resources,
particularly sand and eucalyptus trees.
Truck owners who had previously paid
Tracor for collecting trees were now freely
collecting and selling loads of trees to
villagers close to Flagstaff. This triggered a
response from the Khanyayo villagers.
KMDF and the headman convened a
meeting where it was decided that ‘Tracor
must be protected from the outsiders’. One
elderly political activist from Khanyayo
had this to say:
When we saw our land being made
bare by outsiders we had to act
quickly. It is now clear from what
these people are doing that they do
not own the land. How many people
from Khanyayo have trucks to
remove loads of trees? People who
do not own something find it easy to
destroy it. We have bigger plans for
this land. We don’t see the departure
of Tracor as an end. We can manage
things on our own.48
The Khanyayo hastily put together a
management committee to operate Tracor
and what remained of its resources. A
manager, receptionist and guards were
asked to live on the premises to put a stop
to the looting and denudation of natural
resources. Most of the guards were former
employees of Tracor and knew the place
well. Following this move by the
Khanyayo, all trucks had to go through a
gate, where they had to show proof that
they paid for the trees or sand they were
carrying. Teachers who had been renting
rooms within Tracor now had to pay rent
to the Khanyayo. Government and the SDI
were nowhere to be seen. This prompted
Khanyayo people to wonder if government
still cared about the former Tracor land.
The Khanyayo were even more puzzled by
the government’s silence, given that
investors (Khulani Ma-Africa) had won a
tender for Mkambati (including Tracor
land) and were planning to develop the
area.
However, the takeover of Tracor by
Khanyayo villagers did not last more than
six months, as the JMC and the SDI com-
mittee returned to drive the Khanyayo out.
They succeeded in doing this at a time
when the KMDF and the headman were
having a dispute and no resistance against
the JMC invasion could be sustained. It
was now up to individual and brave
Khanyayo youth to attempt to repossess
Tracor land. However, before any confron-
tation took place, hired guards were sent
by the Department of Public Works to look
after the buildings.49  When asked what
other instructions they had been given, the
guards responded by saying that they did
not get very clear instructions and were
never aware that there was this much
conflict. By December 2000 the guards
and JMC were still in Tracor, but not really
working together. The Khanyayo were
claiming to be regrouping and were plan-
ning another ‘offensive’ to take possession
of the land they believed was theirs.
The long wait for investors
Land conflict was not the only response to
proposed SDI development. Many resi-
dents stopped seeking work elsewhere
because of the opportunities that believed
would arise from the promised invest-
ments. Those who would normally travel
to KwaZulu/Natal to work in the sugar
cane plantations thought they might lose
out if they were not around when the jobs
arrived. Some villagers had been ‘waiting’
since 1997, while others gave up after a
year or two. A few hopefuls were even
camped inside Mkambati Nature Reserve
to wait for jobs and were supported by
their families back in the villages.
Members of the local elite had re-
sponded to the planned developments by
making investments of their own. As early
as 1997, local business people had ac-
quired mini-buses and trucks with a view
to transporting workers between the vil-
lages and Mkambati Nature Reserve.
Supermarkets and cottages were built on
the borders of the Mkambati/Tracor land,
to take advantage of the promised boom in
tourism. Most of these investments took
place between 1998 and 1999 but some
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were abandoned as hopes faded. One local
store owner recently indicated his regret
for selling his store in order to purchase a
transport vehicle. Three years later he sold
the vehicle and bought his store back,
complaining that he exchanged his liveli-
hood (the store) for nothing (the SDI).
Thirdly, the Khanyayo elite took advan-
tage by building mansions on the Tracor
land. Few of these had attended village
meetings where discussions about claiming
the land were conducted. In other words
their occupation of the Tracor land was not
motivated by resistance, but amounted to a
calculated plan to force compensation for
their ‘property’ out of future investors or
government.
While the Khanyayo villagers sup-
ported the occupation of the Tracor land,
they appeared to resent the elite for their
actions on the land; some of the poorer
villages said ‘sibabhekile’ (we are watch-
ing them). By late 2000, poorer villagers
were vowing to build their own structures
on the Tracor land, even though they had
no plans to move from their present home-
steads. In that way, they argued, they
would be continuing resistance, but also be
showing the elite that the land belonged to
all the villagers and not only to the rich.
Many villagers, particularly the elderly
men, never believed there would be jobs
for them and their children. From the
moment they heard that the SDI was a
government initiative they made comments
like:
Government is the same. They make
promises and you never see them
again. Those who think that govern-
ment has stopped telling lies can
continue to wait, but I will continue
doing what I have been doing for all
these years.
Villagers have thus responded differently
to the pending SDI investment, mainly
according to their social status.
Social relations in the village
Tensions around land claims, committee
membership and perceived privileges
seriously strained social relations in the
villages. The rift between the people of
Khanyayo and other areas of the Thaweni
Tribal Authority also negatively affected
the relationship between the chief of the
tribal authority and the headman of
Khanyayo, bringing the conflicting parties
into both magistrate’s and traditional
courts. Divisions also existed between
those involved in the land claims and non-
claimants.
The SDI and DLA pushed affected
parties towards setting aside a community
claim and focusing on those 50 house-
holds or so who were actually removed
from the land. This infuriated the majority,
who argued that the land belonged to them
as a community and that they grazed their
animals there. Some claimants came to feel
that the DLA and the Regional Land
Claims Commission had victimised them.
They argued that the amount the Commis-
sion had offered was not based on realistic
costs. At one stage during the early part of
2000, people belonging to the claiming
group began rallying support from the
non-claimants. This campaign only abated
when the Commission sent a consultant to
collect details of the claimants in Decem-
ber 2000. Suddenly the claimants became
confident and started talking about ‘our
land’, which was insulting to the rest of the
Khanyayo people. The relationship be-
tween the claimants and the non-claimants
was further strained when it was alleged
that many people who were not related to
the people who were removed from
Mkambati were also furnishing the con-
sultants with their details. Now villagers
are saying ‘sawukhe sibone’ (we will see),
and vowing to cause trouble if only a
minority benefits from the land.
A third sphere in which social relation-
ships have been affected is political. Prior
to the 1999 national elections, politicians
rallied support around the SDI, in spite of
the arguments that the SDI should not go
ahead until land claims are resolved. Those
favouring resolution of the land question
before SDI investment were denounced as
anti-government United Democratic
Movement (UDM) members, and were
ostracised by those in power. The DLA
and the SDI team advanced factionalism
by working with those who favoured fast-
tracking the process.
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Infrastructure and jobs so far
By the end of 1999, a consortium won the
bid to invest in tourism in the Mkambati
Nature Reserve. During the same year
the government began improving infra-
structure. Roads were and are being re-
gravelled between Flagstaff and Mkambati
and electricity and telephone poles are
being installed (although the majority of
people are still without these services).
What these infrastructural improvements
brought was a few hundred temporary jobs
with some villagers working a week each
in order to give others a chance, although
the majority have not yet had any work.
The number of jobs said to be provided by
the road building projects might therefore
not be a true indication of the level of
employment provided.
Another problem relating to jobs was
the way people were hired: the local elite –
including business people and political
activists – took control of job allocations.
When a Working for Water project50
started in Mkambati Nature Reserve, the
SDI committee decided to draw workers
from all the administrative areas under
Thaweni Tribal Authority. Ten people per
area were hired to work for one month
each in the four-month project. The pay
was R25 per day, a standard rate for short-
term employment in government projects
in the area at that time. In Khanyayo it was
decided that since there were so few
vacancies, only the very poor, particularly
widows, should be given the opportunities.
However, in the end it was the wives of
political activists and committee members
who got the jobs. In addition to this, a few
worked for more than the one month that
was agreed upon locally. This raised
questions among other villagers, especially
those who never got an opportunity to
work.
Conclusion
There are at least three main lessons that
can be drawn from the Mkambati case
study. The first is that existing conflict in
the area shows that people were aware of
benefits that came with holding rights to a
piece of land. For the Khanyayo it was
mainly for the benefit of grazing their
cattle, but also the collection of a range of
natural resources from Tracor and the
reserve, that they fought for their land
rights. When the SDI was introduced to the
area, their reasons for seeking ownership
of the land became more complex. They
also realised that land gives them bargain-
ing power. Not that they did not know this
before, but the SDI was promising to
present them with opportunities they never
had before including negotiating with
wealthy investors who were interested in
their land. It would therefore be incorrect
to think that villagers, who are poor and
uneducated, do not make the link between
land rights and benefits in a changing
socio-economic environment.
Secondly, current activities of the elite
with regard to development in the area can
provide lessons for the future. It is clear
that in the face of limited opportunities, the
elite will do everything in its power to
maximise its own gain. If opportunities
were greater in number, there is no reason
to assume these would not also be cap-
tured by the local elite. There is little to
counter the power of this group and gov-
ernment is failing to protect the interests of
the poor, although the developments are
specifically intended to benefit this group.
Thirdly, although the Wild Coast SDI is
not fully implemented in the area, it is
making an impact on livelihoods evi-
denced by the conflict over land, animos-
ity between people living in the same
village, and the large numbers of youth
waiting in the village for jobs. Even the
elite is negatively affected as investments
made in anticipation of reaping benefits
from the SDI are not bearing fruit.
Notes
42 Cape Town Archives-1 LSK 177 file
N2/7/3/13.
43 Cape Town Archives-1 LSK 177 file
N2/7/3/13.
44 Foresters of the Transkeian territories
were initially reluctant to endorse the
use of this area as a leper reserve for
the same reasons. They even recom-
mended the construction of a fence to
prevent the lepers from destroying the
dune forests, although this was never
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done. (Cape Town Archives – 1 LSK
177 file N2/7/3/13).
45 These were harvested between 1998
and 1999.
46 An indigenous breed.
47 Member of the Executive Committee
of the province.
48 Interview with a village elder,
Ngwenyeni, Khanyayo, 13 November
1999.
49 This information is from the guards
themselves and was not confirmed
with other sources.
50 A national Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry programme to
protect water resources by removing
alien vegetation.
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The real reasons for stalled
implementation
This study has largely focused on how
shortcomings in the process of implemen-
tation have resulted in delays of the Wild
Coast SDI. However, before drawing
lessons related to the process of the SDI, I
need to point out that this study was not
blind to a larger problem of the SDI stra-
tegy. It is not my intention to leave an
impression that if the process issues, as
presented in this conclusion, are resolved,
then the Wild Coast SDI would achieve its
goals. While resolving these process issues
would go a long way towards smoothing
the implementation of this programme, a
major stumbling block is the conceptual
model of the SDI.
The ‘growth = development’ paradigm
implicit in the SDI programme is widely
believed to be without merit (Kepe et al.
2001; Marais 1998). Unequal distribution
of assets in poor (rural) areas, and the
heavy reliance on leveraging private sector
investment into poor areas are just two of
the challenges that were never likely to be
resolved within the time-frame the SDI
allowed itself. The SDI plan was thus
conceptually limited from the start. Current
delays in the implementation of the stra-
tegy, therefore, are likely to be permanent
unless there is serious rethinking of the
conceptual model on which the SDI is
based. This said, even if the SDI was based
on a workable conceptual model, process
issues would still be crucial to its imple-
mentation.
Information and consultation
One of the key reasons for the failure of
the SDI to gain popular support is the way
in which information about the project has
been conveyed. As this study shows, one
of the main limitations on getting potential
beneficiaries to participate in the planning
and implementation of SDI activities was
the lack of adequate information. This
shortcoming was found to result from the
Chapter Nine:
Stalled development initiatives:
Lessons from the Wild Coast SDI
Introduction
This study has sought to analyse an attempt by government to revitalise
the rural economy of the Wild Coast area by promoting private sector
investment through the Spatial Development Initiative. More specifically
it attempted to analyse the process of implementation of the SDI and
land reform (for example, conflict resolution, consultation and inter-
departmental co-ordination). These issues are explored in detail in three
areas which are investment nodes of the Wild Coast SDI, namely Port
St Johns, Magwa and Mkambati. From observing the impact of the
Wild Coast SDI on rural livelihoods and social life in these areas, several
lessons have emerged, and these are discussed below.
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poorly-executed communication strategy
of the Wild Coast SDI. The use of prima-
rily urban-based facilitators seriously
inhibited the project because of their lack
of experience and credibility in rural areas.
Furthermore, the facilitators were them-
selves short of adequate information about
the programme. The little information they
did have was not disseminated adequately
due to a combination of lack of support
from the government and poor choices on
the part of the facilitators with regard to
channels of communication, venues of
meetings and so forth. At times the inap-
propriateness of the methods of dissemina-
tion encouraged conflict, rather than
participation in the SDI.
Government departments not involved
in the planning of the SDI but whose
involvement in the programme was crucial
(for example, DLA), also experienced
problems in gaining adequate information.
Public support for the SDIs was also
hampered by the secrecy surrounding
implementation plans, which particularly
affected researchers and journalists. It is
argued here that SDI outcomes could be
improved if the information strategy is
improved. The SDI team could also benefit
from making use of the detailed empirical
research conducted by independent people
and institutions in the project areas of the
Wild Coast.
The land question
The land question has turned out to be a
primary factor explaining the slow imple-
mentation of the Wild Coast SDI. This
report has shown how the delays in the
implementation of land reform in the
former bantustans have been problematic
for the SDI. Tenure reform and restitution
have been the most relevant to date in the
areas targeted for development. The
introduction of the Wild Coast SDI encour-
aged numerous fresh land claims and in
certain areas intensified conflict around
competing claims to land. With the Re-
gional Land Claims Commission strug-
gling to deal with rural claims (Turner &
Ibsen 2000), very few claims have been
resolved amicably.
The discussion on the three case study
areas shows how the Wild Coast SDI
attempted to influence the course of the
restitution process by promising economic
development (uphuhliso) in exchange for
withdrawal of claims or acceptance of
alternative compensation by rural clai-
mants. Instead of helping to fast-track the
land claim process in SDI areas, these
alternative measures resulted in conflicts
between those villagers who wanted the
process to take its course and those who
‘would rather have jobs’.
Government also appears unable to
decide how tenure rights to communal
land should be held; whether it should be
by individuals, community trusts, compa-
nies, ‘tribes’ or traditional authorities. At
present traditional authorities are exploit-
ing the state’s indecision over how tenure
rights should be held in order to bolster
their claim for control of communal areas
(Ntsebeza 2000). In areas where opposi-
tion to traditional authorities holding land
rights is more visible (for example, in areas
of Lusikisiki), there are more problems for
the SDI. One of the major problems for
both restitution and tenure is the uncer-
tainty about who should enter negotiations
about land with investors. The proposal
that the Minister of Land Affairs should
enter into negotiations with investors on
behalf of rural people is unlikely to satisfy
all interested parties. These emerging land
problems with the SDI highlight the need
for land rights to be clarified ahead of any
investment or intervention that is targeting
land in the former bantustans.
Another lesson offered by the land
situation is that the SDI and any other
development intervention targeting former
bantustans should be preceded by tho-
rough situational analysis. Where such a
situational analysis is conducted, it should
not only serve as a mere fulfilment of a
requirement; the findings should be used,




The problems relating to the land question
also affect SDI benefits to people in the
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Wild Coast area. The SDI has always
insinuated that benefits from its projects
will be strongly linked to land ownership,
hence the fierce conflict over land experi-
enced in most parts of the Wild Coast. Yet
the SDI operates on ill-defined notions of
‘community’ (Kepe 1999). In most cases,
the SDI is comfortable with a narrow
geographical concept of ‘community’,
with little sensitivity to historical divisions
or associations. However, when the reali-
ties on the ground prove to be incompat-
ible with this definition, the SDI has found
it easy to shift, generally favouring those
with the strongest voice. This in turn
results in power struggles at local level as
was seen in the Port St Johns and
Mkambati case study areas.
In many cases, the question of who
benefits from what development within the
SDI depends on who represents whom and
in what forum. The politics of representa-
tion are not unique to the Wild Coast SDI,
they are a worldwide problem. Within the
SDI, people strive to be on the different
committees, hoping that when benefits
come, they and their chosen ones will be
the first to benefit. It is clear from the study
that party politics and the influence of
traditional authorities undermine transpa-
rency and fairness. In Mkambati and Port
St Johns the role played by party politics
has given the SDI a very bad name. People
who do not support the ruling party feel
sidelined and the SDI appears to turn a
blind eye to this. At the same time, people
are using political parties to strengthen
their claims. In Magwa area the Mpondo
king seems to enjoy unqualified support
from government structures and this opens
up an opportunity for him to personally
gain from development ventures.
With little implementation having taken
place thus far, the SDI still has an opportu-
nity to seek proper advice on how SDI
benefits should be shared, taking into
consideration history and the present status
quo. In listening to the locals it would have
to deal cautiously with the existing power
imbalances.
The environment
With the Wild Coast being targeted mainly
because of its beauty, the environment has
become central to the SDI project. Chapter
3 of this report highlighted the range of
views on how the Wild Coast environment
should be managed. However, certain
issues have been non-negotiable. For
instance, in areas where there were land
claims within nature reserves the SDI, with
support from other government depart-
ments, made it clear that changing land use
on land on which there is a claim is out of
the question. These nature reserves are
seen as the main attraction for ecotourists
in the area. This approach has led to
questions about the constitutional rights of
individual claimants.
The SDI itself has been charged with
environmental insensitivity in some of its
proposed projects. Proposals to build high-
rise buildings and toll-roads or to encou-
rage commercial forestry in environmen-
tally-sensitive areas has damaged the
credibility of the programme. In addition
to this, most of the environmental studies
commissioned by the SDI on these sites
ignored patterns of local use of natural
resources and were conducted within the
SDI’s overall framework of ‘fast-tracking’.
Within the fast-track process, the fact that
development is really about people seems
to have been lost and the need for a liveli-




Inter-departmental co-operation is essential
in projects of the magnitude of the SDI.
This was, however, shown to be lacking in
the Wild Coast SDI, in particular with
regard to the relationship between the DLA
and the SDI team. In addition the SDI
organisers noted that:
complications exist in situations
where a programme (SDI) requires
specific feed stocks (local govern-
ance, environment, infrastructure,
etc.) that fall outside the competency
of the driving department (DTI51 )
(Mahlati 1999).
In the absence of such co-ordination,
conflicting plans were commonplace, as
was seen in the conflict over dune-mining
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at Wavecrest, a Wild Coast ecological
hotspot.
Rural livelihoods
The Wild Coast SDI is aimed at improving
rural livelihoods, yet five years on from
inception there are few signs that this goal
will be met in the near future. The case
studies demonstrate that a high level of
expectation exists, and local people are
keen to participate in future developments.
So far, the prospect of development prom-
ised by the SDI has led to people turning
down work in other areas (as in the case of
sugar-cane workers), investing in idle
infrastructure and services (such as trans-
port), and committing their time to com-
mittee activities before their daily liveli-
hood work (for example, in agriculture).
The SDI should be cautious about
promising more than can be delivered and
should ensure that, in its enthusiasm to
derive benefits from the programme,
people do not neglect their other sources
of livelihood. The diverse and complex
livelihood strategies of rural people should
inform the efforts of the SDI team, particu-
larly as opportunities in new ventures such
as tourism are likely to supplement, rather
than replace, existing economic activities.
Notes
51 The national Department of Trade and
Industry in which the SDIs are based.
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